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Abstract 
In the wake of the financial crisis, public and private investment has stagnated due to 
loss of confidence and austerity policies. The supply side for investment is complex, with 
the boundaries between public and private often blurred. The overall landscape varies 
widely between countries, but is characterised by the growing importance of national 
promotional banks (NPBs) in economic development. Carefully calibrated financial 
instruments, often provided through NPBs, can provide sustainable support for revenue-
generating / saving projects in areas like SME support, R&D&I and energy efficiency 
where market imperfections result in suboptimal levels of investment. The uptake of ESI 
Fund co-financed FIs has increased in 2014-20, but remains focused on loan-based SME 
support. The regulatory framework for ESIF co-financed FIs has improved, especially 
through mandatory ex ante assessments, but the implementation of FIs remains 
challenging for Managing Authorities, suggesting that more timely guidance, more stable 
rules, and perhaps more µoff-the-shelf¶ instruments would be beneficial. However, the 
plethora of initiatives at domestic and European levels can make WKH),µVFHQH¶GLIILFXOWWR
decipher and quantify. Related, there is evidence of policy competition, pointing to the 
need to rationalise modes of intervention and tailor FIs to the relevant institutional and 
economic context.  
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Executive summary 
Rationales for financial instruments co-financed by the ESI Funds 
The planning and early implementation of EU Cohesion policy for 2014-20 took place in 
the aftermath of the worst financial crisis since the 1930s. The impact of the crisis has 
been both widespread and long-lasting, and, in general, Europe has been slow to 
recover. A key factor in the weakness of the recovery has been the impact of the crisis 
on both public and private investment, in spite of historically low interest rates and high 
levels of liquidity in European capital markets. The prime cause relates to uncertainty, as 
well as systemically low rates of economic activity. However, while there is no longer a 
general problem of access to finance, access to finance remains a serious concern for 
certain market segments ± notably SMEs and infrastructure.  
Both private and public sources play an important role in the supply of finance, but are 
not always easy to distinguish. In many EU Member States, the public sector has long 
been involved in the supply of FIs to pursue policy goals. The role of national promotional 
banks became more prominent during the economic crisis, and has continued to grow. 
Promotional banks can provide FIs directly, but most frequently operate indirectly, often 
through commercial banks. EU-level sources of funding are also increasingly channelled 
through these domestic sources. 
The justification for public intervention in economic development policy is to support 
activities that market operators cannot or will not undertake alone, but which are 
FRQVLGHUHG LQ WKH ZLGHU SXEOLF LQWHUHVW 7KLV LV VRPHWLPHV FKDUDFWHULVHG DV µPDUNHW
IDLOXUH¶EXWLQIDFWFDQDULVHLQVLWXDWLRQVZKHUHWKHUHVLPSO\LVQRPDUNHWand the private 
sector is operating quite rationally, or where the market is imperfect and operating sub-
optimally. These include the provision of public goods, the supply of merit goods, the 
presence of externalities and imperfect information in financial markets. Not all of these 
types of market imperfection can be addressed using FIs. 
Financial instruments offer some advantages over non-repayable instruments (such as 
sustainability and cost-effectiveness), but must be tailored to circumstances and 
ultimately can only be used where the investment is income-generating, enabling the 
initial support to be repaid.  In considering forms of intervention and rationales for FIs, it 
is worth noting that WKH WHUP µILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQW¶ HQFRPSDVVHVYHU\GLYHUVH ILQDQcial 
products that differ considerably in terms of their suitability for different targets, their 
implications for recipients and their modes of governance.  
In terms of the rationale for using co-financed instruments in Cohesion policy, these are 
very much context-driven, reflecting the scale and focus of OPs, the appetite to 
experiment with forms of finance not widely used in domestic policy, as well as the wider 
domestic financial context. 
Evaluation evidence of effectiveness of co-funded FIs is thin and has focused on co-
funded FIs for enterprise support; there is little evidence of a revolving effect or 
anticipated levels of private sector participation. However, there is some evidence of FIs 
having helped achieve OP objectives, in particular by increasing access to finance ± one 
of the main rationales for using FIs in 2007-13 ERDF OPs. Transferability of lessons on 
where FIs are most effective is limited by the context-specific nature of FI 
implementation: evidence suggests that FIs are most effective where tailored to specific 
UHJLRQDORUQDWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVDVWKHUHLVQRVXFFHVVIXO µRQHVL]HILWVDOO¶DSSURDFK. 
Models are seldom transferable without modification to take local, regional or national 
circumstances into account. This can include differences in local economic conditions, in 
banking and legal systems, previous experience with implementation of FIs etc. 
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The learning curve of FI implementation over several programming periods provides 
some evidence of the conditions which support effective FI implementation. FIs are most 
effective: 
x When they are based on an accurate assessment of the market situation  
x where there is flexibility and an ability to respond to change  
x ZKHUHWKHUHDUHVDIHJXDUGVDJDLQVWµREMHFWLYHGULIW¶ 
x where they build on previous experience  
x aid is well-focused and related to the programme strategy. 
The use of financial instruments co-financed by ERDF, Cohesion Fund, ESF and 
EMFF in 2014-20 
According to indicative data in the Operational Programmes (OPs), Member States 
planned to almost double their spend on financial instruments, from Structural Funds 
resources committed RIDURXQG¼1.4 billion in 2007-WRDURXQG¼ELOOLRQLQ-
20. Plans vary very widely, with four Member States planning to commit more than four 
times 2007-13 levels (NL, PT, RO, SI), and others planning to reduce or even cease using 
FIs. Some Member States plan to commit more than 8 percent of OP contributions in the 
form of FIs (BG, HU, LT, NL, PT, SI and UK). However, under many OPs, the design and 
implementation of financial instruments remains in a state of flux and the final outcomes 
are likely to differ from OP plans in significant respects. Changes in plans for FIs are also 
affected by the outcomes of the ex ante assessments. 
In 2007-13, the use of financial instruments was mainly the preserve of the European 
Regional Development Fund. All Member States that used FIs used the ERDF to co-
finance them, with seven also using the European Social Fund. Six Member States used 
the European Fisheries Fund for financial instruments. The Cohesion Fund could not be 
used for financial instruments in 2007-13. In 2014-20, planned FI allocations remain 
predominantly under ERDF, but usage of the ESF and EMFF has also increased - the 
overall increase in the planned use of EU resources for FIs under the ERDF and the ESF is 
broadly the same (approaching double). 
Analysis of spending plans for FIs shows that more than half of planned FI spend (52 
percent) is targeted at SMEs (Thematic Objective 3). A further 17 percent each is aimed 
at research and innovation (Thematic Objective 1) and low carbon (Thematic Objective 
4). This means that around 87 percent of all FI spend is planned for these three 
objectives.  
Some 157 or just over half of ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Fund OPs allocate funds for 
financial instruments (excluding Interreg programmes, where no OP included plans for 
using FIs). However, the scale of planned financial instruments varies extremely widely 
both in absolute terms and in terms of importance within the relevant OP. Fourteen OPs 
KDYH SODQQHG VSHQGLQJ H[FHHGLQJ ¼P FROOHFWLYHO\ WKHVH DFFRXQW IRU  SHUcent of 
planned FI spend. Twenty-seven OPs plan to allocate more than 20 percent of resources 
to FIs. Only five EMFF OPs have definite plans for FIs in 2014-IRUZKLFKDURXQG¼
million has been earmarked. In addition to the above six Member States have or plan to 
implement SME Initiative OPs (BG, ES, IT, FI, MT and RO).  
Progress in implementation also varies markedly within and between countries. Many 
Member States are still at quite an early stage in FI implementation (although the picture 
is continually changing and developing). A significant number of ex ante assessments 
have been completed (an estimated 143 at the time of writing). The approaches taken to 
these have been very varied, with some Managing Authorities undertaking ex ante 
assessments in blocks or stages, and other undertaking updates of existing studies. In 
addition, ex antes assessments may have been undertaken at Fund level (e.g. for ERDF) 
either within one OP or across several, for all funds within an OP, for specific instruments 
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or financial products already envisaged or for specific Thematic Objectives. At the time of 
writing, few FIs were operational ± those which were tended to build on previous 
experience, and largely address support for enterprises.  
Practical, legal and administrative issues in the use of financial instruments co-
financed by the funds 
According to the research carried out for the study, the views of Managing Authorities on 
the advantages and disadvantages of different form of support (grants vs FIs) are not 
primarily conceived in terms of pros and cons, but rather in terms of the type project for 
which they are most suitable. Different forms of support suit different project types ± 
MAs view SME development (TO3), low carbon economy (TO4) and research and 
innovation (TO1) as most appropriate for FIs. 
The key disadvantage of grants is perceived by the MAs to be their lack of sustainability 
and the risk of creating a subsidy culture, while the key disadvantage of financial 
instruments is considered to be their administrative complexity. FIs are considered by 
MAs to be harder to administer than grants due to lack of experience, the quality of the 
regulatory framework and the associated administrative burden, although financial 
intermediaries can lessen the administrative burden of FIs. Some MAs also consider that, 
for final recipients, the administrative burden of FIs is lower than grants.  
Value for money has been a growing concern in public policy for many years, and this 
has led many to question the role of grants to promote economic and social 
development. Indeed, the notion that financial instruments provide better value for 
money because sums are repaid and reinvested is one of the key arguments put forward 
by the Commission for their use. However, value for money is not intrinsic to the form of 
support - sometimes grants can offer better value for money than FIs, because of 
administration costs. Among the arguments for financial instruments is that their 
economic impact can be greater not only because funds are recycled and support more 
projects, but also because the use of repayable funding can improve project quality. FIs 
are perceived by MAs to have economic impacts on several levels and sometimes for less 
outlay than grants.  
7KH WHUP µILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQW¶ KDV EHFRPH D µFDWFK DOO¶ IRU IRUPV RI VXSSRUW WKDW DUH
repayable, unlike grants. In practice, however, this term encompasses a variety of forms 
which may have little in common with one another. The choice of financial product by 
MAs is driven primarily by the outcome of the ex ante assessment.  
The relationship between different forms of support (grants, FIs etc.) is important - 
unless the various instruments are appropriately tailored to meet policy and market 
requirements, and dovetailed with one another, there are risks that measures compete, 
overlap or leave some needs unmet. Competition or overlaps between forms of finance 
can be minimised by appropriate programme design. 
Some Managing Authorities do not plan to use FIs at all, whereas others use or plan to 
use them under some, or even all, Thematic Objectives. The survey of Managing 
Authorities sought to understand why financial instruments had not been used. Overall 
the main stated reasons for not using FIs is their unsuitability for planned projects (e.g. 
non-revenue-generating); however, under TO3 and TO4, where FIs are most used, the 
main reason given for not using FIs is the perceived lack of demand among final 
recipients.   
In the 2014-20 Regulations, the Commission introduced the option for MAs to use 
template FIs which comply with standard terms and conditions (off-the-shelf). The 
template models are intended to facilitate FI set up; if the template is adhered to, MAs 
are assured of the compliance of the proposed FIs across a range of regulatory issues, 
including selection of financial intermediaries, funding agreements, State aid and 
Improving the take-up and effectiveness of Financial Instruments 
xiv 
management costs and fees. Views on off-the-shelf FIs are broadly positive, but uptake 
has been low due to timing of the Regulation and a desire for greater domestic flexibility. 
,Q VRPH FDVHV WKH 276 LQVWUXPHQWV KDYH EHHQ XVHG DV µLQVSLUDWLRQ¶ WR GHVLJQ ILQDO
products tailored more closely to local needs.  
The 2014-20 Regulations underpinning the use of FIs are a step change from those 
applicable in 2007-13, partly in response to Member State concern at the absence of 
detail and lack of clarity in those rules in the previous planning period. The general 
perception of Managing Authorities on the new legislative framework is rather mixed, 
though it is fair to say that it is generally found to be challenging. Some Managing 
Authorities were positive on the new Regulations, and the obligatory ex ante assessment 
is viewed very positively; however the view that the Regulations could be improved was 
more widespread. A key area of concern is the uncertainty associated with the scope for 
interpretation.  
The legislative framework for financial instruments in 2014-20 has been characterised by 
considerably increased emphasis on support, notably through fi-compass, and on written 
guidance issued by the Commission. Nevertheless, a significant number of Managing 
Authorities think that more guidance is needed in certain areas, and three main issues 
were identified:  
x timing: there has often been a significant gap between the regulation being issued 
and guidance being available 
x tailoring: many MAs consider the guidance to be too general for their needs, and 
often too theoretical or lacking in practical examples and would like more, and more 
effective, direct contact with the Commission on their specific needs 
x status: the impact the guidance can have on audit, and the perception that the 
Commission sometimes applies stricter rules in the guidance than is implied by the 
regulations themselves.  
In considering what changes to the legislative context might facilitate the use or take-up 
of FIs, identified factors include changes to the State aid rules, simplification, improved 
communication with the Commission, training, information and advice. 
The relationship between ERDF, Cohesion Fund, ESF and EMFF FIs and EU-level 
instruments and EFSI 
ESI Funds are part of a complex landscape of funding mechanisms, including from 
private and public, domestic and EU-funded sources and at regional, national and EU 
levels. MAs can contribute ESIF resources to joint instruments such as the SME Initiative, 
and may also seek complementarities with other EU-level instruments (often managed by 
the EIB Group). The CPR makes specific reference to the possibility of contributing (ERDF 
and EAFRD) resources to the SME initiative. This enables MAs to contribute resources to 
FIs set up at EU level. So far, uptake of the initiative has been fairly limited; only 
Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Malta, Spain and Romania have signed up to it. Part of the 
explanation for limited uptake may be contextual changes: the scheme was introduced to 
address liquidity problems in banks but these have been less severe than expected.  
There is also a wider set of centrally managed EU-level FIs with which there are 
potentially important synergies with Cohesion policy activities, including COSME, which 
aims to improve access to finance for SMEs through loan guarantees and equity; 
InnovFin, the Horizon 2020 equity sharing and risk sharing instruments for innovative 
SMEs, and the Connecting Europe Facility, which provides finance for energy, transport 
and digital projects. Another development at EU level is the introduction of the European 
Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), which was set up by the European Commission 
and the European Investment Bank as the cornerstone of the new Investment Plan for 
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Europe. The Commission published guidance on ensuring coordination, synergies and 
complementarity between the two sources of funds in April 2016. 
The relationship between ESI Fund FIs and other EU instruments of various kinds is not 
well understood by MAs, although where an ex ante assessment has been completed,  
MAs are better able to form an opinion about the relationships between ESIF FIs and 
other instruments. These MAs are more likely to perceive there to be competition 
between ESIF FIs and other instruments than those MAs where no ex ante has been 
done, and there are concerns about the relationship between ESIF FIs and other EU 
sources of finance. This concerns, in particular the competitiveness of ESIF FIs and the 
perception that these are disadvantaged compared to other EU funding sources due to 
the State aid rules, and to some extent procurement issues. Financial intermediaries 
generally had a more comprehensive perspective on funding sources, but often agreed 
that the landscape was crowded and confusing. There are also potential overlaps 
between ESIF and EFSI supported FIs, and while some think there are opportunities for 
synergies, most consider these to be highly challenging. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
The aim of the final section of the report is to provide conclusions on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the legislative framework established at EU level for the use of financial 
instruments, and to identify specific recommendations for possible improvements and 
options for the future regarding the legal framework and the uptake of financial 
instruments co-financed by ERDF, Cohesion Fund, ESF and EMFF.  
The recommendations arising from the study are essentially threefold: 
First, there is a need to reappraise the role of Cohesion policy FIs against the backdrop of 
an increasingly complex intervention landscape. Cohesion policy FIs have specific 
strengths, such as their capacity to adapt to regional conditions or help develop local 
financial markets, but the regulatory aspects of Cohesion policy FIs are onerous 
FRPSDUHG WR PDQ\ KRUL]RQWDO DQG (8 OHYHO LQLWLDWLYHV DQG ZKLOH µV\QHUJLHV¶ between 
different initiatives have become the µholy grail¶ of policy implementation, their 
achievement demands significant administrative capacity. 
Second, there is a compelling case for increased regulatory stability. In both the 2007-13 
and 2014-20 policy cycles, discussions about the effectiveness of financial instruments 
have been dominated by issues of compliance and process, rather than policy design and 
a focus on µwhat works and in what circumstances¶ to address specific economic 
development objectives. 
Last and related, there is a case for refocusing guidance. The increased support provided 
has been widely appreciated, but Managing Authorities have been critical of its timing, 
and its status in relation to audit requirements. More specifically, if FIs are to be more 
widely used in areas where there is limited experience, more tailored support and 
exchange of best practice is needed.  
The broad thrust of the recommendations outlined above is to consolidate, coordinate 
and stabilise the regulatory framework for financial instruments and to support the 
development of administrative capacity in Managing Authorities. Of course, it is also 
possible to countenance more radical options for increasing the uptake and effectiveness 
of financial instruments. These could include limiting the implementation of FIs to so-
called off-the-shelf models, requiring the use of EU level instruments, ring-fencing a 
proportion of operational programme allocations for FIs, using only grants under share 
management, or imposing a presumption in favour of FIs by requiring explicit 
justification for the use of grants in support of productive investment. In practice, the 
most effective way forward is likely to lie in combining elements of these options, and 
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taking a more nuanced approach that takes account of past experience. In other words, 
incremental approach to policy change and supporting the uptake of FIs ± building on 
policy experience, learning and the development of administrative capacity, but adjusting 
policy to maximise the benefits from elements that have or could work well. The use of 
co-financed FIs has involved the build-up of administrative capacity and of the policy 
networks needed to facilitate their use. Regulatory stability is essential to consolidate this 
experience and to enable the focus to shift away from procedural challenges and to 
concentrate on the substantive change that FIs can induce. For this, more and better 
information is needed to enable a fine-grained analysis of which co-financed financial 
products work and why: concrete evidence of how and where FIs can be effective, and 
PRGHOVRIµVXFFHVV¶ZRXOGSURYLGHFRPSHOOLQJUHDsons to increase their uptake. 
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Résumé 
 
Les fondements des instruments financiers cofinancés par les Fonds ESI.  
/DSUpSDUDWLRQHWOHVGpEXWVGHODPLVHHQ°XYUHGHODSROLWLTXHGH&RKpVLRQSRXU-
20 ont eu lieu à la suite de la pire crise financière depuis les années 1930. La crise a eu 
un impact à la fois large et durable, et la reprise en Europe a en général été lente. Un 
IDFWHXU FOp GH OD IDLEOHVVH GH OD UHSULVH D pWp O¶LPSDFW GH OD FULVH VXU O¶LQYHVWLVVHPHQW
public mais aussi privé, en dépit de taux G¶LQWpUrWVKLVWRULTXHPHQWEDVHWGHQLYHDX[GH
liquidités élevés sur les marchés de capitaux européens. La cause première est liée au 
climat G¶LQFHUWLWXGH DLQVL TXH GHV WDX[ G¶DFWLYLWp pFRQRPLTXH V\VWpPDWLTXHPHQW EDV
&HSHQGDQW DORUV TX¶LO Q¶\ D SOXV GH SUREOqPHJpQpUDO G¶DFFqV DX ILQDQFHPHQW FHOXL-ci 
demeure une inquiétude dans certains secteurs du marché ± notamment pour les PME et 
les infrastructures.  
/HVUHVVRXUFHVSULYpHVHWSXEOLTXHVMRXHQWXQU{OHLPSRUWDQWGDQVO¶RIIUHGHILQDQFHPHQW
mais ne sont pas toujours faciles à distinguer O¶XQH GH O¶DXWUH. Dans plusieurs Etats 
PHPEUHV GH O¶8( OH VHFWHXU SXEOLF est depuis longtemps impliqué GDQV O¶RIIUH
G¶LQVWUXPHQWV ILQDQFLHUV j OD SRXUVXLWH G¶REMHFWLIV GH SROLWLTXH SXEOLTXH /H U{OH GHV
banques nationales de développement est devenu plus proéminent pendant la crise 
économique, et a continué à grandir. Les banques de développement peuvent mettre 
directement à disposition des instruments financiers (IF), mais la plupart du temps les 
gèrent indirectement, souvent via des banques commerciales. Les sources de 
ILQDQFHPHQW DX QLYHDX GH O¶8( VRQW pJDOHPHQW GH SOXV HQ SOXV DFKHPLQpHV YLD FHV
canaux nationaux.  
/D MXVWLILFDWLRQ GH O¶LQWHUYHQWLRQ SXEOLTXH GDQV OHV SROLWLTXes de développement 
économique repose sur le soutien aux activités que les opérateurs de marchés ne 
peuvent ou ne veulent pas entreprendre seuls, mais qui sont tout de même considérées 
FRPPH pWDQW G¶LQWpUrW SXEOLF &HFL HVW SDUIRLV LGHQWLILp FRPPH XQH © défaillance du 
marché », mais peut en réaliWpDYRLUOLHXGDQVXQHVLWXDWLRQRLOQ¶\DVLPSOHPHQWSDVGH
marché existant et où le secteur privé agit de façon rationnelle, ou bien quand la 
situation de marché est imparfaite et génère un équilibre sous-optimal. Cela inclut la 
production de biens pubOLFV OD SURGXFWLRQ GH ELHQV G¶LQWpUrW VRFLDO OD SUpVHQFH
G¶H[WHUQDOLWpVHWGHVLQIRUPDWLRQVLPSDUIDLWHVVXUOHPDUFKp7RXWHVFHVLPSHUIHFWLRQVGH
marché ne peuvent pas être FRUULJpHVSDUO¶XWLOLVDWLRQG¶LQVWUXPHQWVILQDQFLHUV 
Les instruments financiers offrent certains avantages par rapport aux instruments de 
soutien non-remboursables (comme leur soutenabilité, et leur efficacité-coût), mais 
doivent être adaptés aux circonstances, et ne peuvent être utilisés que pour des 
investissements qui génèrent des profits, permettant alors le remboursement du soutien 
LQLWLDO(QFRQVLGpUDQWOHVGLIIpUHQWHVIRUPHVG¶LQWHUYHQWLRQVHWORJLTXHVGHVIF, il est utile 
de noter que le terme G¶« instrument financier » comprend un ensemble divers de 
produits financiers, qui diffèrent considérablement en termes de pertinence selon les 
FLEOHVG¶LPSOLFDWLRQVSRXUOHVbénéficiaires finaux, et de modes de gouvernance.  
Concernant les motivations expliquant le recours aux instruments financiers cofinancés 
dans le cadre de la poliWLTXH GH &RKpVLRQ GH O¶8( FHOOHV-ci sont particulièrement 
GpSHQGDQWHV GX FRQWH[WH HQ IRQFWLRQ GH O¶pFKHOOH HW GX IRFXV GHV 32 de la volonté 
G¶H[SpULPHQWHU de nouvelles formes de financement peu développées dans les politiques 
nationales et infranationales, ou encore plus largement du contexte financier national.  
Les preuves isVXHVGHWUDYDX[G¶pYDOXDWLRQVVXU O¶HIILFDFLWpGHFHVLQVWUXPHQWVILQDQFLHUV
cofinancés sont minces, et principalement concentrées sur le soutien aux entreprises. Il 
existe peu G¶Lnformations sur les taux de remboursement et de réinvestissement, ou sur 
le niveau de participation du secteur privé. Cependant, certains éléments indiquent que 
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les instruments financiers ont contribué aux objectifs des PO, en particulier concernant 
un meiOOHXU DFFqV DX ILQDQFHPHQW O¶XQH GHV SULQFLSDOHV UDLVRQVSUpVLGDQW j O¶XWLOLVDWLRQ
G¶LQVWUXPHQWV ILQDQFLHUV GDQV OHV 32 )('(5 -13. La transférabilité des leçons 
acquises sur les domaines où les instruments financiers sont les plus efficaces est limitée 
par les spécificités FRQWH[WXHOOHV GH OHXU PLVH HQ °XYUH  OHV UHWRXUV G¶pYDOXDWLRQV
VXJJqUHQWTXHOHVLQVWUXPHQWVILQDQFLHUVVRQWOHSOXVHIILFDFHORUVTX¶LOVVRQWDMXVWpVjGHV
FLUFRQVWDQFHVQDWLRQDOHVRX UpJLRQDOHV VSpFLILTXHV HW GRQFTX¶LOQ¶H[LVWHSas de format 
XQLTXH DSSURSULp /HV PRGqOHV GH PLVH HQ °XYUH VRQW UDUHPHQW WUDQVIpUDEOHV VDQV
modification prenant en compte les éléments circonstanciels locaux, régionaux, ou 
nationaux. Cela peut inclure des différences en matière de conditions économiques, de 
V\VWqPHV EDQFDLUHV HW OpJDX[ G¶H[SpULHQFHV SDVVpHV GH OD PLVH HQ °XYUH GHV
instruments financiers etc.  
/DFRXUEHG¶DSSUHQWLVVDJHGHODPLVHHQ°XYUHGHVLQVWUXPHQWVILQDQFLHUVVXUSOXVLHXUV
périodes de programmation fournit des indications sur les conditions qui soutiennent une 
PLVHHQ°XYUHGHVLQVWUXPHQWVILQDQFLHUVHIILFDFH/HVLQVWUXPHQWVVRQWOHSOXVHIILFDFH :  
x Quand ils sont basés une évaluation pertinente de la situation de marché 
x Quand il y a de la flexibilité et une capacité à réagir aux changements 
x Quand il y a des protections contre une déviation des objectifs initialement fixés 
x Quand ils sont construits sur une expérience préalable 
x 4XDQGO¶DLGHHVWELHQFLEOpHHWHQOLHQDYHFODVWUDWpJLHGXSURJUDPPH 
 
Le recours aux instruments financiers cofinancés par le FEDER, le Fonds de 
Cohésion, le FSE et le FEAMP en 2014-20 
Selon les données indicatives des Programmes Opérationnels (PO), les Etats membres 
ont prévu de presque doubler le montant alloué aux instruments financiers, de 11,4 
milliards G¶euros des Fonds Structurels 2007-13 à environ 21 milliards G¶HXURV en 2014-
/HVSUpYLVLRQVYDULHQWVHQVLEOHPHQWDYHFTXDWUH(WDWVPHPEUHVSUpYR\DQWG¶DOORXHU
plus de quatre fois les montants de 2007-1/37526,HWG¶DXWUHVSUpYR\DQWGH
réduLUH RX PrPH G¶LQWHUURPSUH O¶XWLOLVDWLRQ G¶,) &HUWDLQV (WDWV PHPEUHV HQYLVDJHQW
G¶DOORXHUSOXVGHGHVPRQWDQWVGHOHXUV32VRXVIRUPHG¶LQVWUXPHQWVILQDQFLHUV%*
HU, LT, NL, PT, SI, and UK). Néanmoins, dans le cas de plusieurs PO, la conception et la 
PLVH HQ °XYUH G¶LQVWUXPHQWV ILQDQFLHUV UHVWH HQ FRXUV G¶pODERUDWLRQ HW OHV UpVXOWDWV
finaux sont susceptibles de différer des prévisions des OP de façon significative. Les 
FKDQJHPHQWV DSSOLTXpV DX[ SUpYLVLRQV HQ WHUPH G¶LQVWUXPHQWV ILQDQFLHUV VRQW DXVVL
influencés par les résultats des évaluations ex-ante.  
En 2007- O¶XWLOLVDWLRQ GHV LQVWUXPHQWV ILQDQFLHUV pWDLW SULQFLSDOHPHQW O¶DSDQDJH GX
Fonds Européen de Développement Régional. Tous les Etats membres qui ont eu recours 
à des instruments financiers ont mobilisé le FEDER pour les cofinancer, dont sept ont 
également mobilisé le FSE, et six le FEAMP. Le Fonds de Cohésion ne pouvait pas être 
XWLOLVp VRXV OD IRUPH G¶LQVWUXPHQWV ILQDQFLHUV HQ 2007-13. En 2014-20, les allocations 
prévues aux instruments financiers proviennent encore essentiellement du FEDER, mais 
le recours au FSE et au FEAMP a également augmenté ± O¶DXJPHQWDWLRQ JpQpUDOH GH
O¶XWLOLVDWLRQSUpYXHGHUHVVRXUFHVGHO¶8(SRXUOHVLQVWUXPHQWVILQDQFLHUVYLDOH)('(5HW
le FSE est globalement la même (presque doublée).  
/¶DQDO\VH GHV SODQV GH ILQDQFHPHQWV GHV LQVWUXPHQWV ILQDQFLHUVPRQWUH TXH SOXV GH OD
moitié des dépenses prévues (52%) sont orientées vers les PME (Objectif Thématique 3). 
VRQWDOORXpVG¶XQHSDUW j OD UHFKHUFKHHW O¶LQQRYDWLRQ 2bjectif Thématique 1), et 
DXWDQWjO¶pFRQRPLHEDV-carbone (Objectif Thématique 4) 
Quelques 157 PO FEDER, FSE et Fonds de Cohésion, soit un peu plus de la moitié, ont 
alloué des fonds aux instruments financiers (sans compter les programmes Interreg, dont 
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auFXQ QH SUpYRLW G¶XWLOLVHU GHV ,) &HSHQGDQW O¶RUGUH GH JUDQGHXU GHV LQVWUXPHQWV
financiers prévus varie grandement, à la fois en termes absolus et en pourcentage du PO 
concerné. Quatorze PO ont prévu des dépenses excédant 400 millions G¶HXURV ; ceux-ci 
rHSUpVHQWHQW HQ FXPXOp  GHV GpSHQVHV WRWDOHV SUpYXHV VRXV IRUPH G¶LQVWUXPHQWV
ILQDQFLHUV  32 SUpYRLHQW G¶DOORXHU SOXV GH  GH OHXU HQYHORSSH DX[ LQVWUXPHQWV
ILQDQFLHUV 6HXOV  32 )($03 RQW DUUrWp XQ SODQ GpILQLWLI G¶XWLOLVDWLRQ G¶LQVWUXPHQWV
financiers en 2014-SRXU OHVTXHOVPLOOLRQVG¶euros ont été réservés. En outre, six 
(WDWV PHPEUHV RQW PLV HQ °XYUH RX SUpYRLHQW GH PHWWUH HQ °XYUH GHV 32 SRXU
O¶,QLWLDWLYH30(%*(6,7),07DQG52 
/¶DYDQFHPHQW GH OD PLVH HQ °XYUH YDULH pJDOHPHQW QHWtement entre et au sein de 
chaque pays. Plusieurs Etats membres sont toujours engagés dans des stades primaires 
GH PLVH HQ °XYUH ELHQ TXH FHW pWDW GH IDLW VRLW FRQVWDPPHQW HQ PRXYHPHQW HW HQ
SURJUqV8QQRPEUHVLJQLILFDWLIG¶pYDOXDWLRQVH[-ante sont achevées (143 au moment de 
O¶pFULWXUH GH FH UDSSRUW /HV DSSURFKHV FKRLVLHV SDU FHOOHV-ci sont multiples, avec 
certaines Autorités de Gestion organisant les évaluations ex-ante en blocs, ou en étapes, 
SHQGDQWTXHG¶DXWUHVHQWUHSUHQDLHQWGHVPLVHVjMRXUG¶pWXdes existantes. De plus, des 
évaluations ex-DQWHRQWpWpUpDOLVpHVjO¶pFKHOOHGHV)RQGVSDUH[HPSOHSRXUOH)('(5
DXVHLQG¶XQ32RX WUDYHUVSOXVLHXUVSRXU O¶HQVHPEOHGHV IRQGVDXVHLQG¶XQ23SRXU
des instruments spécifiques ou des produits financiers déjà envisagés ou pour des 
2EMHFWLIV 7KpPDWLTXHV VSpFLILTXHV $X PRPHQW GH O¶pFULWXUH GX SUpVHQW UDSSRUW SHX
G¶,QVWUXPHQWV )LQDQFLHUV pWDLHQW RSpUDWLRQQHOV ± FHX[ GpYHORSSpV VXU OD EDVH G¶XQH
expérience préalable, et notamment dans le domaine du soutien aux entreprises.  
/HVSUREOpPDWLTXHVSUDWLTXHVOpJDOHVHWDGPLQLVWUDWLYHVOLpHVjO¶XWLOLVDWLRQGHV
instruments financiers cofinancés par les fonds. 
6HORQ OHV UHFKHUFKHVPHQpHVGDQV OH FDGUHGH ODSUpVHQWHpWXGH O¶DSSUpFLDWLRQSDU OHV
Autorités de Gestion des avantages et inconvénients des différentes formes de soutien 
VXEYHQWLRQVYV LQVWUXPHQWV ILQDQFLHUVQ¶HVWSDVSULRULWDLUHPHQW FRQoXHHQ WHUPHVGH
pour et contre, mais plutôt en termes de type de projets approprié. A différentes formes 
de soutien correspondent différents types de projets ± les AG considèrent le 
GpYHORSSHPHQW GHV 30( 27 O¶pFRQRPLH EDV-carbone (OT4), et la recherche et 
O¶LQQRYDWLRQ27FRPPHOHVGRPDLQHVOHVSOXVDGDSWpVDX[LQVWUXPHQWVILQDQFLHUV 
Le principal inconvénient des subventions, selon les AG, consiste en leur manque de 
VRXWHQDELOLWp HW OH ULVTXH TX¶HOOHV FRPSRUWHQW GH FUpHU XQH µFXOWXUH GH OD VXEYHQWLRQ¶
tandis que le principal inconvénient des instruments financiers réside dans leur 
complexité administrative. Les IF sont considérés par les AG comme plus complexes à 
DGPLQLVWUHUTXH OHV VXEYHQWLRQV HQ UDLVRQG¶XQPDQTXHG¶H[SpULHQFHGH ODTXDOLWpGX
cadre réglementaire, et de la charge administrative qui y est associée, bien que les 
intermédiaires financiers permHWWHQW SDUIRLV G¶HQ UpGXLUH OH SRLGV &HUWDLQHV $*
considèrent par ailleurs que la charge administrative des IF est inférieure à celle des 
subventions pour les bénéficiaires finaux.  
/HWHUPHG¶© instrument financier » est devenu un attrape-tout pour toutes les formes de 
soutien remboursable, à la différence des subventions. En pratique cependant, le terme 
FRPSUHQG XQH YDULpWp GH IRUPHV TXL RQW SDUIRLV SHX j YRLU HQWUH HOOHV /H FKRL[ G¶XQ
produit financier par une AG est en premier lieu motivé par le résulWDWGHO¶pYDOXDWLRQH[-
ante.  
La relation entre différentes formes de soutien (subventions, IF, etc) est importante - à 
moins que les divers instruments soient correctement adaptés aux exigences de la 
politique menée et du marché, et articulés entre eux, il existe des risques que les 
PHVXUHVPLVHVHQ°XYUHHQWUHQWHQFRQFXUUHQFHVHFKHYDXFKHQWRXELHQODLVVHQWGHV
besoins insatisfaits. La concurrence ou le chevauchement entre des formes de 
financement peut être minimisé grâce à une conception adéquate du programme.  
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&HUWDLQHV$XWRULWpVGH*HVWLRQQHSUpYRLHQWSDVG¶XWLOLVHUG¶,)GXWRXWDORUVTXHG¶DXWUHV
\ RQW UHFRXUV RX SUpYRLHQW G¶\ UHFRXULU SRXU FHUWDLQV YRLUH WRXV OHV 2EMHFWLIV
Thématiques. Le sondage des Autorités de Gestion cherchait à comprendre pourquoi les 
LQVWUXPHQWV ILQDQFLHUV Q¶DYDLHQW SDV pWp PRELOLVpV 'DQV O¶HQVHPEOH OHV SULQFLSDOHV
raisons énoncées pour expliquer le non-recours aux IF concernent leur inadéquation avec 
les projets planifiés (e.g ne générant pas de revenus) ; néanmoins, dans le cadre des 
OT3 et OT4, où les IF sont le plus utilisé, la principale raison expliquant la non utilisation 
G¶,)FRQFHUQHXQPDQTXHGHGHPDQGHDQWLFLSpHGHVEpQpILFLDLUHVILQDX[ 
Dans les règlements pour 2014-20, la Commission a introduit la possibilité pour les AG 
de recourir à des IF types qui respectent des conditions générales standard (off-the-
VKHOISUrWVjO¶HPSORL&HVPRGqOHVW\SHVRQWSRXUEXWGHIDFLOLWHUODPLVHHQSODFHG¶XQ
IF  VL OHPRGqOH HVW DSSOLTXp OHV$* RQW O¶DVVXUDQFH GH OD FRQIRUPLWp GH O¶,) SURSRVp
avec un ensemble de dispositions réglementaires, y compris concernant la sélection des 
intermédiaires financiers, les accords de financement, les règles relatives aux aides 
G¶(WDWet les coûts et frais de gestion. Les opinions concernant les instruments « prêts à 
O¶HPSORL » sont plutôt positives, mais le recours à ces derniers a été faible, en raison du 
FDOHQGULHUGHSXEOLFDWLRQGHODUpJOHPHQWDWLRQHWODYRORQWpG¶XQHSOXVJUDQGHIOH[LELOLWpj
O¶pFKHORQQDWLRQDOHWUpJLRQDO'DQVFHrtains cas, les instruments « SUrWVjO¶HPSORL » ont 
VHUYLGHVRXUFHG¶LQVSLUDWLRQGDQVODFRQFHSWLRQGHSURGXLWV ILQDQFLHUVSOXVDGDSWpVDX[
besoins locaux.  
Les Règlements 2014-IRQGDQWO¶XWLOLVDWLRQGHVLQVWUXPHQWVILQDQFLHUVFRQVWLWXHQWXQ
changement substantiel par rapport à ceux de la période 2007-13, en partie en réaction 
aux préoccupations des Etats membres face au manque de précision et de clarté de ces 
UqJOHV ORUV GH OD SUpFpGHQWH SpULRGH GH SURJUDPPDWLRQ /¶LPSUHVVLRQ JpQpUDOH GHV
Autorités dH *HVWLRQ VXU OH QRXYHDX FDGUH UpJOHPHQWDLUH HVW SOXW{W PLWLJpH ELHQ TX¶LO
faille noter que ce dernier est généralement considéré comme complexe. Certaines 
$XWRULWpVGH*HVWLRQDYDLHQWXQDYLVSRVLWLIVXUODQRXYHOOHUpJOHPHQWDWLRQHWO¶REOLJDWLRQ
de procéder à une évaluation ex ante a été perçue très favorablement ; cela dit, une 
opinion plus largement partagée soulignait que les Règlements pouvaient être améliorés. 
8QH VRXUFH GH SUpRFFXSDWLRQ LPSRUWDQWH FRQFHUQH O¶LQFHUWLWXGH DVVRFLpH DX[ PDUJHV
G¶LQWHUprétation.  
Le cadre réglementaire des instruments financiers en 2014-20 a été caractérisé par un 
accent considérablement accru porté sur le soutien, notamment via fi-compass, ainsi que 
sur les guidances de la Commission. Néanmoins, un nombre significatif G¶$XWRULWpV GH
Gestion estime que plus de guidances sont nécessaires dans certains domaines, et trois 
sources de difficultés ont été identifiées :  
- Timing : il y a souvent eu un délai significatif entre la publication de la 
réglementation et la disponibilité des guidances 
- Adaptation : plusieurs AG trouvent les guidances trop générales par rapport à 
OHXUV EHVRLQV HW VRXYHQW WURS WKpRULTXHV RX ELHQ PDQTXDQW G¶H[HPSOHV
pratiques, et souhaiteraient davantage de contacts directs et efficaces avec la 
Commission en lien avec des besoins spécifiques.  
- Statut  O¶LPSDFW TXH OHV JXLGDQFHV SHXYHQW DYRLU VXU OHV DXGLWV HW O¶LPSUHVVLRQ
que la Commission applique parfois des règles plus strictes dans les guidances 
que celles induites par les règlements eux-mêmes.  
En cRQVLGpUDQWTXHOVDPHQGHPHQWVDXFDGUH UqJOHPHQWDLUHSRXUUDLW IDFLOLWHU O¶XWLOLVDWLRQ
des Instruments Financiers, les facteurs identifiés incluent des changements apportés 
DX[UqJOHV UHODWLYHVDX[DLGHVG¶(WDWGH ODVLPSOLILFDWLRQXQHPHLOOHXUHFRPPXQLFDWion 
GHOD&RPPLVVLRQGHODIRUPDWLRQGHO¶LQIRUPDWLRQHWGXFRQVHLO 
/¶DUWLFXODWLRQ entre les instruments financiers du FEDER, du Fonds de Cohésion, 
du FSE et du FEAMP et le FEIS 
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/HV)RQGV(6,IRQWSDUWLHG¶XQSD\VDJHFRPSOH[HGHPpFDQLVPHVGHILQDQFHPHnt, privés 
HW SXEOLFV GRPHVWLTXHV HW FRILQDQFpV SDU O¶8( YLVDQW OHV QLYHDX[ QDWLRQDO UpJLRQDO HW
européen. Les AG peuvent allouer des ressources FESI à des instruments conjoints tels 
TXH O¶,QLWLDWLYH 30( HW pJDOHPHQW UHFKHUFKHU GHV FRPSOpPHQWDULWpV DYHF G¶DXWUHV
instruments gérés directement au niveau européen (souvent administrés par le Groupe 
BEI). Le Règlement Portant Dispositions Communes (RPDC) fait explicitement référence à 
OD SRVVLELOLWp G¶HQJDJHU GHV UHVVRXUFHV )('(5 HW )($'(5 GDQV O¶,QLWLDWLYe PME. Cela 
SHUPHWDX[$*G¶DOORXHUGHVUHVVRXUFHVjGHV,QVWUXPHQWV)LQDQFLHUVpWDEOLVDXQLYHDX
8(-XVTX¶jSUpVHQWO¶XWLOLVDWLRQGHO¶,QLWLDWLYHDpWpSOXW{WOLPLWpH ; seules la Bulgarie, la 
)LQODQGH O¶,WDOLH 0DOWH O¶(VSDJQH HW OD 5RXPDQLH V¶\ VRQW engagées. Une partie de 
O¶H[SOLFDWLRQ GH FHWWH XWLOLVDWLRQ OLPLWpH SURYLHQW GH FKDQJHPHQWV FRQWH[WXHOV : le 
mécanisme a été introduit pour répondre à des problèmes de liquidité dans le secteur 
bancaire qui se sont avérés moins sévères que prévu.  
Il existe un ensemble plus large G¶LQVWUXPHQWVILQDQFLHUVHXURSpHQVIDLVDQWO¶REMHWG¶XQH
gestion centralisée TXL SUpVHQWHQW SRWHQWLHOOHPHQW G¶LPSRUWDQWHV V\QHUJLHV DYHF OHV
activités couvertes par la politique de Cohésion, notamment COSME, qui vise à améliorer 
O¶Dccès au financement des PME via des prêts, des garanties, et des investissements en 
fonds propres ; InnovFin, les instruments Horizon 2020 de partage des risques et de 
financement partagé à destination des PME innovantes ; et le Mécanisme pour 
O¶,QWHUFRQQHxion en Europe (MIE), qui apporte des financements aux projets 
énergétiques, de transports, et digitaux. Une autre nouveauté au niveau européen est 
O¶LQWURGXFWLRQGX)RQGV(XURSpHQSRXUOHV,QYHVWLVVHPHQWV6WUDWpJLTXHV)(,6pWDEOLSDU
la Commission EuroSpHQQHHW OD%DQTXH(XURSpHQQHG¶,QYHVWLVVHPHQWFRPPH ODSLHUUH
DQJXODLUH GX QRXYHDX 3ODQ G¶,QYHVWLVVHPHQW SRXU O¶(XURSH /D&RPPLVVLRQ D SXEOLp HQ
Avril 2016 une guidance pour assurer la coordination, les synergies et complémentarités 
entre les FESI et le FEIS.  
La relation entre les instruments financiers des Fonds ESI et les autres instruments 
HXURSpHQV GH GLIIpUHQWHV QDWXUHV Q¶HVW SDV ELHQ FRPSULVH SDU OHV$* ELHQ TXH OHV$*
VRLHQWSOXVHQPHVXUHGHIRUPXOHUXQHRSLQLRQjSURSRVGHO¶DUWLFXODWLRQHQWUH les IF FESI 
et les autres instruments lorsque les évaluations ex ante sont achevées. Ces AG sont plus 
susceptibles de percevoir une concurrence entre les IF FESI et les autres instruments que 
OHV$*TXLQ¶RQWSDVPHQpG¶pYDOXDWLRQH[DQWH3DUDLOOHXUVOD relation entre les IF FESI 
et les autres sources de financement UE est vectrice de préoccupations. Cela concerne 
particulièrement la compétitivité des IF FESI et la perception que ces derniers sont 
désavantagés par rapport aux autres sources de financement UE à cause des règles 
UHODWLYHVDX[DLGHVG¶(WDWHWGDQVXQHFHUWDLQHPHVXUHGHVGLIILFXOWpVOLpHVDX[UqJOHVGH
marché public. Les intermédiaires financiers ont en général eu une approche plus 
exhaustive concernant les sources de financement, mais ont également perçu un 
paysage encombré et confus. Il existe par ailleurs des possibilités de chevauchement 
entre les instruments financiers des FESI et ceux soutenus par le FEIS, et tandis que 
certains y voient des opportunités de synergies, la plupart y voit une source importante 
de difficultés. 
Conclusions et recommandations 
/¶REMHFWLIGH ODVHFWLRQILQDOHGXUDSSRUWHVWGHIRXUQLUGHVFRQFOXVLRQVVXU OHVIRUFHVHW
IDLEOHVVHV GX FDGUH UpJOHPHQWDLUH pWDEOL DX QLYHDX HXURSpHQ FRQFHUQDQW O¶XWLOLVDWLRQ
G¶LQVWUXPHQWV ILQDQFLHUV HW G¶LGHQWLILHU GHV UHFRPPDQGDWLRQV VSpFLILTXHV SRXU GH
potentielles améliorations et options pour le futur en termes de réglementation, et de 
recours aux instruments financiers cofinancés par le FEDER, le Fonds de Cohésion, le FSE 
et le FEAMP.  
/HVUHFRPPDQGDWLRQVpPHUJHDQWGHO¶pWXGHVRQWHVVHQWLHOOHPHQWGHWURLVQDWXUHV : 
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Premièrement, il existe un besoin de réévaluer le rôle des Instruments Financiers de la 
SROLWLTXH GH &RKpVLRQ j OD OXPLqUH G¶XQ HQYLURQQHPHQW G¶LQWHUYHQWLRQ GH SOXV HQ plus 
complexe. Les Instruments Financiers de la politique de Cohésion présentent des forces 
VSpFLILTXHV WHOOHV TXH OHXU FDSDFLWp j V¶DGDSWHU DX[ FRQGLWLRQV UpJLRQDOHV RX j
accompagner le développement de marchés financiers locaux, mais les dispositions 
UpJOHPHQWDLUHV GHV ,) GH OD SROLWLTXH GH &RKpVLRQ V¶DYqUHQW FRWHX[ SDU UDSSRUW j
plusieurs initiatives horizontales ou au niveau européen, et alors que les synergies entre 
GLIIpUHQWHV LQLWLDWLYHV VRQWGHYHQXHV OH6DLQW*UDDO GH ODPLVHHQ°XYUHGHVSROLWLques 
SXEOLTXHVOHXUUpDOLVDWLRQQpFHVVLWHG¶LPSRUWDQWHVFDSDFLWpVDGPLQLVWUDWLYHV 
'HX[LqPHPHQW LODSSDUDLWHVVHQWLHOG¶DXJPHQWHU OHQLYHDXGHVWDELOLWpGHODUpJXODWLRQ
Dans le cadre des cycles 2007-13 et 2014-OHVGLVFXVVLRQVDXVXMHWGHO¶HIILFDFité des 
instruments financiers ont été dominées par les difficultés liées aux modalités de mise en 
conformité et aux procédures, plus que par des questions de conception de la politique, 
de focus sur « ce qui marche et dans quelles circonstances », afin de remplir les objectifs 
spécifiques en matière de développement économique.  
Enfin, dans la continuité des points développés précédemment, il existe des éléments en 
IDYHXU G¶XQH UpRULHQWDWLRQ GHV JXLGDQFHV /H VRXWLHQ DFFUX DSSRUWp D pWp ODUJHPHQW
apprécié, mais les Autorités de Gestion se sont montrées critiques au sujet de leur 
WLPLQJDLQVLTXHGHOHXUVWDWXWSDUUDSSRUWDX[H[LJHQFHVGHO¶DXGLW3OXVVSpFLILTXHPHQW
VLOHV,)GHYLHQQHQWGHSOXVHQSOXVODUJHPHQWXWLOLVpVGDQVGHVGRPDLQHVRO¶H[SpULHQFH 
est limitée, un soutien plus ajusté et un partage de bonnes pratiques sont nécessaires. 
/¶LGpH GLUHFWULFH GHV UHFRPPDQGDWLRQV SUpVHQWpHV FL-dessus est la consolidation, la 
coordination et la stabilisation du cadre réglementaire appliqué aux instruments 
financiers, et le soutien au développement des capacités administratives au sein des 
Autorités de Gestion. Bien entendu, il est également possible de soutenir des options plus 
UDGLFDOHVHQIDYHXUG¶XQSOXVJUDQGXVDJHHWXQHSOXVJUDQGHHIILFDFLWpGHVLQVWUXments 
ILQDQFLHUV&HVGHUQLqUHVLQFOXHQWODOLPLWDWLRQGHODPLVHHQ°XYUHGHV,)GLWV© prêts à 
O¶HPSORL ª O¶REOLJDWLRQ GH UHFRXULU j GHV LQVWUXPHQWV pWDEOLV DX QLYHDX HXURSpHQ OD
UpVHUYDWLRQG¶XQHSDUWLHGHO¶HQYHORSSHGHVSURJUDPPHVRSpUDWLRQQHOVDX[,)O¶XWLOLVDWLRQ
GHV VHXOHV VXEYHQWLRQV GDQV OH GRPDLQH GH OD JHVWLRQ SDUWDJpH RX O¶LPSRVLWLRQ G¶XQH
XWLOLVDWLRQ SDU GpIDXW G¶XQ ,) DFFRPSDJQpH G¶XQH REOLJDWLRQ GH MXVWLILHU H[SOLFLWHPHQW
O¶XWLOLVDWLRQ GH VXEYHQWLRQV HQ IDYHXU GHV LQYHVWLVVHPHQWV SURGXFtifs. En pratique, la 
PpWKRGHG¶DYDQFHPHQW ODSOXVHIILFDFHHVWVXVFHSWLEOHGHFRPSUHQGUHXQHFRPELQDLVRQ
G¶pOpPHQWVLQFOXVGDQVFHVRSWLRQVHWXQHDSSURFKHSOXVQXDQFpHSUHQDQWHQFRPSWHOHV
H[SpULHQFHVSDVVpHV(QG¶DXWUHVWHUPHVXQHDSSURFKHLQFUpPHQWale du changement de 
SROLWLTXH SXEOLTXH HW OH VRXWLHQ j O¶XWLOLVDWLRQ G¶,) ± HQ EkWLVVDQW VXU O¶H[SpULHQFH
O¶DSSUHQWLVVDJHHW OHGpYHORSSHPHQWGHFDSDFLWpVDGPLQLVWUDWLYHVPDLVHQRSpUDQWGHV
ajustements de politique afin de maximiser les bénéfices liés aux éléments qui ont bien 
fonctionné, ou pourrait bien fonctionner. Le recours aux IF cofinancés a donné lieu au 
développement de capacités administratives et de réseaux politiques nécessaires pour 
faciliter leur utilisation. La stabilité réglementaire est essentielle pour consolider cette 
expérience et permettre de recentrer les attentions sur les changements substantiels que 
les IF peuvent générer, plutôt que les difficultés procédurales. Pour cela, plus et mieux 
G¶LQIRUPDWLRQVHVWQpFHVVDLUHSRXUSHUPHttre une analyse fine sur les produits financiers 
cofinancés qui fonctionnent et comprendre comment : les preuves concrètes concernant 
comment et où les IF peuvent être efficaces, de mêmes que les modèles de « réussite » 
pourraient fournir des raisons convaincantes pour augmenter leur utilisation.  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
ESI-Fonds und Finanzinstrument: Hintergründe  
Zur Zeit der Planung und der ersten Umsetzung der EU-Kohäsionspolitik 2014-20 waren 
die Nachwirkungen der schwersten Finanzkrise seit den 1930er Jahren noch zu spüren. 
Die Auswirkungen der Krise haben sich als sowohl weitreichend als auch langanhaltend 
erwiesen und Europa erholt sich im Allgemeinen nur langsam. Ein entscheidender Faktor 
für die schwache Erholung sind die Auswirkungen der Krise auf sowohl öffentliche als 
auch private Investitionen, trotz der historisch niedrigen Zinssätze und dem hohen Maß 
an Liquidität auf den europäischen Kapitalmärkten. Die wichtigsten Gründe sind die 
Unsicherheit und die systemisch niedrige Wirtschaftsaktivität. Im Allgemeinen gibt es 
mittlerweile zwar keine Schwierigkeiten mehr beim Zugang zu Finanzmitteln, Anlass zu 
ernsthaften Bedenken gibt es aber weiterhin für bestimmte Marktsegmente, vor allem für 
KMUs und Infrastruktur. 
Sowohl private als auch öffentliche Quellen spielen eine wichtige Rolle bei der 
Bereitstellung von Finanzmitteln, allerdings ist deren Unterscheidung nicht immer ganz 
einfach. In vielen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten ist der öffentliche Sektor seit längerem an der 
Bereitstellung von Finanzinstrumenten (FI) zur Verfolgung entwicklungspolitischer Ziele 
beteiligt. Im Rahmen der Finanzkrise nahmen nationale Förderbanken eine stärkere Rolle 
ein und diese gewinnen auch weiterhin an Bedeutung. Nationale Förderbanken können FI 
direkt zur Verfügung stellen, agieren meistens aber auf indirekte Weise, oft über 
Geschäftsbanken. EU-Finanzquellen werden ebenfalls zunehmend über diese nationalen 
Quellen gelenkt. 
Die Rechtfertigung für eine öffentliche Intervention in die Wirtschaftsförderungspolitik 
besteht darin, Tätigkeiten zu unterstützen, die die Marktteilnehmer nicht allein leisten 
können oder wollen, von denen man aber annimmt, sie seien im öffentlichen Interesse. 
'LHV ZLUG PDQFKPDO DOV Ä0DUNWYHUVDJHQ³ EH]HLFKQHW NDQQ DEHU DXIWUHWHQ ZHQQ HV
einfach keinen Markt gibt und der private Sektor durchaus rational operiert oder wenn 
der Markt mangelhaft ist und suboptimal operiert. Dies ist der Fall bei der Bereitstellung 
öffentlicher Güter, der Versorgung mit meritorischen Gütern, der Präsenz von 
Externalitäten und bei mangelhafter Information auf den Finanzmärkten. Nicht alle diese 
Marktunvollkommenheiten können mit FI angesprochen werden. 
FI bieten einige Vorteile gegenüber nicht rückzahlbaren Instrumenten (so zum Beispiel 
Nachhaltigkeit und Kosteneffizienz), müssen aber an die jeweiligen Umstände angepasst 
werden und können letztendlich nur eingesetzt werden, wenn die Investitionen 
einkommenserzeugend sind, so dass die anfängliche Unterstützung zurückgezahlt werden 
kann. Bei der Betrachtung von Formen der Intervention und der Grundprinzipien von FI 
LVW HV ZLFKWLJ ]X HUZlKQHQ GDVV GHU %HJULII Ä)LQDQ]LQVWUXPHQW³ VHKU XQWHUVFKLHGOLFKH
Finanzprodukte abdeckt. Diese unterscheiden sich stark, was ihre Eignung für 
unterschiedliche Zielsetzungen, die Implikationen für Empfänger und ihre Art der 
Steuerung anbelangt.  
Was die Gründe für eine Nutzung von kofinanzierten Instrumenten in der 
Kohäsionspolitik anbelangt, so ist anzumerken, dass diese vor allem kontextbestimmt 
sind. Sie spiegeln das Ausmaß und den Fokus von OPs wieder, den Grad an 
Experimentierfreude mit in der nationalen Politik wenig genutzten Formen der 
Finanzierung, sowie die weiteren staatlichen Finanzzusammenhänge wieder. 
Evaluierungsbelege für die Effektivität von kofinanzierten FI gibt es wenige und sie 
konzentrieren sich auf kofinanzierte FI zur Unternehmensunterstützung; es gibt wenig 
Beweise für revolvierende Effekte oder das Ausmaß der Beteiligung des privaten Sektors. 
Es gibt jedoch Belege dafür, dass FI zur Erreichung der Zielsetzungen von OPs 
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beigetragen haben, insbesondere durch einen verbesserten Zugang zu Finanzmitteln ± 
einer der wichtigsten Gründe für den Einsatz von FI in den EFRE OPs 2007-13. Die 
Übertragbarkeit von Lehren zum effektiven Einsatz von FI wird beschränkt durch den 
kontextspezifischen Charakter der FI-Implementierung: Es gibt Hinweise, dass FI dann 
am effektivsten sind, wenn sie auf spezifische regionale oder nationale Umstände 
zugeschnitten sind, da es keinen erfolgreichen einheitlichen Ansatz gibt. Modelle sind nur 
selten übertragbar ohne Abänderungen zur Berücksichtigung lokaler, regionaler oder 
nationaler Umstände. Dazu gehören Unterschiede bei lokalen wirtschaftlichen 
Rahmenbedingungen, sowie bei Bank- und Rechtssystemen und vorherige Erfahrungen 
bei der Umsetzung von FI etc. 
Die Erfahrungskurve bei der Implementierung von FI über mehrere Programmperioden 
liefert Anzeichen für die Bedingungen zur Unterstützung einer effektiven FI-Umsetzung. 
FI sind am effektivsten: 
x wenn sie auf einer akkuraten Einschätzung der Marktsituation basieren, 
x wenn sie Flexibilität bieten, sowie die Fähigkeit auf Veränderungen zu reagieren, 
x wenn es eine Absicherung vor einer Verlagerung von Zielsetzungen gibt, 
x wenn sie auf vorherigen Erfahrungen aufbauen, und 
x wenn die Förderung fokussiert ist und in Verbindung zur Programmstrategie steht. 
Der Einsatz von Finanzinstrumenten, die über EFRE, Kohäsionsfond, ESF und 
EMFF für 2014-20 kofinanziert werden 
Laut indikativer Angaben in den Operationellen Programmen (OPs) planten 
Mitgliedsstaaten ihre Ausgaben für FI beinahe zu verdoppeln, von rund 11,4 Milliarden 
Euro Strukturfondressourcen in 2007-13 auf rund 21 Milliarden Euro für 2014-20. Die 
Pläne unterscheiden sich stark und vier Mitgliedsstaaten (NL, PT, RO, SI) planen, mehr 
als das Vierfache der 2007-13 eingesetzten Mittel bereitzustellen, während andere eine 
Reduzierung oder sogar Beendigung des Einsatzes von FI vorsehen. Einige 
Mitgliedsstaaten planen, mehr als acht Prozent der OP-Beiträge in Form vom FI 
einzusetzen (BG, HU, LT, NL, PT, SI und UK). In vielen OPs bleiben der Entwurf und die 
Implementierung von FI jedoch in einem ständigen Fluss und es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, 
dass die endgültigen Ergebnisse deutlich von den OP-Plänen abweichen werden. Zudem 
beeinflussen die Ergebnisse der Ex-ante-Bewertungen eventuelle Änderungen bei der FI-
Planung. 
2007-13 war der Einsatz von FI vor allem die Domäne des EFRE. Alle Mitgliedsstaaten, 
die FI einsetzten, nutzten den EFRE zur Kofinanzierung, sieben von ihnen nutzten zudem 
den ESF. Sechs Mitgliedsstaaten nutzten den EMFF für FI. Der Kohäsionsfonds konnte 
2007-13 nicht für FI genutzt werden. Für 2014-20 fällt die geplante FI-Zuweisung vor 
allem unter den EFRE, aber der Einsatz des ESF und des EMFF hat ebenfalls zugenommen 
± der gesamte Anstieg beim geplanten Einsatz von EU-Ressourcen für FI im Rahmen des 
EFRE und des ESF ist in etwa gleich (nahezu das Doppelte). 
Eine Analyse der Investitionspläne für FI zeigt, dass mehr als die Hälfte der geplanten FI-
Ausgaben (52 Prozent) auf KMUs ausgerichtet ist (Thematisches Ziel 3). Weitere 17 
Prozent gehen jeweils an die Bereiche Forschung und Entwicklung (Thematisches Ziel 1) 
und CO2-Reduktion (Thematisches Ziel 4). Dies bedeutet, dass rund 87 Prozent der 
gesamten FI-Ausgaben für diese drei Ziele vorgesehen sind. 
157 aller EFRE-, ESF- und Kohäsionsfonds-OPs ± knapp über die Hälfte ± stellen 
Fördermittel für FI zur Verfügung (mit Ausnahme von Interreg, dessen OPs keinen 
Einsatz von FI vorsehen). Das Ausmaß der vorgesehenen FI ist jedoch stark 
unterschiedlich, sowohl absolut, als hinsichtlich ihrer Bedeutung innerhalb des OPs. Vier 
OPs sehen Ausgaben von mehr als 400 Millionen Euro vor; gemeinsam machen diese 55 
Prozent der vorgesehenen FI-Ausgaben aus. 27 OPs planen mehr als 20 Prozent ihrer 
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Ressourcen für FI einzusetzen. Nur fünf EMFF OPs haben konkrete FI-Pläne für 2014-20, 
für die rund 80 Millionen Euro vorgesehen sind. Zusätzlich haben oder planen sechs 
Mitgliedsstaaten OPs im Kontext der KMU-Initiative (BG, ES, IT, FI, MT und RO). 
Fortschritte bei der Implementierung von FI variieren innerhalb und zwischen Ländern. 
Viele Mitgliedsstaaten befinden sich noch immer in einer frühen Phase der FI-
Implementierung, wobei sich die Situation jedoch ständig verändert. Eine bedeutende 
Zahl an Ex-ante-Bewertungen wurde abgeschlossen (zum Zeitpunkt der Verfassung 
dieses Berichts geschätzte 143). Die Ansätze waren hierbei sehr unterschiedlich. Einige 
Verwaltungsbehörden haben Ex-ante-Bewertungen in Blöcken oder Abschnitten 
durchgeführt, andere haben existierende Studien aktualisiert. Zusätzlich fanden teilweise 
auch auf Fonds-Ebene Ex-ante-Bewertungen statt (z.B. für EFRE), entweder innerhalb 
eines OPs oder auf OP-übergreifender Basis, für alle Fonds innerhalb eines OPs, für 
spezifische Instrumente oder bereits vorgesehene Finanzprodukte oder für spezifische 
Thematische Ziele. Zum Zeitpunkt der Verfassung dieses Berichts waren nur wenige FI 
operativ ± zumeist jene, die auf vorherigen Erfahrungen basierten und sich mit 
Unterstützung für Unternehmen befassten. 
Praktische, rechtliche und verwaltungstechnische Aspekte beim Einsatz 
kofinanzierter Finanzinstrumente 
Laut der für die Studie durchgeführten Forschungsarbeit bilden sich Verwaltungsbehörden 
ihre Meinung zu den Vor- und Nachteilen unterschiedlicher Arten der Förderung 
(Zuschüsse vs. FI) nicht vorrangig auf Basis von Pro- und Kontraüberlegungen, sondern 
vielmehr auf Basis der Art von Projekten, für die FI sich am besten eignen. 
Unterschiedliche Arten der Förderung eignen sich für unterschiedliche Arten von 
Projekten ± Verwaltungsbehörden sehen KMU Entwicklung (TZ3), Kohlenstoffarme 
Wirtschaft (TZ4) und Forschung und Entwicklung (TZ1) als die am besten geeigneten 
Einsatzbereiche für FI. 
In den Augen der Verwaltungsbehörden sind die wichtigsten Nachteile von Zuschüssen 
ihre mangelnde Nachhaltigkeit und das Risiko GHU (QWVWHKXQJ HLQHU Ä=XVFKXVVNXOWXU³
während der größte Nachteil von FI deren administrative Komplexität ist. 
Verwaltungsbehörden sehen die Anwendung von FI auf Grund mangelnder Erfahrung als 
schwieriger an als die von Zuschüssen, allerdings können Finanzmittler den 
Verwaltungsaufwand für FI mildern. Einige Verwaltungsbehörden gehen auch davon aus, 
dass der Verwaltungsaufwand für Empfänger bei FI niedrige ist als bei Zuschüssen. 
Das Preis-Leistungs-Verhältnis ist seit einigen Jahren von zunehmender Bedeutung für 
die öffentliche Politik und hat dazu geführt, dass oft die Rolle von Zuschüssen bei der 
Förderung der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklung in Frage gestellt wird. Die 
Auffassung, dass FI ein besseres Preis-Leistungs-Verhältnis bieten, weil Beträge 
zurückgezahlt und reinvestiert werden, ist eines der Hauptargumente der EU-Kommission 
für ihren Einsatz. Das Preis-Leistungs-Verhältnis ist jedoch kein intrinsischer Bestandteil 
einer Förderform ± gelegentlich bieten Zuschüsse ein besseres Preis-Leistungs-
Verhältnis, auf Grund der Verwaltungskosten von FI. Zu den Argumenten für FI gehört 
auch, dass sie einen höheren wirtschaftlichen Einfluss haben können, nicht nur weil 
Fördermittel wiederverwertet werden und mehr Projekte unterstützen, sondern auch, 
weil der Einsatz rückzahlbarer Fördermittel die Qualität eines Projekts verbessern kann. 
In den Augen der Verwaltungsbehörden wirkt der wirtschaftliche Einfluss von FI auf 
mehreren Ebenen, teilweise mit geringeren Ausgaben als dies bei Zuschüssen der Fall ist.  
'HU%HJULIIÄ)LQDQ]LQVWUXPHQW³KDWVLFK]XHLQHUXPIDVVHQGHQ%H]HLFKQXQJIUDOOH$UWHQ
rückzahlbarer Fördermittel entwickelt, im Gegensatz zu Zuschüssen. In der Praxis 
umfasst der Begriff eine Reihe von Förderformen, die unter Umständen wenig 
miteinander zu tun haben. Die Auswahl von Finanzprodukten durch die 
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Verwaltungsbehörden wird vor allem durch die Ergebnisse der Ex-ante-Bewertungen 
bestimmt. 
Die Beziehungen zwischen unterschiedlichen Förderformen (Zuschüssen, FI, etc.) spielen 
eine wichtige Rolle ± sind die unterschiedlichen Instrumente nicht auf die Bedürfnisse von 
Politik und Markt zugeschnitten und aufeinander abgestimmt, besteht das Risiko, dass 
Maßnahmen miteinander konkurrieren, sich überlappen oder bestimmte Bedürfnisse nicht 
abdecken. Konkurrenz und Überlappungen zwischen Finanzierungsformen können durch 
geeignetes Programmdesign minimiert werden. 
Einige Verwaltungsbehörden planen keinen Einsatz von FI, wohingegen andere wiederum 
vorsehen, sie im Rahmen einiger, oder sogar aller, Thematischer Ziele einzusetzen. Die 
Befragung von Verwaltungsbehörden sollte zu einem besseren Verständnis der Gründe 
führen, warum FI nicht eingesetzt werden. Der Hauptgrund für die Nichtnutzung von FI 
war deren Unangemessenheit für geplante Projekte (z.B. nicht-einkommenserzeugend); 
der Hauptgrund für eine Nichtnutzung von FI im Rahmen von TZ3 und TZ4 war jedoch 
die Wahrnehmung, dass eine fehlende Nachfrage seitens der Endempfänger bestünde.  
Im Rahmen der Verordnungen für 2014-20 führte die EU-Kommission für 
VerZDOWXQJVEHK|UGHQGLH2SWLRQGHU1XW]XQJYRQ),PLWVWDQGDUGLVLHUWHQ$*%VHLQÄYRQ
GHU6WDQJH³'LH9RUODJHQPRGHOOHVROOHQGLH(LQULFKWXQJYRQ),HUOHLFKWHUQZHUGHQGLH
Vorlagen befolgt, so können sich Verwaltungsbehörden sicher sein, dass die 
vorgeschlagenen FI einer Reihe rechtlicher Rahmenbedingungen gerecht werden, 
einschließlich der Auswahl von Finanzmittlern, der Finanzierungsvereinbarungen, der 
VWDDWOLFKHQ %HLKLOIH XQG GHU .RVWHQ XQG *HEKUHQ IU 9HUZDOWXQJ 'LHVH ), ÄYRQ GHU
6WDQJH³ZHUGHQ LP$OOJemeinen sehr positiv eingeschätzt, allerdings zeigt sich nur eine 
langsame Akzeptanz, auf Grund des Zeitpunkts der Veröffentlichung der Verordnungen 
und des Wunsches nach einer größeren staatlichen Flexibilität. In einigen Fällen wurden 
GLHVH ,QVWUXPHQWH ÄYRQ GHU 6WDQJH³ DOV ,QVSLUDWLRQ IU GHQ (QWZXUI YRQ 3URGXNWHQ
genutzt, die besser auf lokale Bedürfnisse abgestimmt sind. 
Die Verordnungen für 2014-20 zur Unterstützung des Einsatzes von FI stellen eine 
wesentliche Veränderung zu den Verordnungen 2007-13 dar, teilweise als Reaktion auf 
die Bedenken von Mitgliedsstaaten hinsichtlich fehlender Details und einem Mangel an 
Klarheit. Die allgemeine Auffassung von Verwaltungsbehörden zum neuen Rechtsrahmen 
ist sehr unterschiedlich, aber man kann sagen, dass er generell als eine Herausforderung 
gesehen wird. Einige Verwaltungsbehörden sehen die neuen Verordnungen sehr positiv 
und die obligatorische Ex-ante-Bewertung wird als sehr positiv betrachtet; weiter 
verbreitet aber ist die Ansicht, dass die Verordnungen verbesserungsfähig sind. Deutliche 
Bedenken gibt es in etwa hinsichtlich der Unsicherheit, die mit dem 
Interpretationsspielraum in Verbindung gebracht wird. 
Der Rechtsrahmen für FI für 2014-20 zeichnet sich durch eine deutlich stärkere 
Schwerpunktsetzung auf Unterstützung bei der Umsetzung aus, vor allem über fi-
compass, sowie auf über von der Kommission herausgegebene schriftliche Leitlinien. 
Nichtsdestotrotz ist eine deutliche Anzahl an Verwaltungsbehörden der Ansicht, dass es 
in gewissen Bereichen zusätzlicher Leitlinien bedarf. Es wurden drei Punkte 
herausgearbeitet: 
x Timing: Oft war der zeitliche Abstand zwischen der Veröffentlichung von 
Verordnungen und der Verfügbarkeit von Leitlinien sehr groß. 
x Eignung: Viele Verwaltungsbehörden sehen die Leitlinien als zu allgemein für ihre 
Bedürfnisse und als zu theoretisch oder durch zu wenige praktische Beispiele 
untermauert und wünschen sich mehr und effektiveren direkten Kontakt mit der EU-
Kommission bezüglich ihrer spezifischen Bedürfnisse. 
x Status: Die Auswirkungen, die Leitlinien auf Prüfungsverfahren haben können sind 
unklar und es wird wahrgenommen, dass die EU-Kommission bei den Leitlinien 
teilweise strengere Regeln anwendet als in den Verordnungen selbst vorgesehen.  
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Überlegungen zu Änderungen des Rechtsrahmens, die die Nutzung oder Annahme von FI 
erleichtern könnten haben Faktoren wie Änderungen der staatlichen Beihilfevorschriften, 
Vereinfachungen, verbesserte Kommunikation mit der EU-Kommission, Training, 
Information und Ratschläge identifiziert. 
Die Beziehungen zwischen EFRE-, Kohäsionsfonds-, ESF- und EMFF-FI und 
anderen EU-Instrumenten sowie EFSI 
ESI-Fonds sind Teil eines komplexen Angebots an Fördermechanismen, einschließlich 
privater und öffentlicher, staatlicher und EU-Quellen, auf regionaler, nationaler und EU-
Ebene. Verwaltungsbehörden können ESIF-Ressourcen gemeinsamen Instrumenten 
beisteuern, wie etwa der KMU-Initiative, und viele streben zudem nach einer 
Komplementarität mit anderen Instrumenten auf EU-Ebene (oft von der EIB-Gruppe 
verwaltet). Die Verordnung zu gemeinsamen Bestimmungen bezieht sich spezifisch auf 
die Möglichkeit, der KMU-Initiative (EFRE und ELER) Ressourcen beizusteuern. Dies 
ermöglicht es Verwaltungsbehörden, Ressourcen für FI auf EU-Ebene zur Verfügung zu 
stellen. Bisher ist die Annahme der Initiative relativ beschränkt; nur Bulgarien, Finnland, 
Italien, Malta, Spanien und Rumänien haben sich dazu verpflichtet. Eine teilweise 
Erklärung für diese eingeschränkte Annahme könnten die kontextuellen Veränderungen 
sein: die Regelung wurde eingeführt, um die Liquiditätsprobleme von Banken anzugehen, 
diese haben sich aber als weniger schwerwiegend herausgestellt als angenommen. 
Es gibt auch ein umfassenderes Set an zentral verwalteten FI auf EU-Ebene, die 
potentiell wichtige Synergien mit den Aktivitäten der Kohäsionspolitik aufweisen, 
einschließlich COSME, dessen Ziel ein verbesserter Fördermittelzugang für KMUs über 
Kreditbürgschaften und Eigenkapital ist. Andere Beispiele sind InnovFin, die Horizont 
2020 Eigenkapital- und RisikoteilungsinstrXPHQWH IU LQQRYDWLYH.08VXQG Ä&RQQHFWLQJ
(XURSH³ GLH )LQDQ]PLWWHO IU (QHUJLH-, Transport- und digitale Projekte zur Verfügung 
stellt. Eine weitere Entwicklung auf EU-Ebene ist die Einführung des EFSI (Europäischer 
Fonds für strategische Investitionen), der von der EU-Kommission und der Europäischen 
Investitionsbank als Eckpfeiler des neuen Investitionsplans für Europa ins Leben gerufen 
wurde. Die EU-Kommission gab im April 2016 Leitlinien zur Koordinierung und zu 
Synergien und Komplementarität der beiden Förderquellen heraus. 
Der Zusammenhang zwischen FI der ESIF und anderen EU-Instrumenten 
unterschiedlicher Art wird von Verwaltungsbehörden nicht immer ausreichend 
verstanden; dort wo Ex-ante-Bewertungen durchgeführt wurden sind 
Verwaltungsbehörden aber eher in der Lage, sich eine Meinung über Zusammenhang 
zwischen ESIF-FI und anderen Instrumenten zu bilden. Bei diesen Verwaltungsbehörden 
ist es wahrscheinlicher, dass die Wahrnehmung einer Konkurrenz zwischen ESIF-FI und 
anderen Instrumenten besteht, als bei Verwaltungsbehörden, bei denen keine Ex-ante-
Bewertungen durchgeführt wurden und es Bedenken zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
ESIF-FIs und anderen EU-Finanzquellen gibt. Diese beziehen sich vor allem auf die 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von ESIF-FI und die Wahrnehmung, dass diese auf Grund von 
staatlichen Beihilfevorschriften und zu einem gewissen Maß auch auf Grund von 
vergaberechtlichen Vorgaben im Vergleich zu anderen EU-Förderquellen benachteiligt 
sind. Finanzmittler hatten in der Regel umfassendere Ansichten zu von Förderquellen, 
viele bestätigten aber, dass die Förderlandschaft zu weitreichend und verwirrend ist. 
Zudem gibt es potentielle Überlappungen zwischen ESIF- und EFSI-unterstützten FI und 
obwohl hier teilweise Möglichkeiten für Synergien gesehen werden, sehen die Meisten sie 
als eine große Herausforderung. 
Schlussfolgerungen und Empfehlungen 
Ziel dieses letzten Abschnitts des Berichts ist die Formulierung von Schlussfolgerungen 
zu den Stärken und Schwächen des Rechtsrahmens auf EU-Ebene zur Nutzung von FI, 
sowie die Herausarbeitung spezifischer Empfehlungen für mögliche Verbesserungen und 
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zukünftige Optionen für den Rechtsrahmen und die Nutzung von FI, die mit Mitteln aus 
EFRE, Kohäsionsfonds, ESF und EMFF kofinanziert werden. 
Die Empfehlungen, die sich aus der Studie ergeben, sind dreifacher Art: 
Erstens besteht der Bedarf einer Neubewertung der Rolle kohäsionspolitischer FI vor dem 
Hintergrund einer zunehmend komplexeren Interventionslandschaft. Kohäsionspolitische 
FI haben spezifische Stärken, wie etwa ihre Kapazitäten, sich regionalen Gegebenheiten 
anzupassen oder lokale Finanzmärkte zu entwickeln. Die regulativen Aspekte 
kohäsionspolitischer FI sind jedoch aufwändig im Vergleich mit vielen horizontalen 
Initiativen und Initiativen auf EU-Ebene. Während sicK Ä6\QHUJLHQ³ ]ZLVFKHQ
YHUVFKLHGHQHQ,QLWLDWLYHQ]ZDU]XPÄ+HLOLJHQ*UDO³EHLGHU8PVHW]XQJUHJLRQDOSROLWLVFKHU
Ziele entwickelt haben, so verlangt ihre Erzielung doch auch nach geeigneten 
Verwaltungskapazitäten. 
Zweitens gibt es überzeugende Argumente für eine stärkere rechtliche Stabilität. Sowohl 
in der Programmperiode 2007-13, als auch in der Programmperiode 2014-20 wurden 
Diskussionen zur Effektivität von FI oft von den Themen Einhaltung der Regeln und 
Implementierungsprozesse dominiert, anstatt von den regionalpolitischen Inhalten und 
HLQHP)RNXVDXIÄZDVIXQNWLRQLHUWXQGXQWHUZHOFKHQ8PVWlQGHQ³XPVSH]LILVFKH=LHOH
der Wirtschaftsentwicklung anzugehen. 
Zu guter Letzt und in Verbindung zum Obenstehenden kann argumentiert werden, dass 
es einer Neuausrichtung der Leitlinien bedarf. Die verstärkte Unterstützung seitens der 
EU-Ebene wurde sehr geschätzt, Verwaltungsbehörden haben allerdings Kritik geäußert 
hinsichtlich des Timings und Status von Leitlinien im Hinblick auf Prüfungsvorgaben. Dies 
bedeutet, dass mehr maßgeschneiderte Unterstützung und ein Austausch zu bewährten 
Vorgehensweisen nötig ist, sollen FI in Bereichen mit eingeschränkter Erfahrung 
vermehrt eingesetzt werden.  
Die grundlegende Zielrichtung der oben aufgestellten Empfehlungen ist die 
Konsolidierung, Koordinierung und Stabilisierung des Rechtsrahmens für FI, sowie die 
Unterstützung und Entwicklung der Verwaltungskapazitäten von Verwaltungsbehörden. 
Es wäre auch möglich, radikalere Optionen zur Verbesserung der Annahme und 
Effektivität von FI zu unterstützen. Dazu könnte eine Reduzierung der Implementierung 
YRQ),DXIVRJHQDQQWH0RGHOOHÄYRQGHU6WDQJH³JHK|UHQGLH9HUSIOLFKWXQJGHV(LQVDW]HV
von FI auf EU-Ebene, die Zweckbindung eines Teils der EU-Mittel oder eine Bevorzugung 
zu Gunsten von FI, indem eine ausdrückliche Rechtfertigung für den Einsatz von 
Zuschüssen verlangt wird. In der Praxis ist die wahrscheinlich effektivste Vorgehensweise 
eine Kombination verschiedener Elemente dieser Möglichkeiten, sowie die Anwendung 
eines stärker differenzierten Ansatzes, der Erfahrungen der Vergangenheit berücksichtigt. 
In anderen Worten, ein stufenweiser Ansatz zur Änderung politischer Richtlinien und der 
Förderung der Annahme von FI ± aufbauend auf Erfahrung, Lernprozessen und dem 
Ausbau von Verwaltungskapazitäten, aber mit einer Anpassung politischer Richtlinien zur 
Maximierung der Vorteile von Elementen, die sich als erfolgreich erwiesen haben oder 
erweisen könnten. Der Einsatz kofinanzierter FI ging einher mit dem Ausbau von 
Verwaltungskapazitäten und der politischen Netzwerke, die zur Unterstützung ihres 
Einsatzes nötig sind. Rechtliche Stabilität ist unverzichtbar für eine Konsolidierung dieser 
Erfahrungen, sowie wie die Fokussierung auf eine Schwerpunktverlagerung weg von 
verfahrenstechnischen Herausforderungen und hin zu den substanziellen 
Veränderungen, die FI erreichen können. Dazu werden mehr und bessere 
Informationen benötigt, die eine detaillierte Analyse kofinanzierter Finanzprodukte 
ermöglichen, d.h. welche Produkte funktionieren und weshalb. Konkrete Belege dafür wie 
XQGZR),HIIHNWLYHLQJHVHW]WZHUGHQN|QQHQXQGÄ(UIROJVPRGHOOH³ZUGHQEHU]HXJHQGH
Gründe für eine bessere Annahme der Instrumente liefern. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This is the Final Report for the study on improving the take up and effectiveness of 
financial instruments, prepared by the European Policies Research Centre, University of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow. Following this introduction (Section 1), this report is in five parts.  
Section 2 considers the rationale for financial instruments in Cohesion policy, 
evidence of the effectiveness of Cohesion policy FIs and provides an overview of the 
wider national and EU supply side. This draws on existing literature, particularly that 
used for the recent ex ante evaluation of financial instruments under Cohesion policy 
2007-13, but also the wider literature sourced by the national expert team for the study.  
Section 3 provides a µVQDSVKRW¶ RI WKH XVH RI ILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWV LQ -20. 
Among other sources, it uses a combination of Operational Programme data, desk 
research and an online survey of Managing Authorities to provide an overview of planned 
use of financial instruments and to establish the extent to which FIs are actually 
operational.  
Section 4 assesses the practical, legal and administrative issues in the use of 
financial instruments co-financed by the funds. These focus on a number of aspects, 
including: the pros and cons of different forms of support; the rationales for the use and 
non-use of financial instruments; the value of off-the-shelf instruments; the decision-
making process for the setting up financial instruments; and the extent to which the legal 
framework facilitates or hinders the use of financial instruments. 
Section 5 examines the relationship between the ERDF, the Cohesion Fund, the ESF 
and the EMFF, on the one hand, and the EU level financial instruments, instruments 
managed by the EIB and EFSI, on the other. This section considers: the extent to which 
the ERDF, the Cohesion Fund, the ESF and the EMFF overlap and/or compete with 
commercial or other public FIs; the rationale for and mechanisms through which joint 
and EU level instruments are used; and the incentives and disincentives for Cohesion 
policy funded financial instruments as opposed to other FIs. 
Section 6 sets out the conclusions from the study on the strengths and weaknesses of 
the legislative framework for FIs, and offers some options and recommendations for 
possible improvements regarding the legal framework and the uptake of ESIF co-financed 
measures. 
This report is supported by several Annexes: 
x Annex 1: Case studies 
x Annex 2: Institutions involved in supply of public sector FIs in EU28 
x Annex 3: Summary of FIs 2007-13 and 2014-20 
x Annex 4: Operational and near-operational FIs ± selected examples (Spring 2016) 
x Annex 5: Methodological issues 
 
Improving the take-up and effectiveness of Financial Instruments 
3 
2. RATIONALES FOR FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS CO-FINANCED BY THE FUNDS 
KEY FINDINGS 
x ESI Funds have been planned and implemented in the aftermath of the worst 
financial crisis since the 1930s. 
x Private and public investment has yet to recover, in spite of historically low 
interest rates and high levels of liquidity in European capital markets. 
x The underlying issue relates to uncertainty and systemically low rates of economic 
activity. 
x There is no longer a general problem of access to finance, but certain market 
segments still find this challenging± notably SMEs and infrastructure. 
x Private and public sources play an important role in the supply of finance, but are 
not always easy to distinguish. 
x Access to finance for SMEs has improved, but recovery remains fragile and 
continued uncertainty is affecting investment. Bank loans remain the most 
popular source of finance, with equity the least popular.  
x In many EU Member States, the public sector has long been involved in the supply 
of FIs to pursue policy goals. 
x The role of national promotional banks became more prominent during the 
economic crisis, and has continued to grow. Promotional banks can provide FIs 
directly, but most frequently operate indirectly, often through commercial banks. 
x EU-level sources of funding are increasingly channelled through these domestic 
sources, including ESIF, EIB, EIF and EFSI; funding is RIWHQ µUHEUDQGHG¶making 
the overall picture of the supply of FIs less transparent. 
x Different types of market imperfection justify public intervention, but not all can 
be addressed using FIs. 
x Financial instruments offer some advantages over non-repayable instruments, but 
must be tailored to circumstances. 
x Use of co-financed instruments in Cohesion policy is heavily influenced by size and 
focus of OP, and national context. 
x Evaluation evidence of effectiveness of co-funded FIs is thin and has focused on 
co-funded FIs for enterprise support; there is little evidence of a revolving effect 
or anticipated levels of private sector participation. 
x FIs have contributed to increasing access to finance ± addressing one of the main 
rationales for using FIs in 2007-13 ERDF OPs.  
x Transferability of lessons on where FIs are most effective is limited by the 
context-specific nature of FI implementation. 
x The learning curve of FI implementation over several programming periods 
provides some evidence of the conditions which support effective FI 
implementation.  
x The relative efficiency of FIs as opposed to grants is underexplored. 
 
The overall objectives of this section are essentially threefold: first, to provide an 
overview of the wider supply side and sources of financial instrument being delivered 
at national and EU levels; second, to explore the economic reasoning for using 
financial instruments, having regard to the type of market failures that warrant 
intervention; and third, to set out the evidence identifying the economic context in which 
the use of financial instruments (FIs) funded through Cohesion policy have proven 
effective.  
In exploring these issues, it is important to take account of the wider macroeconomic 
context. The financial turmoil in 2008 and the subsequent sovereign debt crises have had 
a pURIRXQG HIIHFW RQ WKH HQYLURQPHQW IRU LQYHVWPHQW DQG FRQVHTXHQWO\ RQ WKH µUHDO¶
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economy. In spite of historically low interest rates, investment has stagnated for much of 
the last decade in response to persistent uncertainty and low demand, fuelling concerns 
at the long-term future of the European economy. This has prompted calls to stimulate 
public investment in order to increase short-term demand and raise potential output, 
culminating in the Investment Plan for Europe.1 The changed macroeconomic climate, 
and wider policy responses to it, has important implications for the environment in which 
Cohesion policy operates. Against this background, this part of the report begins with a 
brief review of the wider investment context, focusing on trends since the financial crisis 
(Section 2.1). Section 2.2 considers the domestic context for funding investment, 
including access to finance and the provision of national and subnational sources of 
finance. Section 2.3 explores the economic rationale for public intervention in the market 
and the potential role for different kinds of financial instrument to address different types 
of market imperfection, and the circumstance in which financial instruments might be 
preferred to grants. Last, Section 2.4 reviews the evidence for the effectiveness of 
financial instruments and context and criteria that contribute to their success.  
2.1. The wider investment context 
The planning and early implementation of EU Cohesion policy for 2014-20 took place in 
the aftermath of the worst financial crisis since the 1930s. The impact of the crisis has 
been both widespread and long-lasting, though its effects have been far from uniform 
across the EU. Generally, however, Europe has been slow to recover. While growth rates 
in the period 2007-11 were similar in the EU and the USA, growth in the States has been 
much more robust since, though in both economies growth is expected to slow somewhat 
in 2016 and 2017.  
More specifically, over the 5-year period 2007-11, GDP growth across the EU was just 
0.6 percent, with rates in subsequent years rising from -0.5 percent in 2012 to 2.0 
percent in 2015.2 For the EU as a whole, the scale of the recovery remains modest, with 
2 percent and 1.8 percent GDP growth forecast for 2015 and 2016 respectively, though 
with very significant differences between countries.3 
A key factor in the weakness of the recovery has been the impact of the crisis on 
investment ± both public and private.4 Significantly, in the EU as a whole, investment5 
accounted for a smaller share of GDP in 2015 than in 2005. Indeed, the proportion 
declined by about 15 percent - from 22.2 percent of GDP in 2007 to 19.3 percent in 2015 
(see Figure 2.1).  
                                          
1 https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/jobs-growth-and-investment/investment-plan_en#actions  
2 European Commission (2016) Spring economic forecast. 
3 For example, growth rates in 2007-11 ranged from -3.3 percent in the case of Greece to 4.5 
percent in the case of Poland; by 2016, all EU economies except Greece (-0.3 percent) are forecast 
to expand, albeit at differing rates ± from Ireland at a forecast 4.9 percent to Finland at just 0.7 
percent. 
4 European Commission (2014) European Economic Forecast, Autumn 2014; European Investment 
Bank (2013) Investment and Investment Finance in Europe; McKinsey & Company (2012) 
InvestLQJLQ*URZWK(XURSH¶V1H[W&KDOOHQJH 
5 As measured by gross fixed capital formation. 
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Figure 2.1: EU trends in investment (public and private) and GDP 
 
Source: EPRC calculations from AMECO data. 
Importantly, the aggregates shown in Figure 2.1 conceal significant differences 
between countries in the contribution of investment to GDP. These differences 
apply both to the initial position in terms of the contribution of investment to GDP in 
2007, and to the patterns of changes over the period to 2015.  
In 2007, the contribution of investment to GDP was over 30 percent in some 
countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Spain), but 
less than 22 percent in others (Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom). 
There are also distinct patterns of change in the contribution of investment to GDP 
(see also Figure 2.2 for selected countries): 
x In some Member States the contribution of investment to GDP was broadly the 
same by 2015 as it had been in 2007 - Austria, Belgium, Germany, Malta, Sweden. 
x In others, the contribution of investment to GDP declined very significantly: in 
Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Spain and Estonia, the decline exceeded 40 percent.  
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Figure 2.2: Contribution of investment to GDP 2007-2015 (selected countries) 
Source: EPRC calculations from AMECO data. 
Across the EU, the contribution of public investment to GDP was around 3.2 percent 
in 2007 (compared to about 19.5 percent for private fixed capital investment). However, 
these averages conceal very significant differences between countries. In 2007, 
government investment contributed less than 3 percent of GDP in some countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom), but more than 6 percent 
in others (Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania).  
In looking at change in public investment over time, there are very marked 
differences between countries. In absolute terms (see Figure 2.3): 
x Some countries have experienced a dramatic shrinkage in public investment, 
notably in Ireland, Spain and Greece where in real terms public investment in 2013-
15 was at less than half of 2007-9 levels. These countries had comparatively high 
levels of public investment, partly related to a pre-crisis boom, and experienced 
severe cuts as a consequence of the need for fiscal consolidation.  
x At the opposite end of the spectrum, other Member States have seen a significant 
increase in public investment, most notably in Hungary, Slovakia and Malta ± likely 
partly as a consequence of the impact of Cohesion policy receipts.  
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Figure 2.3: Changes in public investment 2007-9 and 2013-15 
MS GFCF in 2013-15 as % of 2007-9 MS GFCF in 2013-15 as % of 2007-9 
IE 41.1 FR 107.3 
ES 42.3 PL 107.5 
GR 49.4 SI 112.7 
HR 51.2 UK 117.6 
CY 53.4 AT 119.6 
PT 56.0 EE 122.2 
IT 81.3 BG 131.3 
LT 87.9 DE 131.7 
LV 91.9 FI 133.1 
CZ 92.4 LU 134.9 
NL 94.6 BE 136.9 
RO 96.2 DK 142.0 
EU 99.7 SE 154.7 
  
HU 159.5 
  
SK 167.8 
  
MT 218.8 
Source: EPRC calculations from AMECO data. 
This is broadly reflected in the contribution of public investment to GDP, as illustrated in 
Figure 2.4. This compares the contribution of public investment to GDP in the period 
2007-9 and 2013-15.  
At the level of the EU, this contribution fell from 3.5 percent of GDP in 2007-9 to 2.9 
percent in 2013-5, a reduction of 16.5 percent. However, in several countries, the 
contribution of public investment to GDP fell by more than 45 percent between 
the two periods (Cyprus, Croatia, Ireland and Portugal). The fall in Greece (34 percent) 
was less dramatic owing to the sharper and sustained fall in GDP. In a few countries, 
the contribution of public investment to GDP increased by more than 25 percent 
(Hungary, Malta and Slovenia).  
In short, the need for fiscal consolidation in a number of EU countries ± notably Ireland, 
Spain, Greece and Portugal, as well as some of the newer Member States ± has limited 
the scope for investment, with implications for private investment and economic activity 
more generally. 
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Figure 2.4: Changes in the contribution of public investment to GDP (2007-9 
and 2013-15) 
 
Source: EPRC calculations from AMECO data. 
Levels of public investment are significantly smaller than private investment in their 
contribution to GDP (about 3 percent in 2015, compared to about 16 percent), and have 
different effects on growth and economic activity, but reductions in the level of private 
investment can partly be attributed to reduced public investment.6 Indeed, sustained 
levels of low public investment may lead to a deterioration of public capital and reduce 
output in the longer-term,7 hence IMF arguments in favour of stimulating public 
infrastructure investment.8 
Figure 2.5 shows that, for the EU as a whole, private investment in 2015 had 
scarcely regained 2007 levels, whilst in the US investment was running at over 180 
percent of 2007 levels by 2015.  
Within the EU figure, patterns of private investment since the crisis vary widely. In 15 
Member States, private investment in 2015 had not yet reached 2007 levels in real 
terms. The situation is particularly acute in Greece where investment in 2015 had 
declined to less than 30 percent of 2007 levels, while in Spain and Portugal investment in 
2015 was at around two-thirds of 2007 levels. 
                                          
6 Buti, M. and Mohl, P. (2014) Lacklustre investment in the Eurozone: Is there a puzzle? 
7 ECB (2016) Public Investment in Europe, ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 2.  
8 ,0)µ,VLWWLPHIRULQIUDVWUXFWXUHSXVK"7KHPDFURHFRQRPLFHIIHFWVRISXEOLFLQYHVWPHQW¶
World Economic Outlook, October.  
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Figure 2.5: Trends in private investment and the impact of the crisis (selected 
countries) 
 
Source: EPRC calculations from AMECO data. 
Analysis by the European Investment Bank9 suggests that the prime cause of the 
collapse and stagnation in private investment is uncertainty - about the world economy 
and the longer term implications of the European financial and sovereign debt crisis. 
Similarly, the IMF has argued that the main factor holding back business investment 
since the global financial crisis has been the overall weakness of economic activity and 
firms have reacted to weak sales by reducing capital spending. Other factors, including 
financial constraints and policy uncertainty, have also held back investment in some 
economies and some market segments.10 However, there is a consensus in the IMF and 
EIB that there is no generalised problem of access to finance in Europe. In fact, for 
some activities the reverse is true - firms have increased savings through cost-cutting 
and lower interest and dividend payments; they have had access to funds, but instead of 
investing, firms have become savers. Indeed, McKinsey has estimated that listed 
(XURSHDQ FRPSDQLHV KDG H[FHVV FDVK KROGLQJV RI ¼ ELOOLRQ LQ  ± more than 
double the drop in private investment between 2007 and 2011.11 
That said, while the supply of finance is not the main problem underlying weak 
investment, access to finance remains a serious concern for some firms and activities. In 
this context, the EIB analysis makes clear that small and medium-sized and 
innovative firms remain affected by financing constraints, partly owing to their reliance 
on bank lending, which became curtailed as banks rebuilt their balance sheets and took 
more cautious approaches to risk. Moreover, the EIB points to significant infrastructure 
needs across Europe, with significant challenges for financing as bond markets have 
                                          
9 EIB (2013) Investment and Investment Finance in Europe.  
10 IMF (2015) World Economic Outlook  
11 McKinsey & Company (2012) IQYHVWLQJLQJURZWK(XURSH¶VQH[WFKDOOHQJH 
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dried up and private long-term financing has become more difficult to secure. 
Furthermore, the Commission points to the significant needs for investments to realise 
the Energy Union objectives12 for 2020 and 2030. Similarly, the IMF makes a case for 
increased public infrastructure investment in economies with clearly identified needs and 
efficient public investment processes. In this context, additional public infrastructure 
investment may be warranted to spur demand in the short term, raise potential output in 
WKHPHGLXPWHUPDQGWKXV³FURZGLQ´SULYDWHLQYHVWPHQW. Against this background, the 
Investment Plan for Europe aims to tap into the high levels of liquidity in EuropH¶VFDSLWDO
markets by sharing risk in order to lever in private investment. 
2.2. Access to finance - the provision of finance from private and public 
sources 
This section provides a brief overview of the current status of the provision of finance for 
enterprises and projects from both private and public sector sources in the EU. It is worth 
noting that it is becoming increasingly difficult to differentiate between private and public 
sources of funding. Funds that originate from the public sector (both EU and domestic) 
are often delivered by commercial banks and private sector fund managers. There is 
often a lack of transparency over the original source of funding e.g. due to re-branding. 
Governments also frequently participate in the capital of so-called private banks, which 
may in fact be majority-owned by the private sector. The status of financial institutions 
may also change over time (see, for example, the recently privatised Green Investment 
Bank in the UK).  
2.2.1. Private sector sources of finance 
While the general economic environment in terms of market conditions and access to 
finance continue to improve, recovery remains somewhat fragile.13 Growth estimates 
have been revised downwards DQG µ%UH[LW¶ FRQWULEXWHV WR RQJRLQJ uncertainty, and is 
expected to have a negative impact on the recovery process.  
Although the SME business climate has improved, continued uncertainty has had an 
impact on investment decisions. However, in 2014, for the second year in a row, the 
most pressing problem identified by EU28 SMEs was finding customers. Access to 
finance was rated by SMEs on average as the fifth most pressing problem± down from 
second in 2013. However, 14 percent of SMEs identified access to finance as the most 
pressing problem they faced, especially those located in Cyprus, Greece and Slovenia. 
Among SMEs in EU28 expecting to grow in the next two to three years, bank loans 
were the most preferred type of external financing in 2014. The second most 
preferred type of funding were other sources such as trade credit or loans from related 
companies, shareholders or public sources. Equity investment was the least preferred 
type of funding among SMEs with the ambition to grow. In all countries, making existing 
public measures easier to obtain finance or tax incentives was indicated as the most 
important driver for improving access to future financing, except in Sweden and the 
Czech Republic, where SMEs perceived the most important drivers to be making existing 
public measures easier to obtain finance and the provision of guaranteed loans. 
The SAFE survey found that bank loans, bank overdrafts, credit lines or credit card 
overdrafts and trade credit are used by over 90 percent of EU28 SMEs for which this type 
                                          
12 European Commission (2015) A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a 
Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, COM(2015)080 final 
13 This discussion is based on Kraemer-Eis H, Lang F, Torfs W and Gvetadze S (2016) European 
Small Business Finance Outlook June 2016, EIF Research and Market Analysis, Working Paper 
2016/35 and the EC Survey on SMEs' access to finance (SAFE) 2014 edition. 
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of financing is relevant. Equity investment was the least preferred type of funding among 
SMEs with the ambition to grow. The cost of borrowing has continued to decline to 
record lows, but with significant country-level differences in the costs of finance. 
Although banks remain the key external financing source for SMEs, alternative financing 
instruments are gaining importance (including crowdfunding, debt funds, etc.). In almost 
all EU countries, SMEs face higher costs of finance than large firms.  
Overall, according to the SMAF index developed by the EC, SMEs access to financial 
resources improved in 24 out of 28 Member States between 2007 and 2013.14 The key 
driver seems to be the fall in interest rates for loans and overdrafts since 2009 for many 
EU countries. According to SMAF sub-indexes, debt finance has improved in 25 Member 
States outweighing the decline in the equity finance. Access to finance improved the 
most in France, Germany, and Lithuania and deteriorated in Greece, Romania and 
Hungary. Debt finance improved in all EU countries except Greece, Cyprus and Romania, 
while Spain has one of the least favourable equity finance environments. 
Figure 2.6: SMAF index in 2013 
 
Source: EC SMAF index  
Supporting the provision of debt finance, guarantees continue to be widely, and 
increasingly, used, with the highest volumes in Italy and France. Italy and Portugal have 
the largest markets, related to GDP. New guarantee activity in 2015 was strongest (as a 
proportion of GDP) in Hungary, Portugal, Italy, Poland and Turkey.  
Private equity investment has recovered over recent years, and in 2015, investments 
by private equity funds located in Europe increased by 13 percent WR ¼ ELOOLRQ, 
compared to 2014. Venture capital investments have increased by 11 percent WR ¼
billion. Business angel activity has grown to fill some of the gap left by venture capital 
investment after 2008. Exit markets have been strong in 2015; total divestments by 
                                          
14 The reference year of the SMAF Index is 2007 (EU 2007=100) allowing a comparison across 
countries, between Euro area and EU-28, and in time. 2007 was selected as a reference being the 
year before the start of the financial crisis. Thus, low values of the index indicate poor performance 
compared to the access to finance in EU level 2007. 
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private equity firms located in Europe increased, although there have been warnings of 
potential overheating. However, private equity and venture capital investment, and 
number of funds, remain well below the levels reached before the financial crisis. 
Related, government agencies accounted for 31 percent of total venture capital 
fundraising in 2015, supporting market recovery, but also highlighting the difficulty noted 
above in distinguishing public and private activity.  
Beyond access to finance for enterprises, the private sector finances roughly two-thirds 
of infrastructure investment in the EU, in the form of debt (85 percent) and equity 
(15 percent). The debt funding market is dominated by banks. Bank lending for 
infrastructure projects has declined disproportionately since the crisis, due to 
deleveraging, new regulatory provisions and reduction of risk exposure ± at the same 
time banks are reluctant to divest large amounts of existing infrastructure loan assets 
freeing up capacity for new lending. Further, some banks exited the market completely 
after the crisis.15 The picture is similar for sustainable energy infrastructure, where the 
private sector accounts for roughly two-thirds of investment financing in OECD countries 
(debt or equity); this includes corporate sources such as electric utility companies and 
the financial sector (mostly banks). Investment here has also been constrained since the 
crisis and is expected to continue to diminish (from both public and private sources).16  
2.2.2. National and EU sources of financial instruments 
Within many EU Member States, the domestic public sector has long been involved in the 
provision of financial instruments (FIs) in the form of loans and guarantees (and more 
recently equity) in pursuit of economic development and other public policy goals. 
However, the scale of this finance is difficult to assess. The literature on the public sector 
provision of finance has tended to concentrate on grants, and there is a marked gap in 
the literature on the provision of alternative forms of finance including financial 
instruments.17 
A wide range of different institutions is involved in the public sector supply of FIs, 
including national and regional development banks, public financial institutions, regional 
development agencies, guarantee providers, government departments, and standalone 
funds (see Annex 2). The boundaries between these institution types are blurred. There 
is considerable diversity in terms of length of experience,18 some are small in scale and 
reach, while others are substantial and operate internationally.19 Their geographical and 
sectoral remits also vary. Some, such as the Land banks in Germany, have an explicitly 
subnational remit. Others are nationwide in scope, but with a strong regional 
representation (Bpifrance, BGK in Poland). There is little standardised information 
                                          
15 Finance for Growth: Report of the High Level Expert group on SME and Infrastructure Financing, 
2013. 
16 OECD (2015) Mapping Channels to Mobilise Institutional Investment in Sustainable Energy. 
Green Finance and Investment. OECD Publishing, Paris.  
17 Mazzucato M and Penna C (2015), The Rise of Mission-Oriented State Investment Banks: the 
FDVHVRI*HUPDQ\¶V.I:DQG%UD]LO¶V%1'(66358:RUNLQJ3DSHU6HULHV6:36-26 
(September), University of Sussex; Selyavina E (2014) What is a national development bank? 
Theoretical foundation and taxonomy design, ISJ Theoretical and Applied Science 12 (2) 47-52, 
ISPC European Research. 
18 Whittle M, Malan J and Bianchini D (CSES) (2016) New Financial Instruments and the Role of 
National Promotional Banks, Report to the European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal 
Policies, Policy Department D, Budgetary Affairs. 
19 Michie R and Wishlade F (eds.) (2014) Business Development Banks and Funds in Europe: 
Selected Examples: Briefing to the Scottish Government in the Context of the Scottish Business 
Bank Proposal. European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde. 
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available and systemic transparency is low,20 making it difficult to compare the 
governance, remit and scale of the various entities. The environment within which public 
sector FIs are implemented is increasingly complex. Some funds and institutions operate 
transnationally and across borders, and are linked with other institutions through 
cooperation programmes, joint initiatives or provision of funding. Further, EU funding 
sources also use domestic institutions and financial intermediaries within Member States 
and regions to deliver finance to final recipients.21 
2.2.3. What institutions are involved in the supply of public FIs?  
The institutions delivering public sector FIs vary widely in structure and function,22 
making comparisons difficult, but three broad groupings can be identified:  
x Public financial institutions, which operate more than one fund (or funds of funds) 
and often collaborate with other organisations, but whose focus remains on business 
development, especially SMEs. Examples include Finnvera (FI), Land business banks 
(DE), Bpifrance (FR), the Strategic Banking Corporation of Ireland (IE), and Finance 
Wales and the British Business Bank (UK). 
x Investment funds with a remit essentially limited to SME development ± for 
example, Innovation SME+ (NL), Vaekstfonden (DK) and Industrifonden (SE).  
x Public banks, whose operations are on a more significant scale and extend into 
areas beyond SME development into infrastructure, lending to local authorities and 
potentially international operations, examples include KfW (DE), BGK (PL), ICO (ES), 
and Land banks (DE).  
In reality, the boundaries between these groups is blurred, and whether institutions 
SURYLGLQJSXEOLFVHFWRU),VRSHUDWHDVµDJHQFLHV¶RUare VHWXSDVµIXQGV¶WKH\UHPDLQa 
µFRQFHSW UDWKHU WKDQD IL[HGFDWHJRU\¶, and can be most usefully distinguished by their 
mission of promoting economic development and other socio-economic goals.23 
Figure 2.7: Development of institutions supplying public-sector FIs 
 
                                          
20 Wruuck P (2015) Promoting Investment and Growth: The role of development banks in Europe, 
EU Monitor Global Financial Markets, Deutsche Bank Research. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Schmit M, Gheeraert L, Denuit T, Warny C (2011) Public Financial Institutions in Europe, 
European Association of Public Banks, Brussels. 
23 Ibid.  
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The public sector has long been involved in the supply of FIs in many developed 
economiesDQGQDWLRQDOSURPRWLRQDOEDQNVKDYHµWUDGLWLRQDOO\EHHQSDUWRIWKHHFRQRPLF
policy toolkiWDQGWKHILQDQFLDOPDUNHWODQGVFDSH¶24 Some of the oldest institutions are of 
very longstanding. For example, the German Land banks were created in the late 19th 
century and the French Caisse des dépôts et consignations (CDC), which owns 50 percent 
of the present day Bpifrance, can be traced back to 1816. The Italian Cassa depositi e 
prestiti was founded in 1850, and the Polish Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK) in 
1924.  
Box 2.1: The State Development Bank of Poland (BGK) 
The decree establishing BGK was issued in 1924, when it was created by a merger of three existing 
public banks the Polish National Bank, the State Reconstruction Bank, and the Credit Institution of 
0DORSROVND&LWLHV%*.¶VRSHUDWLRQZDVVXVSHQGHd from 1948 as a result of banking reform, but in 
1989, BGK resumed operation as a State-owned bank, acting as the issue agent for Treasury 
ERQGV %*.¶V PLVVLRQ LV WR VXSSRUW WKH VRFLDO DQG HFRQRPLF JURZWK RI 3RODQG DQG WR SURYLGH
services to the public finance sector. As such, BGK actively participates in the implementation of 
the state's economic objectives, and manages several special purpose funds and a number of 
governmental programmes. 
Several large institutions and funds were set up in EU Member States during the post-
war period, including KfW (Germany), ICO (Spain), and Industriefonden in Sweden. This 
was followed by a further wave of wave of institutions set up in Central and Eastern 
European countries after 1989, to promote the transformation of transition economies 
(for example, in the Czech Republic, Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania).  
Box 2.2: The Czech-Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank 
The Czech-Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank was established in 1992. Its goal is to 
provide financial assistance to SMEs, development of infrastructure and other economic sectors in 
accordance with the economic policy of the Government of the Czech Republic. The Bank is 100 
percent State-owned and operates at national level. The Czech-Moravian Guarantee and 
'HYHORSPHQW%DQN¶VORQJ-term goals and primary business are focused on providing assistance to 
SMEs with the aim of enabling easier access to financial capital, sharing business risk and reducing 
project costs through support tools such as bank guarantees, preferential loans and financial 
subsidies. The Bank also participates in the implementation of State policy aimed at financing 
specific projects helping to improve regional technical infrastructure and reconstruction of panel-
block apartment buildings. 
New impetus to the growth of national promotional banks was given by the economic 
crisis, when many public sector institutions provided counter-cyclical funds as commercial 
banks curtailed their lendiQJ$QHZµIRXQGDWLRQDOSKDVH¶KDVsince been launched, with 
some Member States setting up new institutions (e.g. Ireland, Portugal and the UK), 
others reorganising existing institutions (e.g. France, Latvia), and a number of countries 
considering changes and/or setting up new development/ promotional banks (e.g. Malta, 
Greece). 25 
Box 2.3: Strategic Banking Corporation of Ireland 
The Strategic Banking Corporation of Ireland (SBCI) was formally launched in 2014, in the wake of 
,UHODQG¶V H[LW IURP WKH (8,0) ILQDQFLDO VXSSRUW SURJUDPPH ,W LV D QHZ VWUDWHJLF 60( IXQGLQJ
company, aiming to ensure access to flexible funding for Irish SMEs. Its objective is to support 
sustained SME-led economic performance in Ireland following the recession. Initial funding partners 
LQFOXGH WKH (,% ¼ PLOOLRQ .I: ¼ PLOOLRQ DQG WKH ,UHODQG 6WUDWHJLF ,QYHVWPHQW )XQG
,6,) ¼PLOOLRQ ,6,) KDV DOVR SURYLGHG ¼PLOOLRQ LQ HTXLW\ FDSLWDO WR IXQG6%&, VWDUW-up 
costs. SBCI will source funds externally through its three funders and lend them to SMEs through 
                                          
24 Wruuck P (2015) Op cit. 
25 Ibid. 
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loans via other institutions (on-lenders). On-lenders may be retail banks or other organisations 
which have the ability to assess loan proposals from SMEs. 
Public involvement ranges from minor participation to full control. When 
analysing the scope of public financial institutions in the (then) EU27 plus Croatia, 
Macedonia, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, Schmit et al took account of the actual level 
of control rather than jusW OHYHO RI RZQHUVKLS DQG WKH µFRQWLQXRXV VSHFWUXP RI SXEOLF
LQIOXHQFH¶26 The analysis estimated that the assets of the publicly influenced financial 
VHFWRUDPRXQWHGWR¼ELOOLRQSHUFHQWRIWRWDOEDQNDVVHWVZLWKRYHUKDOIRIWKLV
pertaining to public institutions. Full public ownership is the prevalent model among the 
European promotional banks and is largely a reflection of their founding history and 
evolution rather than regional patterns.27 In some countries, public sector involvement is 
through many institutions (DE, ES, IT) while in others, the role is concentrated in fewer 
bodies (e.g. Kredex in Estonia, INVEGA in Lithuania).28  
Models vary widely between Member States. For example, in Germany and Spain 
there are networks made up of relatively high numbers of regional institutions which are 
well embedded in local banking activities; by in contrast, in the UK, Ireland and the 
Nordic countries there is relatively little government intervention. In Central and Eastern 
European countries, the public sector has a strong influence over a few institutions with a 
specific focus.29 
Detailed governance arrangements vary between organisations, notably the 
extent of government involvement and the relationship with relevant ministries; it is 
worth noting that this relationship can change over time as institutions become more 
HPEHGGHG HJ WKH%ULWLVK%XVLQHVV%DQNZDV LQLWLDOO\VHWXS LQDVD µSURJUDPPH¶ UXQ
GLUHFWO\ E\ WKH 8.¶V 'HSDUWPHQW IRU %XVLQHVV ,QQRYDWLRQ DQG 6NLOOV RQFH 6WDWH DLG
clearance was granted, the programme was transferred to the British Business Bank, 
which now operates as a Government-owned financial institution). Institutions can also 
move out of the public sector, as with the Green Investment Bank in the UK (see below). 
Some institutions/funds remain directly run by a national ministry (e.g. Vaekstfonden, 
Finnvera, Industriefonden) while others operate as independent legal entities with State-
appointed board members (the German Land banks and Land business development 
banks).30 
Box 2.4: Green Investment Bank, UK 
The Bank was launched in November 2012. With capital from the UK government, it was the first 
bank of its kind in the world - D³IRUSURILW´EDQNZKRVHPLVVLRQLVWRDFFHOHUDWHWKH8.¶VWUDQVLWLRQ
to a greener economy, and to create an enduring institution, operating independently of 
government. UK Government provided the Green Investment Bank with initial capital to invest in 
green projects, on commercial terms, across the UK and stimulate mobilisation of other private 
VHFWRUFDSLWDOLQWRWKH8.¶VJUHHQHFRQRP\7KH%DQNLVVHHQDVDNH\SDUWRIWKH8.¶VHIIRUWVWR
achieve its environmental targets. The UK Government committed an initial £3.8 billion in the 
Bank. By 2014, the Bank had invested in 26 projects, directly investing £1.3 billion. Target sectors 
included: offshore wind; energy efficiency; waste and bioenergy; and onshore renewables. In 
March 2016, the UK Government launched the process to move the Green Investment Bank into 
the private sector. The transaction will involve both the sale of existing shares owned by the UK 
Government and also the commitment of additional capital for the Green Investment Bank by new 
investors. 
                                          
26 Schmit et al (2011) Op cit.  
27 Wruuck P (2015) Op cit. 
28 Schmit et al (2011) Op cit. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Michie R and Wishlade F (eds.) (2014) Op cit.  
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Most institutions operate indirectly through private actors or combine both 
indirect and restricted direct funding.31 Indirect models are most popular where 
relationship banking is strong and where there is a network of commercial institutions to 
work with. This is the case in Germany, for example, with Land banks having strong links 
into the local commercial banking sector. 
2.2.4. What type of project/investment can public FIs support?  
The remit of the public sector organisations involved is expanding. The original 
rationale and remit of some of the older institutions involved in the provision of public 
sector FIs was often rooted in major historical crises ± for instance, the need to 
safeguard public funds following the collapse of the Napoleonic empire lay behind the 
CDC in France, or support for post-war reconstruction in the case of the KfW in 
Germany.32 Currently, public sector financial institutions acting in domestic markets set 
out to fulfil a wide variety of missions, including addressing finance gaps, supporting the 
agricultural sector, developing infrastructure, promoting tourism, and supporting financial 
inclusion in regional markets.33 This role has diversified in the past three decades, going 
beyond traditional activities in both scale and scope,34 extending to playing an important 
part in addressing current societal challenges, especially around innovation, energy and 
the green economy.35  
SME lending remains the predominant activity of most of the institutions concerned, 
HVSHFLDOO\ ZKHQ µFRPPHUFLDO EDQNV KDYH SDUWLDOO\ RU IXOO\ ZLWKGUDZQ IURP WKH 60(
OHQGLQJVSDFH¶36 Newer institutions tend be more focused on business development (i.e. 
infrastructure or local authority lending is not part of their remit), and some have been 
born directly out of concerns with issues of access to finance ± for example, SBCI (IE), 
which was a direct response to the financial crisis in Ireland. Public institutions have also 
increasingly become involved in providing long-term venture capital for high-tech start-
ups (the so-called µgazelles¶ DQG DUH OHDG IXQGHUV RI µPLVVLRQ-RULHQWHG LQQRYDWLRQ¶ LQ
some countries in the push towards smart growth.37  
Guarantees are the most widely used instrument by public sector institutions.38 
Governments have used credit guarantee schemes since the 1950s, usually targeting a 
sector, region, or type of firm. Public guarantee schemes have also been the most widely 
used instrument of government policy to ease SME access to finance in the crisis.39 In 
some cases this involved easing the terms ± for instance, in France, Oséo (now 
Bpifrance) increased the maximum guarantee cover to 90 percent, while in Italy eligibility 
criteria were relaxed and in many countries loans to finance working capital needs were 
guaranteed.40  
                                          
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Schmit et al (2011) Op cit.; Selyavina E (2014) Op cit.  
34 Mazzucato M and Penna C (2015) Op cit.  
35 Selyavina E (2014) Op cit. 
36 Whittle M, Malan J and Bianchini D (CSES) (2016) Op cit.  
37 Mazzucato M and Penna C (2015) Op cit.  
38 7UHQWLQDJOLD07µ,QVWLWXWLRQV¶LQ1DYDUHWWL*(G:KRWDNHVWKHULVNVIRUIXQGLQJ
SMEs?, European Economy, Regulation and the Real Sector 2105.2. 
39 Kraemer-(LV+/DQJ)DQG*YHWDG]H6µ(XURSHDQ6PDOO%XVLQHVV)LQDQFH2XWORRN¶ EIF 
Working paper 2014/26. 
40 OECD (2013) SME and Entrepreneurship Financing: The Role of Credit Guarantee Schemes and 
Mutual Guarantee Societies in supporting finance for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
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The most widely used data available on guarantees is that produced by the European 
Association of Mutual Guarantee Societies (AECM). This covers the activities of its 
members which are predominantly publicly-owned bodies. Guarantees appear to be most 
significant in Hungary, Portugal and Italy, with outstanding guarantees in the order of 1.5 
WRSHUFHQWRI*'3,Q,WDO\SXEOLFJXDUDQWHHVRQ60(ORDQVURVHIURPDURXQG¼ELOOLRQ
LQ  WR ¼ ELOOLRQ E\ 41 Finland, Germany and the Netherlands also relied 
heavily on public guarantee schemes to compensate for the reduction in private bank 
lending during the economic crisis.42 Use of counter-guarantee schemes is much less 
common,43 but prevalent in Italy and also used in Belgium.  
Loans are also widely used, but provision of venture capital and equity FIs more 
generally is far less common ± Belgium, Sweden and the UK have until recently been the 
main actors in this respect. 
2.2.5. What is the scale of public FIs? 
The relevant institutions vary widely in terms of scale and importance. There is 
no transparent and easily comparable treatment of promotional banks in national 
statistics, which limits the possibility for comparison across countries, and makes it 
difficult to assess their role and significance.44 Comparison of scale and budgets of such 
institutions can be misleading, in particular because it does not reflect the importance of 
a particular institution/fund to the economy in which it operates ± small institutions can 
play an important role, or have a large share of a specific market.45 However, in terms of 
scale, among the most prominent bodies are several of the German Land Banks (up to 
¼ELOOLRQRIDVVHWVE\WKHHQGRIDQGWKHLand business development banks (up 
WR¼ELOOLRQ (see Figure 2.8).  
                                          
41 Navaretti G, Calzolari, and Pozzolo A (2015) Is special treatment of SMEs warranted? in 
Navaretti G (Ed) (2015) Who takes the risks for funding SMEs?, European Economy, Regulation 
and the Real Sector 2105.2. 
42 OECD quoted in Gozzi J and S Schmuckler (2015) Public Credit Guarantees and Access to 
Finance in Navaretti G (Ed) (2015) Who takes the risks for funding SMEs?, European Economy, 
Regulation and the Real Sector 2105.2.   
43 Gozzi J and S Schmuckler (2015) ,Public Credit Guarantees and Access to Finance in Navaretti G 
(Ed) (2015) Who takes the risks for funding SMEs?, European Economy, Regulation and the Real 
Sector 2105.2. 
44 Wruuck P (2015) Op cit. 
45 Ibid. 
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Figure 2.8: Scale of public FIs (selected examples) 
Member 
State 
Institutions  Capitalization  
¼ELOOLRQ 
Population 
(million) 
GDP  
¼ELOOLRQ 
DE Land Banks  
 
Land Business Development Banks  
 
KfW 
from 17 to 274 
(2013) 
from 1 to 145 
 
72.5 (2013) 
82.0 2,737 
DK Vaekstfonden  0.36 5.6 249 
ES ICO  from 53 (2008) to 
102 (2013) 
46.7 1,023 
FR BPI France  
Bpi Financement 
Bpi Participations 
51.5 (end of 2013) 
34.7 
16.8 
65.6 2,060 
IE SBCI  0.8 (October 2014) 4.6 164 
PL BGK  2 (2014) 38.5 390 
SE Industrifonden  0.408 9.6 421 
UK British Business Bank  5 (to 2018+) 63.9 1,899 
Note: ,( VHW WR LQFUHDVH E\ ¼ ELOOLRQ RYHU WKH QH[W ILYH \HDUV *'3 ILJXUHV  
Source: Eurostat and Quarterly National Accounts and based on Michie R and Wishlade F (eds.) 
(2014) Op cit. 
In terms of sources of funding, national and regional promotional banks are not 
necessarily limited to public funds, but may also be able to access (inter)national 
financial markets ± facilitated in many cases by State guarantees, allowing them to 
borrow at favourable rates. 
Box 2.5: How Finnvera is funded 
Finnvera was set up in 1999 through the merger of Kera Corporation (Kera Oyj) and the Finnish 
Guarantee Board (Suomen Valtiontakuukeskus). Kera Corporation provided loans and guarantees 
for domestic business activities while the Finnish Guarantee Board was responsible for export credit 
services. The merger took place in order to reorganise the administration of publicly supported 
VSHFLDOILQDQFLQJWRLPSURYHWKHHIILFLHQF\DQGHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKH6WDWH¶VVSHFLDOILQDQFLQJDQGto 
VWUHDPOLQHWKH6WDWH¶VFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH Finnvera is expected to be economically self-sufficient 
(i.e. in the long run, it must be able to cover its own operating costs and credit and guarantee 
losses with the income from commercial activities). The State currently covers c.50 percent of 
)LQQYHUD¶VGRPHVWLFFUHGLWORVVHV2WKHUORVVHVDQGRSHUDWLRQDOFRVWVDUHWREHFRYHUHGE\SURILWV
Finnvera borrows on domestic financial markets to fund its activities. However, the State is directly 
responsible for the domestic guarantees and export credit guarantees granted by Finnvera. 
In addition, increasing µEuropeanisation¶ is evident, as many national and regional 
financial institutions that deliver FIs using domestic funds co-fund them with ESI Funds 
or manage EU FIs (see Figure 2.9), or are involved in implementation of the joint SME 
Initiative with the EIB.  
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Figure 2.9: Examples of institutions using ESIF in 2007-13/2014-20 
MS Institutions involved  
BE SOWALFIN (Société Wallonne de Financement et de Garanties des PME), created in 2002 
to support SMEs via specific FIs was Intermediate Body for Wallonia ERDF OP and 
delegates management of FIs to subsidiaries, WKHµ,QYHVWV¶± investment funds part-
owned by SOWALFIN managed FIs under ERDF 2007-13 OP, as did SOCAMUT and 
NOVALIA, subsidiaries of SOWALFIN and providers of micro-credit, loans and guarantees. 
CZ Czech-Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank implemented ERDF FIs in 2007-13.  
DE Land Banks and Land business development banks use ESI funds to co-finance some FIs. 
EE Kredex, a national fund acting as NPB, implemented ESIF FIs in 2007-13.  
ES ICO, a national state financial agency and intermediated lender, managed an EU-funded 
JEREMIE fund in 2007-13, offering guarantees on RTDI projects.  
FI Finnvera used EU funding to offer interest subsidies on loans in 2007-13, as well as co-
investments in venture capital instruments.  
HU Hungarian Development Bank is Fund of Funds manager for ESIF FIs in 2014-20 
IT Invitalia, national promotional agency, was responsible for management of national 
directly-managed FIs in 2007-13 (e.g. NOP R&C funds 2007-13). Medio Credito Centrale 
(Banca del Mezzogiorno MedioCredito Centrale S.p.A. (BdM-MCC)) has also been involved 
with ESIF FIs through the co-funded Fondo Centrale di Garanzia (FCG).  
LT INVEGA managed the Entrepreneurship Promotion Fund, which used ESIF.  
PL BGK (Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego) has been holding fund manager for JESSICA and 
JEREMIE initiatives, and has served as a paying authority for Structural Funds. 
PT The Institução Financeira de Desenvolvimento (IFD) was set up to manage ESIF FIs in 
2007-13. PME Investimentos ± Sociedade de Investimento, S.A, a credit institution under 
the supervision of the Bank of Portugal, was FINOVA Holding Fund manager in 2007-13. 
SE Almi Invest a key provider of State equity capital in Sweden was fund manager of the 
regional risk capital funds co-financed by ESIF in 2017-13.  
SK The Slovak Guarantee and Development Bank implemented FIs in 2007-13 and 2014-20.  
UK British Business Bank managed some ERDF legacy funds from 2000-06 and 2007-13, 
and will manage several ERDF-funded FoF in 2014-20. Scottish Investment Bank 
(Scottish Enterprise) managed ERDF-funded FIs in 2007-13, and may also fund manage 
in 2014-20. Finance Wales managed the 2007-13 EU-funded JEREMIE Fund in Wales and 
has been entrusted with management of the Wales SME Investment Fund in 2014-20. 
INVEST NI, a regional development agency and Intermediate Body for ERDF uses ESIF to 
co-fund three of their six Access to Finance funds for SMEs.  
Source: EPRC compilation 
2.2.6. What is the role of EU-level institutions? 
The environment has become more complex with a larger role being played by the 
EU institutions, which are increasingly involved in the supply of FIs. This is both under 
in their own name and through intermediaries, increasingly national promotional banks. 
The European Investment Bank Group (EIB Group) plays an important role, and is central 
to the implementation of most EU-level FIs (while the Commission maintains overarching 
responsibility).46 The EIB currently has a dual role: as an investment bank which can 
offer loans at low cost to its borrowers due to its AAA status; and as a public institution 
tasked with implementing broader European policy objectives such as economic 
development, climate-change prevention, employment generation, financing SMEs and 
convergence.47 The role of the EIB in Cohesion policy has progressively expanded since 
the early 2000s, and now includes provision of long-term loans to public and private 
project promoters, framework loans to public authorities, intermediated loans providing 
                                          
46 Whittle M, Malan J and Bianchini D (CSES) (2016) Op cit. 
47 van der Zwet A, Bachtler J, Miller S, Vernon P and Dozhdeva V (2016) The role of European 
Investment Bank Group in European Cohesion Policy, report to the European Parliament, REGI 
Committee.  
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credit lines to banks and leasing bodies to on-lend, and global loans managed by 
intermediaries, usually financial institutions.48 
Alongside the EIB, the European Investment Fund (EIF) is a public-private partnership 
owned by the EIB (61.3 percent), the EU through the European Commission (26.5 
percent) and 29 public and private institutions (12.2 percent). The last category includes 
financial institutions such as Barclays Bank plc in the UK and Banco Santander in Spain, 
as well as national/regional promotional banks (e.g. BGK in Poland, Bpifrance and some 
of the German Land banks) as well as development agencies (e.g. Scottish Enterprise in 
the UK).49 6XSSRUWLQJ60(VDQGPLGFDSILQDQFH LVWKH(,%*URXS¶VVLQJOHODUJHVWSROLF\
priority in terms of activity volume.50 ,Q  WKH (,% *URXS¶V VXSSRUW WR 60(V
DPRXQWHG WR ¼ ELOOLRQ QHZ RSHUDWLRQV VLJQHG RIZKLFK ¼ ELOOLRQ IURP WKH (,)
supporting over 290,000 SMEs.  
The EIB and EIF are also involved in managing EU-supported ),VDVµHQWUXVWHGHQWLWLHV¶
the EIB focuses on the provision of loan and debt-based instruments to mid-caps while 
the EIF deals with loan guarantee schemes (such as COSME, InnovFin, Creative Europe, 
EaSI, Erasmus+ and PF4EE) as well as equity instruments such as the COSME Equity 
Facility for Growth, and implements its own venture capital fund of funds programme 
(Figure 2.10).51 These FIs are generally implemented through financial intermediaries, 
including national/regional development banks, and ultimately commercial banks, who 
on-lend to SMEs and project promoters. Institutions using these funGV PD\ µUH-EUDQG¶
them, reducing transparency about the source of funds. 
Box 2.6: National implementation of InnovFin SME Guarantee Scheme in France 
BPI has signed two agreements with the EIF in relation to the InnovFin SME Guarantee scheme. 
8QGHU WKH DJUHHPHQW WKH\ ZLOO SURYLGH ILQDQFH WR LQQRYDWLYH FRPSDQLHV LQ )UDQFH ZRUWK ¼
million between 2015-17, guaranteed by the EIF. Bpifrance has branded the two loan FIs at 
national level as part of its own product portfolio, which is then marketed directly to SMEs. These 
comprise: Start-up loan (3UrWG¶$PRUoDJHLQYHVWLVVHPHQW) to address financing needs of start-up 
companies. Bpifrance will combine this FI with the EU guarantee at a 40 percent rate. Innovation 
loan (PUrWSRXUO¶LQQRYDWLRQ), an existing loan programme which will be increased in scale in terms 
of beneficiaries and loan maxima, backed by the EU guarantee at a 50 percent rate.  
Source: Whittle M, Malan J and Bianchini (2016) Op cit. 
The picture has become more complex with the launch in July 2015 of the European 
Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) as part of the Investment Plan for Europe. 
7KH&RPPLVVLRQKDVPDGH¼ELOOLRQDYDLODEOHDQGWKH(,%KDVSURYLGHGDQDGGLWLRQDO
¼ELOOLRQIRU()6,ZKLFKSURYLGHVDJXDUDQWHHIRUWKH(,%WRH[WHQGLWVµVSHFLDODFWLYLWLHV¶
portfolio. The funds that provide the guarantees are derived from re-allocated resources 
(the Connecting Europe Facility and Horizon 2020). The funds are used to allow the EIB 
to invest in higher-risk projects (special activities). However, EFSI itself is not a financial 
instrument (within the meaning of the EU Financial Regulation), although it can be 
invested in FIs.52 
                                          
48 van der Zwet A, Bachtler J, Miller S, Vernon P and Dozhdeva V (2016) Op cit.  
49 van der Zwet A, Bachtler J, Miller S, Vernon P and Dozhdeva  V (2016) Op cit. 
50 Revoltella D and H Kraemer-Eis (2015) Tackling SMEs asymmetric risk: the EIB approach, in 
Navaretti G (Ed) (2015) Who takes the risks for funding SMEs?, European Economy, Regulation 
and the Real Sector 2105.2 
51 Entrusted entity status for the indirect management of EU FIs is apparently being considered by 
the Commission for other entities such as EBRD (Whittle M, Malan J and Bianchini D (CSES) (2016) 
Op cit p10). 
52 Ibid. 
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The EIB and EIF both play an important role in delivering EFSI; national 
development/promotional banks can also be involved by co-investing alongside the EFSI 
in strategic investment projects of interest in their respective Member State.53 Member 
States can contribute to EFSI, either directly or via their national 
development/promotional banks. They can contribute either at the level of projects, FIs 
or investment platforms.54 By June 2016, eight Member States had pledged contributions 
to EFSI via their national promotional banks: %XOJDULD ¼ PLOOLRQ 6ORYDNLD ¼
million, Poland ¼ ELOOLRQ /X[HPERXUJ ¼ PLOOLRQ )UDQFH ¼ ELOOLRQ ,WDO\ ¼ ELOOLRQ
6SDLQ¼ELOOLRQ*HUPDQ\¼ELOOLRQSOXVWKH8.DQQRXQFHGLWZRXOGPDNHDJXDUDQWHH
available to co-finance infrastructure projects in the UK (not via promotional bank).55 
According to the Commission, national promotional banks have expressed a clear 
preference for cooperating at the level of investment platforms and on the level of 
individual projects rather than direct participation.56 
It is clear that while the EIB and EIF are responsible for injecting large volumes of 
funding into the supply of FIs in EU Member States, the bulk of the FIs are delivered 
through national or regional institutions.  
In summary, there are a wide variety of sources of funds (EU, domestic) being delivered 
through a complex web of institutions and intermediaries, including commercial banks 
and private sector fund managers. The number, range and remits of these organisations, 
coupled with a lack of transparency in the ultimate source of funding ± partly owing to 
GRPHVWLFSUDFWLFHVRIµUHEUDQGLQJ¶IXQGV- makes it very difficult accurately to assess the 
scale of funds available, and the additionality of any new funding stream that is 
announced. Most of the EU institutions and national promotional banks discussed above 
do not lend directly, rather on-lend through commercial banks and financial 
intermediaries. The effect of public sector intervention should be to increase the supply 
available at the level of the SME or project promoter. This complexity may be irrelevant 
to the SME or project promoter who may be unaware of the source of funds. However, 
from a policy analysis perspective, it renders the task of differentiating between public 
and private sector sources of funding and quantifying the overall scale of available funds 
quite impossible. 
                                          
53 Potential investment projects are presented to EIB or EIF by project promoters. EIB/EIF internal 
governing bodies and the EFSI Investment Committee decide on granting of EFSI support.  
54 Investment platforms are special-purpose vehicles, managed accounts, contract-based co-
financing or risk-sharing arrangements or arrangements established by any other means by which 
entities channel a financial contribution in order to finance a number of investment projects (Art. 2, 
2015/1017). 
55 European Commission (2015) Working together for jobs and growth: The role of National 
Promotional Banks (NPBs) in supporting the Investment Plan for Europe. 
56 Ibid.  
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Figure 2.10: EU-level FIs in 2014-20 and the role of NPBs 
EU-level FI Implementation details Scale 
COSME Loan 
Guarantee 
facility 
Guarantees and counter guarantees provided 
to financial intermediaries, who on-lend loans 
and leases to high-risk SMEs. So far, several 
national promotional banks are involved: AWS 
(AT), CMZRB (CZ), Danish Growth Fund, 
Kredex (EE), KfW and Bürgschaftsbank 
Nordrhein-Westfalen (DE), SCBI (IE), Cassa 
depositi e prestiti (IT), BGK (PL). Strong 
participation by commercial banks.  
2YHU ¼ ELOOLRQ LQ ORDQV
and over 340,000 SMEs 
supported since 2007 under 
predecessor scheme (SME 
Guarantee Facility). 
COSME Equity 
Facility for 
Growth 
Invests in venture capital and private equity 
funds, which act as financial intermediaries to 
provide funding to SMEs, predominantly in their 
expansion and growth stages. No information 
yet on participation.  
2YHU ¼ ELOOLRQ LQ HTXLW\
investments mobilised since 
2007 under predecessor 
scheme (High Growth and 
Innovative SME Facility). 
InnovFin SME 
Guarantee 
Facility 
(Horizon 2020) 
Provides guarantees and counter-guarantees to 
financial intermediaries, who provide loans, 
financial leases and loan guarantees for 
research-based and innovative SMEs and small 
mid-caps.  
So far, numerous national promotional banks 
have signed agreements with the EIB to act as 
intermediaries. E.g. AWS (AT), Danish Growth 
Fund, Bpifrance, KfW and Bürgschaftsbank 
Baden-Württemberg (DE), SCBI (IE), Cassa 
depositi e prestiti (IT, BGK (PL), British 
Business Bank (UK).  
The predecessor scheme 
(RSFF) financed 114 R&I 
SURMHFWV ZLWK ¼ ELOOLRQ
and provided loan 
JXDUDQWHHV ZRUWK RYHU ¼
billion. 
Natural Capital 
Financing 
Facility (LIFE)  
Loans and investments funds that support 
projects promoting the preservation of natural 
capital. No interest as yet from national 
promotional banks or commercial banks ± may 
be targeted at specialist financial advisers and 
micro-credit institutions instead. 
Small pilot scheme; will only 
support 10 projects across 
EU28. 
Private Finance 
for Energy 
Efficiency 
Instruments ± 
P4EE (LIFE) 
Loan guarantee facility for energy efficiency 
investments. Only commercial banks can take 
part. 
Not available to national 
promotional banks.  
Cultural and 
Creative Sector 
Guarantee 
Facility (CCS 
LGF)/Creative 
Europe  
Aims to encourage greater lending to SMEs in 
creative and cultural sectors via credit risk 
protection through a capped guarantee and 
capacity building. National promotional banks 
can apply to become financial intermediaries.  
 
Sources: Whittle M, Malan J and Bianchini D (CSES) (2016) Op cit; van der Zwet A, Bachtler J, 
Miller S, Vernon P and Dozhdeva V (2016) Op cit. 
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Figure 2.11: Selected EIF Fund of Funds 
MS Title Operation 
EE, 
LT, 
LV 
Baltic 
Innovation Fund 
Launched by the EIF with the Governments of Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia in 2012 to boost equity investments made into Baltic SMEs 
ZLWKKLJKJURZWKSRWHQWLDO%,)UHSUHVHQWVD¼PLOOLRQLQYHVWPHQWE\
(,) ZLWK HDFK %DOWLF *RYHUQPHQW FRPPLWWLQJ ¼ PLOOLRQ WKURXJK
national agencies (INVEGA in Lithuania, KredEx in Estonia and Altum 
in Latvia). A significant part of the resources committed by national 
agencies are returned resources from earlier Structural Funds financed 
financial instruments under JEREMIE framework, now being reused. 
NL Dutch Venture 
Initiative (DVI-
II) 
$¼PYHQWXUHDQGJURZWKFDSLWDO)XQGRI)XQGVLQLWLDWLYHRIWKH(,)
and PPM Oost, supported by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
Launched in March 2016, it aims at investing in fast growing and/or 
innovative companies, targeting companies in sectors such as ICT, 
clean-tech, med-tech, renewable energy and life sciences, through 
primary investments in Dutch-oriented VC funds.  
LU Luxembourg 
Futures Fund 
(LFF) 
$¼PIXQGVHWXSE\WKH(,)DQGWKHSNCI which will invest and co-
invest in early and growth innovative European technology SMEs as 
well as in VC funds. LFF invests directly or indirectly in VC funds and 
SMEs to foster the sustainable development of strategic sectors (i.e. 
ICT, cleantech and other technology sectors excluding health 
technologies and life science sectors). 
PL Polish Growth 
Fund of Funds  
$¼P)XQGRI)XQGVLQLWLDWLYHODXQFKHGLQ$SULOE\WKH(,)ZLWK
BGK to stimulate equity investments into growth-focused enterprises 
in Poland. Locally, the initiative is named Polski Fundusz-funduszy 
Wzrostu (PFFW). At the initial stage, PGFF combinHV D ¼ PLOOLRQ
FRPPLWPHQWIURP(,)ZLWK¼PLOOLRQIURP%*. 
SE Swedish 
Venture 
Initiative 
The Swedish Venture Initiative combines ESIF resources with EFSI. 
The Swedish Venture Initiative will invest using ESIF in several early 
stage venture capital funds which will then invest primarily in Swedish 
enterprises. Co-investment from EFSI by the EIF into the underlying 
funds will encourage private investors to commit additional resources 
into these funds. It is expected that more than SEK 1 billion in equity 
investments will be made available to the Swedish enterprises. 
 
Source: EIF 
2.3. What is the economic rationale for using financial instruments in 
Cohesion policy? 
,QDGGUHVVLQJ WKLVTXHVWLRQ LW LVXVHIXO WRFRQVLGHU WKUHH LQWHUUHODWHG µVXE-TXHVWLRQV¶ LQ
order to tease out the key issues, more specifically: 
x What is the justification for public intervention at all? 
x If intervention is justified, to what extent can the aims of intervention be met, or met 
better, by financial instruments as opposed to non-repayable funding? 
x What are the rationales for co-financing FIs under Cohesion policy?  
2.3.1. What is the justification for public intervention? 
In broad terms the justification for public intervention in economic development policy is 
to support activities that market operators cannot or will not undertake alone, but which 
DUH FRQVLGHUHG LQ WKHZLGHUSXEOLF LQWHUHVW7KLV LV VRPHWLPHVFKDUDFWHULVHGDV µPDUNHW
IDLOXUH¶EXWLQIDFWFDQDULVHLQVLWXDWLRQVZKHUHWKHUHVLPSO\LVQRPDUNHWDQGWKHSULYDWH
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sector is operating quite rationally, or where the market is imperfect and operating sub-
optimally. These include the following:57 
The provision of public goods. 7KHVHDUHJHQHUDOO\GHILQHGDVµQRQ-H[FOXGDEOH¶DQGµQRQ-
ULYDOURXV¶PHDQLQJWKDWDFFHVVWRWKHJRRGVFRQFHUQHG cannot be limited to those who 
pay for them and their use by one party does not diminish their availability to others. 
Classic examples of public goods include lighthouses and street lighting, but clean air, 
and certain types of public infrastructure such as flood defences might also be considered 
public goods since there is no scope to create an efficient market for them. 
The supply of merit goods, that is, those goods and services which governments 
consider would be consumed at a lower level than desirable if determined solely by the 
free market, and where public authorities should intervene in order to ensure uptake at 
optimal levels. Examples include aspects of education, culture, health services, museums 
and libraries. 
The presence of externalities - the notion that the activities of an individual or an 
undertaking have spillovers which affect others and that these are not reflected in market 
prices. In other words, commercial assessments of returns on investment do not 
necessarily capture the wider social or longer term benefits. The conventional example of 
a positive externality is research and development. Firms may be deterred from investing 
in R&D because they cannot reap all the gains from their investment (assuming a 
successful outcome) and there DUH ULVNV WKDW RWKHUVZLOO µIUHH ULGH¶ RQ WKHLU LQQRYDWLRQ
This may result in suboptimal levels of investment in R&D, and yet the dissemination of 
new technology has wider societal benefits justifying public sector intervention to 
provide, among other things, WKH µSDWLHQW ORQJ-WHUPILQDQFH¶ LPSRUWDQW IRU LQQRYDWLRQ58 
Similarly, firms may be discouraged from bearing the costs of vocational training to the 
H[WHQW WKDW LW LQFUHDVHV WKH OLNHOLKRRGRI VWDII EHLQJ µSRDFKHG¶ E\ RWKHU HPSOR\HUVZKR
have made no such investment, and yet there are wider benefits to society (and 
individuals) of a better skilled workforce. Further examples are urban development or 
energy efficiency projects which offer longer-term societal and environmental gains that 
justify public intervention, but might not attract sufficient commercial funding. 
Imperfect information LQILQDQFLDOPDUNHWV2IFRXUVHµSHUIHFW¶LQIRUPDWLRQLVDSXUHO\
theoretical construct, and risk aversion where insufficient information is available is a 
rational market response by an investor. However, information asymmetries can be 
particularly acute among start-ups who have no track record and new firms in high 
technology sectors, where the risks are difficult to assess precisely because their 
activities are innovative. Such firms often lack the collateral needed to secure capital or 
the cost of capital is too high because of their risk profile; analysis has suggested that 
access to finance is likely to be especially difficult for certain categories of SME, notably 
start-ups, small and/or young firms, high tech enterprises.59 This is an important policy 
consideration because there has been increasing policy focus, at European, national and 
subnational levels on the nurturing of high growth firms.60 This reflects the fact that a 
very small proportion of new firm starts will account for the majority of benefits in terms 
                                          
57 Meiklejohn, R. (1999) The Economics of State Aid, LQµ6WDWHDLGDQGWKH6LQJOH0DUNHW¶(XURSean 
Economy, 3.  
58 Mazzucato M and Penna C (2015), The Rise of Mission-Oriented State Investment Banks: the 
FDVHVRI*HUPDQ\¶V.I:DQG%UD]LO¶V%1'(6SPRU Working Paper Series SWPS 2015-26 
(September), University of Sussex.  
59 Siedschlag, I et al (2014) Access to External Financing and Firm Growth, background study for 
the European Competitiveness Report 2014, ESRI. 
60 OECD (2010) High Growth Enterprises: What governments can do to make a difference, Paris: 
OECD. 
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of investment, employment and exports,61 but significant numbers of ambitious new 
firms cite access to finance as a constraint on their development.62 This focus also partly 
reflects the role that private venture capital is considered to have played in the 
development of high technology firms in certain locations - like Silicon Valley and Israel - 
and in the development of some high profile firms such as Google and Facebook.63 
Indeed, concern has long been expressed at the relative underdevelopment of venture 
capital markets in European countries,64 and at the role of space and place in the 
availability of capital, with capital heavily concentrated in the more prosperous areas. 
In practice, two or more of these situations justifying public intervention may be present 
simultaneously. For example, information asymmetries may mean that assessment of 
very small projects requiring microfinance incur disproportionate transaction costs for 
investors, leading to a dearth of funds for initiatives that could have a positive impact on 
society by reintegrating individuals into the labour market supporting disadvantaged 
groups and/or reducing welfare dependency. 
2.3.2. Can the aims of intervention be met better by financial instruments than 
grants? 
7KH VHFRQG µVXE-TXHVWLRQ¶ FRQFHUQV WKH form of intervention. From a policy design 
perspective, repayable funds are an alternative delivery mechanism to grants. It is 
important to highlight this, since the use of financial instruments is often cast in terms of 
DGGUHVVLQJDµJDS¶LQDFFHVVWRILQDQFH± typically difficulties that SMEs have in accessing 
loan funding or investment capital. However, grants can also be used to address gaps in 
access to finance and the key issue here lies not in the objective of funding per se, but 
rather in what difference the delivery mechanism can make to the achievement of that 
objective and wider policy effects.  
Box 2.7: What are the rationales for choosing grants or financial instruments? 
Grants and financial instruments play different roles in economic development, but their purposes 
also overlap. 
Grants can be used to address a range of market imperfections ± the undersupply of public goods 
or merit goods, as well as externalities such as training or research and development or 
information asymmetries resulting in insufficient access to capital.  
Financial instruments are only viable where the purpose to which they are put has the potential to 
generate revenue or savings which can be used to repay the original outlay ± for example, 
successful commercialisation of an innovation or cost savings from energy efficiency investments. 
The revenue-generating requirement tends to limit the use of financial instruments to certain types 
of market imperfection ± notably those related to externalities or information asymmetries. 
In these areas financial instruments can, at least partially, replace grants as a policy delivery 
mechanism. This has several advantages. In particular:  
x From a budgetary point of view financial instruments should be more sustainable than 
grants 
x The need to repay support may lead to better quality projects 
x Financial instruments can be used to cover the totality of investment needs for economic 
activities, while for grants the scope of funding will be limited by the State aid rules 
                                          
61 Henrekson, M and Johansson, D (2010) Gazelles as job creators: a survey and interpretation of 
the evidence, Small Business Economics, 35 (2), 227-244. 
62 Maula, M, Murray G and Jääskeläinen M, (2007) Public financing of young innovative companies 
in Finland, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Helsinki, Publication 3/2007. 
63 Gompers, P and Lerner, J (2001) The Money of Invention: How Venture Capital Creates New 
Wealth, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.  
64 Phillippon, T and Veron, N (2008) )LQDQFLQJ(XURSH¶V)DVW0RYHUV, Bruegel Policy Brief 2008/10.  
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On the other hand, grants can be more suitable, even for revenue generating / saving projects, 
ZKHUH WKHUH LV DQHHG IRU DQ µLQFHQWLYHHIIHFW¶ WRSHUVXDGHRUJDQLVDWLRQV WRXQGHUWDNH LQLWLDWLYHV
that they would not do otherwise. They may also be more efficient where there is a small number 
of small-scale projects involving recipients such as social enterprises who are unused to market-
based products.   
Grants and financial instruments can complement one another within the same project by, for 
example, grant funding feasibility studies which may demonstrate the viability of support through 
financial instruments or through loans at subsidised rates of interest. 
Debates over different forms of support have long been part of policy design discussions 
in the field of international development aid, and have often been controversial.65 The 
debt crisis in many developing countries in the 1980s led to a reappraisal of the 
respective role of grants and loans in development policy. This followed the so-called 
Meltzer Commission report66 which had concluded that development assistance should be 
administered through performance-based grants rather than soft loans, and that these 
grants should be disbursed not to governments, but rather to NGOs, charities or private 
sector organisations who would bid for funding.67 The practical outcome is said to have 
EHHQ WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI µEHVW SUDFWLFH¶ LQ OHQGLng and grant awards that include 
elements such as debt sustainability analysis for loans or grant financing rationales for 
SXEOLF µJRRGV¶ VXFK DV DGGUHVVLQJ +,9 RU FOLPDWH FKDQJH68 At the same time, an 
emerging strand of thinking eschewed arguments about whether loans or grants are 
more suitable per se, but instead argued that the key issue is how to combine support 
through financial engineering mechanisms that best suit development needs.69  
Box 2.8: What kinds of market imperfection can financial instruments address?  
Financial instruments can be used to support revenue generating or saving investments where the 
private sector may not be willing or able to provide any or all of the capital requirements. 
Examples include: 
x Loans to support training of individuals where the individual lacks the credit history to 
secure conventional finance either at all or on affordable terms  
x Loans and loan guarantees for micro enterprises where transaction costs and risks are too 
high or too difficult for conventional private sources to appraise 
x Equity investment in young firms with significant capital requirements and high risk 
investments 
x Long-term loans for energy-efficiency investment resulting in cost savings and 
environmental benefits  
x Mixed packages of repayable support for multi-XVHXUEDQJHQHUDWLRQGHVLJQHGWRµFURZG-LQ¶
SULYDWHVHFWRUIXQGLQJSDUWO\WKURXJKSROLF\µVLJQDOOLQJ¶ 
In practical terms, a role for financial instruments is only feasible where the ultimate 
investment is income-generating, enabling the initial support to be repaid. This means 
that where public intervention is justified by the need for public goods, repayable support 
                                          
65 It is, incidentally, evident that the controversy arises partly from the formal definition of Official 
Development Assistance and its use as mechanism to hold donors to account ± see Hynes, W and 
Scott, S (2013) The Evolution of Official Development Assistance: Achievements, Criticisms and a 
Way Forward, OECD. 
66 IFIAC (International Financial Institutions Advisory Committee) (2000), Report of the 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO)LQDQFLDO,QVWLWXWLRQ$GYLVRU\&RPPLVVLRQ³0HOW]HU5HSRUW´8QLWHG6WDWHV&RQJUHVV
Washington, DC. 
67 Cohen, D, Jacquet, P and Reisen, H. (2007) Loans or grants? CEPR Discussion Paper Series 
6024.  
68 Arvanitis, Y. (2013) Blending grants and loans for private sector development: the use of grants 
HOHPHQWVDQGWKH$I'%¶VH[SHULHQFH$IULFD(FRQRPLc Brief, 4(2).  
69 Jacquet, P. and Severino, J-M. µ3UrWHUGRQQHUFRPPHQWDLGHU"¶5HYXHG¶pFRQRPLH
financière. 
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is unlikely to be well-suited. In other words, appropriate forms of finance need to be 
tailored to the market imperfection being addressed. Three principal benefits of financial 
instruments opposed to grants are conventionally highlighted.70  
First, FIs are more sustainable because funds are repaid, creating a legacy to invest 
again. For policymakers with long experience of financial instruments, this is often 
regarded as the key benefit, even if it is not always the primary consideration among 
newer FI practitioners.71 Importantly, however, the scale of returns depends not only on 
the presence of sufficient numbers and scale of viable projects that are not commercially 
funded and the scope for timely exits and repayments, but also on the level of costs 
involved in running repayable funds and the need for defaults, losses and fees not to 
erode returns. 
Second, FIs can improve project quality ± this may be partly through the due diligence 
involved in private sector project assessment, but also because having to repay support 
focuses the recipient on the obligation to repay. This rationale is partly founded on the 
idea that the level of deadweight involved in FIs is lower than for grants; there is also a 
psychological dimension as both investee and investor share the risk, though how this is 
distributed will depend on how the instrument is designed. In addition, the use of FIs is 
influenced by the view that private sector expertise in assessing business plans improves 
the viability of projects compared to grants. 
Third, and partly related to the sustainability argument, FIs can make more cost-
effective use of public funds partly because funds may be recycled, but also because of 
their potential to attract private funds. This argument was particularly significant in the 
context of the financial crisis, which affected not only public spending but also the 
willingness of the private sector to lend and invest. That said, there is limited evidence of 
the capacity of public FIs to draw in private capital, and many ESIF co-funded 
instruments use public capital alone.72 A secondary benefit related to private capital is 
the scope for publicly backed financial instruments to support the development of local 
(or sometimes larger) private financial markets.  
Box 2.9: How has the financial crisis affected the justification for using financial 
instruments? 
The financial crisis and its aftermath have increased both the scope and the need to use financial 
instruments in economic development policy. Public expenditure constraints have reduced the 
scale of funding available and intensified the requirement for financially sustainable solutions for 
infrastructure spending. The crisis has also affected access to finance for some businesses, 
especially SMEs; these tend to be more reliant on bank lending which has become more 
constrained as banks sought to rebuild their balance sheets. 
While these benefits might be accepted as conventional wisdom, financial instruments 
are not suitable for all types of intervention. As outlined earlier, the justifications for 
intervening vary and these in turn affect the choice of delivery mode (whether non-
repayable or financial instruments). In practice, however, the academic and policy 
literature reveals little research on the relative merits of grants versus financial 
instruments in different VLWXDWLRQV$UHFHQW µthink piece¶SRVLWHGWKDWWKHUHVKRXOGEHD
                                          
70 European Commission (2012) Financial Instruments in Cohesion Policy, Commission Staff 
Working Document, SWD (2012)36 final, Brussels 27 February 2012. 
71 Wishlade, Michie R, Familiari G, Schneidewind P and A Resch (2016) Ex-post evaluation of 
Cohesion policy programmes 2007-2013, focusing on the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) and Cohesion Fund (CF) ± Work package 3: Financial instruments for enterprise support: 
Final report to the European Commission. 
72 Ibid. 
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presumption in favour of using financial instruments in supporting SMEs, but that grants 
might be appropriate in four scenarios: 73 
x for early stage research and development (where there is an established precedent 
for the provision of grants to new ventures to support proof of concept and provide 
seed funding, and grants may be appropriate early rounds of funding for young, small 
technology-based SMEs) 
x to encourage change in behaviour, such as investment in energy-saving measures 
(using a grant to incentivise behaviour change to tackle an important market failure 
and to deliver public goods);  
x at key points in their development, for social enterprises and charities (some of which 
will never be traded on markets or be financially self-sustaining); and  
x addressing a viability gap to enable a project to proceed (where own contributions 
and commercial sources are insufficient but additionality and value for money criteria 
are met). In these circumstances there may be a case for grant to fill the viability gap 
and enable the project to go ahead, if additionality and value for money criteria are 
met.  
The relationship between grants and financial instruments and their respective 
roles is rarely well articulated in policy ± whether in the domestic arena or in the 
implementation of Cohesion policy by national and regional authorities. There is a need 
for the SME support offer to be coordinated (e.g. FIs will not be attractive when grants 
are available for similar purposes)74 and a plethora of schemes causes confusion for 
recipients.75 While this has not received much attention in the past, the recent evaluation 
of FI for enterprises in Cohesion policy 2007-13 suggests that this is rising up the agenda 
following the wider use of FIs in 2007-13. Some MAs perceived FIs as improving the 
capacity of Cohesion policy to meet targets, in comparison with grants,76 with a key 
benefit being that FIs discourage grant dependency, promote DQ³HQWUHSUHQHXULDOFXOWXUH´ 
and may support (niche) market development. Moreover, FIs require more corporate 
finance expertise, potentially improving sound decision-making.77 That said, grants are 
often considered easier to administer.78 
Box 2.10: Energy Efficiency: FIs v Grants ± the 2007-13 Experience 
Most support for energy-saving in Cohesion policy was in the form of grants; loans making up only 
eight percent of total commitments. A higher proportion of domestic funds were in the form of 
repayable instruments (about one-third). MAs preferred grants for several reasons, including: 
x reluctance by potential applicants to engage with loans (especially in EU12 countries), due to 
a) constraints on public authorities taking on loan commitments (in the case of public 
buildings) and b) cultural reluctance to accept loan commitments (in the case of residential 
buildings) 
x administrative complexity and limited experience in using loans or other FIs 
                                          
73 Regeneris Consulting and Old Bell 3, Grants for SMEs in Wales  
http://gov.wales/docs/wefo/publications/150127thinkpiecesmegrantsinwales.pdf    
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Interests?, Report prepared for the European Parliament Committee on Budgetary Control. 
77 Regeneris Consulting and Old Bell 3, Grants for SMEs in Wales  
http://gov.wales/docs/wefo/publications/150127thinkpiecesmegrantsinwales.pdf   
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x additional demands on target beneficiaries and in some cases significant effort required to 
encourage uptake. 
Grants were considered to be more appropriate than FIs for: ³deep energy efficiency interventions 
where beneficiaries may face uncertainty about the pace and scaOHRISD\EDFNRIWKHLQYHVWPHQW´ 
Such projects are typically: more costly; more risky in terms of outcome (e.g. energy savings); 
and less attractive funded on a loan basis. Deep energy renovations imply higher costs than a 
traditional, usually partial, energy upgrades of buildings. Ambitious investments are needed to 
DYRLGDµORFN-LQHIIHFW¶ZKHUHUHFHQWO\-renovated buildings are still not sufficiently efficient to meet 
policy objectives. High-profile investment in relatively new deep renovation techniques could help 
to stimulate a more self-sustaining market for them in future (providing a demonstration effect) 
and improve skills of the construction industry. The evaluation suggests that the intensity and form 
of support could be differentiated depending on the ambition of the energy upgrade, with higher 
subsidies available when more energy reduction is possible, with linked use of FIs, where 
appropriate. For residential buildings, a higher ratio of grant funding could be appropriate for fuel-
poor home-RZQHUVEXWµFKDQQHOOLQJJHQHURXVOHYHOVRIVXSSRUW¶WRSXEOLFEXLOGLQJVFRXOGGLOXWHWKH
impact of ERDF/CF support and weaken the exemplar role of such investments, and make public 
authorities reluctant to make energy efficiency investments from own resources. Institutional 
constraints to the use of FIs may be present. These could be addressed by to enabling loan 
FRPPLWPHQWVRQDQ³LQYHVWWRVDYH´EDVLVRUWKURXJKYHKLFOHVVXFKDVHQHUJ\VHUYLFHFRPSDQLHV
(ESCO).  
Source: Ramboll and IEEP (2015) Ex post evaluation of Cohesion policy programmes: Energy 
efficiency in public and residential buildings, Final Report to the European Commission. 
The scope to combine different forms of support has been given limited consideration 
in Cohesion policy, but blending loans and grants has become common practice in 
international development finance.79 This involves the combination of grant aid from 
official development assistance with other public or private sources of finance such as 
loans and risk capital. This approach is perceived to offer a number of advantages, some 
of which are relevant to Cohesion policy, in particular: 
x WKHVFRSHWRGRµPRUHZLWKOHVV¶DVDOUHDG\PHQWLRQHG 
x the possibility to ensure the uptake of international political and technical standards 
x the ability to enhance µRZQHUVKLS¶ WKURXJK FORVH LQvolvement in the design and 
implementation of the funding 
x the capacity to open up and provide incentives for entry into new or otherwise too 
risky markets for the private sector, and lever in private funds. 
Potential downsides are also identified, including: 
x the risk that financial incentives outweigh development objectives 
x the possibility that finance becomes too concentrated on certain sectors if funding 
IROORZVµPDUNHWOHG¶WUHQGV 
x ill-defined monitoring and evaluation  
x inefficiencies in the way in which private investment is incentivised  
Box 2.11: What are the institutional considerations concerning forms of public 
intervention? 
Financial instruments vary widely in scope, scale and design, which in turn has significant 
implications for governance and administration. This too means that institutional context and 
capacity play an important role in determining what forms of support are workable. Partly related, 
the maturity of the financial intermediary market can affect the feasibility of introducing different 
kinds of instruments.  
The spectrum of intervention in the form of financial instruments can range from measures which 
involve many thousands of quite standardised transactions ± for example in the form of loan 
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EU? ECDPM Briefing note 55.  
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guarantee schemes to SMEs ± to measures comprising of only a few operations and involving 
complex arrangements and compliance issues ± like urban development programmes. To this 
extent it is difficult to generalise on institutional issues, except to note that context matters.  
Financial instruments have the potential partially to compensate for weak public administrative 
capacity ± for example by using market-based measures in the form of soft loans administered by 
banks, as opposed to grant schemes managed by public authorities. Public financial instruments 
PD\WKHUHIRUHµSLJJ\EDFN¶RQH[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVRIIHUHGWKURXJKQDWLRQDOSURPRWLRQDOEDQNVRU
WKHUHWDLOEDQNLQJVHFWRUWRSURYLGHDQDGGLWLRQDOµWUDQFKH¶RIIXQGLQJZLWKFRQGLWLRQVDGMXVWHGWR
reflect policy objectives.  
Conversely, publicly-backed financial instruments can also help develop weak financial markets ± 
for example through co-financing schemes that, in the long term, help draw in and expand 
business angel networks or regional venture capital markets. At the same time, certain types of 
financial instrument may be difficult to deploy because of so-FDOOHG µPDUNHW WKLQQHVV¶ DQG WKH
absence of a well-developed pipeline of investible projects requiring wider forms of intervention to 
develop the necessary critical mass.   
In considering forms of intervention and rationales for FIs, it is important to stress that 
WKHWHUPµILQDQFLDOLQVWUXPHQW¶HQFRPSDVVHV very diverse financial products that 
differ considerably in terms of their suitability for different targets, their implications for 
recipients and their modes of governance, among other things; in short, the common 
denominator is simply that funding is repayable. The conventional breakdown 
distinguishes loans, guarantees and equity, but there are a number of variants and the 
possibility of combining one or more product to meet the needs of both the funder and 
the final recipient. The various forms also carry advantages and disadvantages for 
recipients and policymakers.  
Box 2.12: What are the roles of different financial products?  
Although often discussed collectively, financial instruments comprise very diverse products: they 
fulfil different functions for final recipients and have different implications for policymakers and 
financial intermediaries.  
Guarantees are arguably the most straightforward to design, implement and to recalibrate as 
economic development needs change. They have most potential for impact where collateral-based 
lending is the norm and the business population is not asset rich. The use of guarantees (in 
domestic and Cohesion policy) is significant in only a few countries, and the sums covered are, on 
average often modest, partly because they are frequently combined with loans in microfinance 
packages for start-ups and young firms. However, where they are used, their reach can be 
significant, with many thousands of publicly-backed guarantees offered annually in some 
countries.  
Loans are the most widely used source of private finance for SMEs and are offered almost 
everywhere in domestic and / or cofinanced economic development policies; loans are also widely 
used by other project promoters, such as local authorities for capital investment. Loans are 
comparatively easy to administer from a public administration perspective to the extent that the 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIDORDQIXQGFDQEHµRXWVRXUFHG¶RUIXQGVFDQHVVHQWLDOO\EHXVHGWRLQFUHDVHWKH
volume of finance available through existing commercial sources. Loan products can help address 
credit rationing, as well as cost-of-credit issues (through interest rate subsidies or easier terms). 
Loans are typically preferred by some SMEs because there is no loss of control or ownership, as 
with equity, but they can lack the flexibility required by young firms. 
Private equity markets vary widely across Europe and equity and venture capital are not prominent 
sources of finance for SMEs, especially smaller ones. Indeed, across Europe, over 80 percent of 
60(VFRQVLGHUWKDWµHTXLW\LVQRWDSSOLFDEOHWRP\ILUP¶1. Publicly-backed equity is the least-used of 
WKHWKUHHµFRQYHQWLRQDOO\-GHILQHG¶ILQDQFLDOSURGXFWVDQGLVRIWHQUHJDUGHGDVDµQLFKH¶SURGXFWIRU
potentially fast-growing innovative firms. Equity products can provide significant amounts of 
medium-to-long-term capital, but imply at least some loss of management control by founders and 
are typically more difficult to manage for public authorities.  
1 European Commission (2013) SME Access to Finance Survey 
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Loans are the most widely used and simple form of support. The terms of the 
loans can vary widely with respect to: interest rate, coverage, duration, collateral 
requirements, and so on. There are a number of advantages to loan instruments:80 
x Firms may prefer debt to equity due to the lower information and dilution costs.81  
x There is no loss of control over how the business is managed. 
x The amount of capital and interest are known amounts that can be factored into 
business planning. 
x The interest rates can incorporate a subsidised element so that the loan is offered 
below market rates.  
x For MAs and intermediaries, loans are relatively easy to administer and the State aid 
compatibility is straightforward even if a subsidy element is incorporated. 
x Returns to the fund should be quite predictable. 
Disadvantages to loan instruments can also be identified:82 
x Loans may lack flexibility; they must be repaid on a fixed timescale and the burden of 
repayments may affect cash flow and/or the capacity of the firm to expand. 
x Changes in market conditions can affect the ability of the firm to repay the loan. 
x Collateral might be required, this can involve debt being secured on property or 
guarantees, for which further payment is required.  
x For MAs and intermediaries, the key disadvantages are: 
o a capital outlay is required at the outset 
o returns may be unpredictable.  
o Loans funded through Cohesion policy may be either crowding-out private 
investment or investing in projects which the private sector has, for sound 
reasons, rejected.  
o There may be administrative complexities around the management and re-use 
of loan repayments. 
Guarantee funds provide support to companies unable to obtain finance, typically debt 
finance, due to a lack of collateral. Guarantee funds (and cross or counter-guarantee 
funds that provide support to intermediaries providing guarantee funds) are an important 
source of support for new businesses. There are a number of advantages to 
guarantees:83 
x They are relatively simple to design and administer and typically require investment 
appraisal to be conducted on a commercial basis, minimising deadweight.84 
x They have the most potential for high and positive effects in countries and regions 
where collateral-based lending is the norm and where the entrepreneurial population 
is not asset-rich.85  
x Appropriately designed, they provide access to finance that would not be available 
otherwise, and sometimes more cheaply as a result of the guarantee. 
                                          
80 Michie R, Wishlade F and Granqvist K (2013) Financial Instruments for Business Development in 
EU Cohesion Policy: National Experiences, Issues and Options. Report to Lombardy Region on the 
2007-13 Operational Programme, European Policies Research Centre, Glasgow; Schneidewind et al. 
(2013) Op cit.  
81 Rigby J and Ramlogan R (2013) Access to Finance: Impacts of Publicly Supported Venture 
Capital and Loan Guarantees, NESTA Working Paper No. 13/02. 
82 Michie R, Wishlade F and Granqvist K (2013) Op cit. 
83 Ibid.  
84 Cowling M (2012) Credit rationing, equity gaps and policy solutions for financing entrepreneurial 
business in Europe: Theory, tests, evidence and the design and effectiveness of policy instruments, 
report to European Commission. 
85 Ibid.  
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x For managing authorities and financial intermediaries, guarantees require less capital 
outlay. In addition, State aid clearance is relatively easy, especially if the country 
concerned has an approved formula for calculating the aid element.  
x Guarantees can also be useful in addressing credit rationing, for example: where the 
EDQNLQJ VHFWRU LV KLJKO\ FRQFHQWUDWHG DQG WKHUH LV D ODFN RI µUHODWLRQVKLS¶ EDQNLQJ
where commercial loans require assets to be placed as security; where there is a 
diverse entrepreneurial population (poor as well as rich entrepreneurs); where there 
is substantial diversity in the quality of lending institutions; and where access to loans 
is conditional on factors not related to project quality. 
x Evidence suggests that access to credit is of greater concern to firms than the cost of 
credit, implying that loan guarantees might be a more appropriate policy instrument 
than soft loans. 
x Can be a particularly cost effective way of creating additional employment.86 
x Easing access to finance for credit-constrained SMEs, through schemes such as loan 
guarantees, provides support for important agents in the regeneration of deprived 
areas and businesses who are employers of under-represented groups in the labour 
market.87 
A number of disadvantages have also been highlighted:88 
x Guarantees can be costly and there may be no reduction in interest rates in relation 
to the market rate.  
x The disadvantages of loans also apply to guarantees.  
x )RU 0$VLQWHUPHGLDULHV WKH µDGGLWLRQDOLW\¶ RI JXDUDQWHHV PD\ EH GLIILFXOW WR
determine.89  
x It is impossible to measure the counterfactual.90  
x The use of guarantees requires clarity of objectives ± is it to encourage lending to 
riskier projects, which would entail higher levels of default? Who should assess the 
level of risk? 
x From a ESI Fund financial management perspective, a further disadvantage is the 
unpredictability of claims on the guarantee, making the full costs difficult to 
determine.91 
x The relationship between loan guarantees and innovation is opaque and the literature 
is divided on whether publically funded loan guarantee schemes are effective 
instruments for promoting lending to SMEs.92 
Although the co-funding of equity instruments by the public sector has gained a higher 
profile in recent years, equity instruments have been less widely used than other forms 
                                          
86 Cowling M (2010) Economic Evaluation of the Small Firms Loan Guarantee (SFLG) Scheme, 
Report to BIS, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. 
87 Ibid.  
88 Michie R, Wishlade F and Granqvist K (2013) Op cit. 
89 Guarantees may be covering bank loans that lenders would have offered anyway: one study 
outlines a framework of Type 1 and Type 2 errors: if a loan guarantee scheme secures a loan for a 
firm that later fails, this is a Type 1 error because banks made the correct decision not to lend to 
the firm in the absence of a loan guarantee, whereas government-backed loans which are 
successfully repaid would, in the absence of a guarantee scheme, represent a missed opportunity 
IRUWKHEDQN7KLVZRXOGEHD7\SHHUURU¶± see Astebro T and Bernhardt E (2003) The winners 
curse of human capital. Small Business Economics, 24. 1-16.  
90 Rigby and Ramlogan (2013) Op cit.  
91 For other forms of FI, there must be a capital outlay at the start and funds can be allocated until 
they are exhausted; for guarantees, a claim is only made on the funds if there is a default on the 
loan, making it more difficult to assess whether the budget limit is likely to be reached and 
potentially less likely that the entire amount allocated is actually spent. 
92 Rigby and Ramlogan (2013) Op cit.  
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of FI under Structural Funds programmes. Equity investment represented a 
comparatively small proportion of co-financed FIs in 2007-13. Some key advantages of 
equity include:93 
x Equity instruments can add economic value added when designed appropriately and 
used in a relevant context.94  
x Equity finance is primarily suited to firms that have high growth potential but lack the 
cash-flow necessary to borrow from conventional sources. From the perspective of 
the managing authority or investor, equity investment has the potential to generate 
substantial returns through what may turn out to be investment in high-growth 
enterprises.  
x The capital input may be very substantial, and it does not have to be repaid (although 
an entrepreneur may ultimately opt to buy-out an investor in order to regain total 
control of the firm). 
x The investor may also bring considerable skills, experience and contacts that can 
support the development of the firm.  
x For public investors, an equity-type instrument can provide a higher level of 
management control, through higher involvement of the fund in project management 
or the management of target companies. 
x Mezzanine finance may be attractive to small firms which are resistant to pure equity. 
There are also potential disadvantages of equity instruments: 
x Equity investment is a highly specialised form of finance and is only appropriate for a 
very small minority of firms.95 
x Equity investors are purchasing part ownership, so there will be partial loss of 
management control of the firm. (However, although this may be a disadvantage for 
an entrepreneur, it could potentially be an advantage for the public investor.)  
x The main issues to arise in the design of equity instruments using ESI Funds relate to 
their complexity:96 
o Difficult State aid issues may arise depending on the type and scale of 
investment targeted.  
o Management costs may be high, partly owing to the due diligence to be 
carried out.  
o It may prove difficult to lever in private sector investment.  
o Returns are unpredictable both in terms of scale and timing and depend on the 
capacity to exit the investment. 
x These instruments are less successful in regions and countries where the innovation 
infrastructure and ecosystem is not developed enough to support and sustain the 
creation of knowledge that can be commercialised.97 
x Access to venture capital is very dependent on proximity of venture capital firms and 
urban centres.98 
x There is evidence of poor performance where funds are geographically constrained.99 
As already noted, the three main types of financial product have many variants. 
Moreover, beyond ESI Fund policies, an array of complex financial mechanisms is in 
evidence in international development policy, domestic financing of public investment 
                                          
93 Michie R, Wishlade F and Granqvist K (2013) Op cit; Schneidewind P, et al Op cit.  
94 Cowling M (2012) Op cit. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Michie R, Wishlade F and Granqvist K (2013) Op cit.  
97 Cowling (2012) Ibid.  
98 Rigby J and Ramlogan R (2013) Op cit.  
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and through the Investment Plan for Europe and other EU level initiatives, especially 
those supported by the EIB Group. These include various forms of structured finance, 
securitisation and public-private partnerships. 
Arguably the key issue to emerge from the above discussion is the importance 
tailoring the financial product appropriately. Financial instruments within the ambit 
of Cohesion policy in 2007-13 concerned support for enterprises (principally SMEs), 
urban development and energy efficiency. In 2014-20, financial instruments can be used 
for any of the Thematic Objectives, though TO3 (SMEs) and TO4 (low carbon), and 
especially the former, are likely to dominate in the use of financial instruments. 
Different types of market imperfection give rise to different funding constraints 
and solutions, as summarised in Figure 2.12. 
Figure 2.12: Target recipients, market imperfections and rationales for FI 
 
Source: EPRC compilation.  
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2.3.3. What is the rationale for Cohesion policy to co-finance FIs? 
The final, rather narrower, sub-question concerns the rationale for Cohesion policy co-
financing of financial instruments. Clearly, arguments for financial instruments ± namely 
sustainability, project quality and efficiency ± all play a role. However, as the ex post 
evaluation of financial instruments for SMEs100 showed, countries and regions took very 
diverse approaches to the use of financial instruments in Cohesion policy in 2007-13. 
There are few clear patterns underpinning this, but key considerations include: 
x The objectives of the OP and whether these are capable of being addressed through 
financial instruments ± for OPs with small financial allocations, the aims are often 
narrowly focused and may not be susceptible to the use of FIs. 
x Small size of the financial allocation. In some cases this underpins a decision not to 
use FIs partly owing to the relatively onerous administration and governance 
LQYROYHG DQG WKH ODFN RI µFULWLFDO PDVV¶ DV LQ )ODQGHUV %( FRQYHUVHO\ WKH VPDOO
allocation may be regarded as an opportunity to focus resources and create 
sustainable funds (as in London, UK). 
x The role of domestic sources of FI. For some countries with longstanding domestic 
FIs, co-funding may simply complement those resources, providing a supplementary 
µEORFN¶ RI ILQDQFH DGPLQLVWHUHG DORQJVLGH GRPHVWLF IXQGV W\SLFDOO\ E\ HQWUXVWHG
institutions with long experience (as in some German Länder and Wallonia (BE)). 
x The opportunity to experiment with forms of finance not widely used previously.  
In short, there are various motivations for co-funding FIs, but these are very much 
context-driven, reflecting the scale and focus of OPs, the appetite to experiment with 
forms of finance not widely used in domestic policy, as well as the wider domestic 
financial context.  
In 2014-20, the picture has become more complex in two main ways. First, financial 
instruments can be used across all policy areas, opening up new possibilities for ways of 
funding programmes, but also the prospect of applying already complex financial 
products to activities in which there is limited experience. Second, the decline in public 
investment and the need to reignite growth in the European economy have prompted the 
HPHUJHQFH RI D UDQJH RI µVHFWRUDO¶ LQLWLDWLYH LQ DUHDV WKDW SRWHQWLDOO\ RYHUODS ZLWK WKH
objectives of the ESI Funds. Tasks 4 and 5 of this study explore the impact of this new 
environment in practice.  
2.4. What evidence is there of the effectiveness of co-funded FIs? 
7KH µHIIHFWLYHQHVV¶ RI FR-funded FIs concerns their contribution to achieving OP 
objectives. However, FI performance goes beyond the programmed results and targets 
to embrace disbursement rates, private sector leverage effects and the generation of 
returns and value for money. 
While the literature on repayable assistance is expanding, evaluation evidence of the 
effectiveness of co-funded FIs remains limited. What does exist is overwhelmingly 
orientated towards enterprLVH VXSSRUW DQG WKH GLIIHUHQW GLPHQVLRQV RI WKH µDFFHVV WR
ILQDQFH¶ TXHVWLRQ $V VXFK XUEDQ UHJHQHUDWLRQ DQG HQHUJ\ HIILFLHQF\ ),V DORQJ ZLWK
repayable measures under ESF and EMFF receive considerably less attention, reflective of 
the relative lack of experience and lower uptake of repayable assistance in these areas. 
More specifically, much of the wider (i.e. non Cohesion policy) literature focuses on 
publicly backed venture capital. However, this is the least used of the three main types of 
financial instrument co-financed through the Structural Funds. Furthermore, although 
recent attention has focused on the availability of equity, largely owing to its perceived 
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role in financing potentially high growth enterprises, many EU countries have long 
traditions of providing soft loans and or guarantees as instruments of national or regional 
economic development policy. However, these instruments appear to be relatively under-
evaluated, particularly in countries without a strong tradition of regular policy 
reappraisal. Last, and as mentioned above, few studies consider the rationale for the 
form of intervention ± grants as opposed to repayable mechanisms ± or the relative 
efficiency of public funds disbursed in repayable form and their capacity to draw in 
private funding; these issues are mentioned in some studies, but are not the primary 
focus of any of those identified in the literature search.  
Managing authorities report FI data regularly to the Commission, as part of the Annual 
Implementation Report process. However, there are a number of issues with the quality 
and reliability of this data, further complicated by the fact that reporting requirements for 
many indicators were voluntary in 2007-13. Despite this, there is some evidence of 
FIs having helped achieve OP objectives. The recent ex-post evaluation of FIs for 
enterprise support shows that, for the OPs analysed, almost all of the Priority Axes where 
FIs were implemented met their operational objectives, 70 percent achieving them to a 
high degree.101 FIs were found to have clearly improved access to finance for a 
considerable number of enterprises in case study OPs (e.g. around 7 percent of all SMEs 
in Lithuania) - accordingly, an important OP objective, to ´increase SME access to 
finance´, was achieved. However, data was too poor to assess the contribution of FIs in 
terms of final outcomes such as productivity, jobs created etc. as too few MAs provided 
such data related to FIs to make any assessment of their impact. However, the flexibility 
of FIs was valued ± relating to the capability of FIs to offer a wider range of financing 
needs and allow firms to access funds for working capital, which in times of crisis was 
often what SMEs required rather than finance for further investment.102  
In terms of revolving funds and the DELOLW\RI),VWRFUHDWHµOHJDF\¶, perhaps the main 
rationale for using FIs in place of grants in Cohesion policy programmes, there is again 
little evidence on the level of returns being achieved so far by co-funded FIs. The 
µUHYROYLQJ¶DVSHFWRI FIs has been treated very differently among different Member States 
and regions, and many FIs lacked an explicit strategy for revolving funds or providing a 
legacy.103 Data has been found to be too thin and too unreliable to make even tentative 
estimates of µUHYROYHG¶SXEOLFPRQH\7KHH[SRVWHYDOXDWLRQUHSRUWHGWKDWORDQVFKHPHV
in five case study OPs (out of nine case studies carried out) had reported revolved money 
± with a range of between 25 percent and 200 percent of the original amount disbursed. 
Other loan schemes had not yet reached the stage of revolving, partly due to the late 
start and the average loan duration. Similarly, most venture capital FIs were established 
for a fixed duration, typically 10 years, and so the final financial outcome and hence the 
sustainability of the public money invested had not been estimated.  
The potential attraction of additional private sector investment is another reason 
given by the Commission and Managing Authorities for co-funding FIs in Cohesion policy. 
The ex-post evaluation of FIs for enterprise support found that only just over five percent 
of funds paid to holding funds and specific funds came from private sources. However, 
this varied widely between countries, with the UK, FR and PT attracting private finance 
but other Member States attracting none. Levels of private sector participation also 
differed significantly between the types of FIs, with co-funded guarantee schemes 
attracting high leverage rates, and a mixed picture for equity.104 A report for the 
European Parliament found that although the majority of (Managing Authority) 
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interviewees considered that they had been very successful in attracting private finance 
under their FIs, hard data was difficult to obtain and interpret.105 However, the potential 
of FIs to help develop private investment has been viewed positively, and there is 
evidence that ERDF support has helped the creation of a venture capital market in some 
areas where it was poorly developed.  
On the cost-effectiveness of co-funded FIs, there is limited evidence to demonstrate 
whether or not FIs represent better value for money than grants. In the Czech Republic, 
FIs were found to be more cost effective than grants when it came to creating jobs, while 
in Bavaria the opposite was found to be true.106  
In terms of evaluations of specific types of FIs, co-funded soft loans and interest-
rate subsidies may be more cost-effective in creating employment and boosting 
sales for many SMEs in certain circumstances, outperforming grants. However, grants 
were found to be more suitable for small firms who are in need of smaller amounts of 
finance, which would not be provided by private debt finance.107 Co-funded FIs also 
outperformed grants under an ESF measure to fund start-ups.108 While grants remained 
unsurprisingly much more popular, the loans offered to individuals were considered more 
effective as they discouraged those who had not fully considered the viability of their 
plans.  
Box 2.13: Effectiveness of FIs for urban development and energy efficiency 
In 2007-13, co-funded FIs could be used for enterprise support, or for urban development or 
energy efficiency. Most evaluations focus on FIs for enterprise support, reflecting lower usage of 
FIs for urban development or energy efficiency, and the fact that many of these FIs were 
introduced later in the programming period. The majority of existing literature on JESSICA urban 
development FIs, for example, takes the form of EIB-commissioned feasibility studies, seeking to 
determine the correct scale and model for implementation, providing no ex post evidence on 
effectiveness. The long-term nature of the investments made under JESSICA-type FIs implies that 
more literature will emerge over coming years.  
Financial instruments have limitations, for example where a lack of subsidies means 
that new enterprises are less willing to initiate the early stage of innovation, where high 
management costs are involved, or where results are disappointing ± for instance if the 
funds are not achieving the expected returns and are becoming more conservative in 
their investments with the result that they FDQQRW EH GLIIHUHQWLDWHG IURP µRUGLQDU\¶
investors.109Another limitation (also potentially true of grants) is the possibility that co-
funded FIs crowd-out private sector finance. One study questioned the strategic value of 
(co-funded) subsidised loans, as positive effects were found to be negligible or non-
existent, while the potential for crowding-out of local banks was too high. In addition, 
commercial banks risked becoming too accustomed to the risk cover provided via 
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ERDF.110 These limitations point to the need for financial instruments to be carefully 
designed to address specific needs and tailored to context.  
Evidence suggests that FIs are most effective where tailored to specific regional or 
national circumstances DV WKHUH LVQR VXFFHVVIXO µRQH VL]H ILWV DOO¶ DSSURDFK IRU ),V
and models are seldom transferable without modification to take local, regional or 
national circumstances into account. This can include differences in local economic 
conditions, in banking and legal systems, previous experience with implementation of FIs 
etc. Several academic papers emphasise the need for instruments to be tailor-made for 
different areas.111 External framework conditions play an important role in access to 
finance and must be taken into consideration as a significant part of the policy mix.112 In 
some cases this may require significant domestic legislative change ± as was required in 
France in order for the relevant regional authorities to have the legal competence to 
operate JEREMIE-type funds.113  
Preliminary gap assessment or market analysis before setting up co-funded FIs was not 
mandatory until the 2014-20 period, and was not always carried out. In some cases this 
contributed to over-capitalisation of FIs, or poor targeting114, suggesting that FIs are 
most effective where they are based on an accurate assessment of the market 
situation, providing clear evidence for government intervention. Research on market 
gaps and economic structures is key to accurate instrument design and funds allocation, 
as market conditions are diverse.115  
Managing authorities have highlighted that the effectiveness of FIs improves where 
there is flexibility and an ability to respond to change7KH(,%¶VVWRFNWDNLQJUHSRUW
found that most Managing Authorities in 2007-13 had to deviate from their initial plans 
due to changing circumstances.116 The need to adapt to change has implications for the 
ex ante assessment, which should be reviewed regularly to check economic 
circumstances and market needs. Implementation structures chosen must ensure 
flexibility is possible; monitoring has an important role to play in providing feedback on 
performance. For example, Investitionsbank Berlin (DE) works in partnership with a local 
credit research company which conducts interviews with 1,000 SMEs in Berlin each year. 
These interviews assess the ease of access to debt finance and the extent to which 
companies use public finance. The results of this survey are then used to evaluate, 
improve or adjust FIs.117 In terms of flexibility in implementation structures, holding 
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funds/fund of funds models can provide the ability to move resources between funds 
depending on demand, although they bring an additional tier of costs.118  
),V DUH PRVW HIIHFWLYH ZKHUH WKHUH DUH VDIHJXDUGV DJDLQVW µREMHFWLYH GULIW¶, 
ensuring investments are in line with the strategies and targets set. Private sector 
management of publically funded FIs brings additional challenges. An evaluation of 
ERDF-funded venture capital and loan funds carried out for the Commission in 2007 
points out that the extent of public or private involvement in venture capital and loan 
funds can have implications for risk management and the relative emphasis on regional 
development objectives versus purely financial objectives.119 Evidence from the 
evaluation suggests that public sector involvement leads to a greater focus on purely 
regional development objectives. Also, because the public sector shareholders perceive 
the impact on regional development as one of the most important aims of venture capital 
and loan fund interventions, they are often willing to assume greater risks and accept 
lower financial returns. This can increase deal flow and widen the impact on jobs. In 
contrast, private shareholders are likely to be more concerned with financial returns and 
VHH UHJLRQDO GHYHORSPHQW LPSDFWV PRUH LQ WHUPV RI WKH µGHPRQVWUDWLRQ HIIHFW¶ DULVLQJ
from a professionally managed venture capital operation. Monitoring and evaluation have 
an important role to play here ± as do the business plan, funding agreement and 
contractual arrangements - in maintaining a close link between policy objectives and 
outcomes.120 
FIs have been most effective where they build on previous experience in the 
region/Member State. Creation of successful FIs is an iterative process, involving trial 
and error. In Nordrhein-Westfalen, for example, when co-funding FIs under the ERDF OP 
in 2007-13, it was considered appropriate to draw on the existing expertise and 
structures within the NRW Land-owned public investment bank, NRW.BANK, rather than 
setting up a parallel institutional framework. It was also hoped that the use of the Land 
Investment Bank would ensure that the fund was fully neutral and would not favour any 
particular lending institutions. The perceived advantages of the Land Investment Bank 
are its familiarity with the financial circumstances of local firms and its experience in 
working closely and constructively with the different Land Ministries and playing a 
bridging role between the Land government, commercial/cooperative banks and local 
SMEs.121  
Whether support is provided in the form of grants or FIs, effectiveness will depend on 
whether the aid is well-focused and related to the programme strategy. For 
H[DPSOH'*5(*,2¶VH[SHUWHYDOXDWLRQQHWZRUN UHSRUWVRQ ILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWVQRWHG
that in Austria, Belgium and Sweden FIs and grants were considered complementary in 
2007-13 OPs and formed different components of a strong policy support offer.122 Equity 
in particular was considered less successful where the business support environment and 
support infrastructure is underdeveloped, and in general, more preparation and 
                                          
118 Ibid. 
119 CSES (2007) Comparative Study of Venture Capital and Loan Funds Supported by the Structural 
Funds, Final Report, August 2007. 
120 Wilson, K and Silva, F (2013) Op cit.; NEA2F (2013) North East Access to Finance: The Future 
Shape of Access to Finance: Strategic Overview and Recommendations. 
121 Michie R and Wishlade F (2011) Op cit. 
122 Resch A and Naylon I (2012) Financial engineering: Austria 2007-13, report to European 
Commission; Greunz L (2012) Financial engineering: Belgium 2007-13, report to European 
Commission; Nilsson J-E, (2012) Financial engineering: Sweden 2007-13, report to European 
Commission.  
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awareness is needed for SMEs with regard to equity.123 Demand side policies to develop 
entrepreneurial and investment talent and networks are also critical and there is a strong 
need for provision of information, advice and hands-on support.124 This is linked to 
coordination between different government departments and links with the private 
sector. This in turn puts a premium on the need for capacity-building, a key conclusion of 
the 2013 stocktaking report.125  
                                          
123 Cowling M (2012) Op cit.; Baldock R and North D (2012) The Role of UK Government Equity 
Funds in Addressing the Finance Gap facing SMEs with Growth Potential, Paper for the Institute for 
Small Business and Entrepreneurship Conference, 7-8 November, Dublin. 
124 Wilson, K and Silva, F (2013) Op cit.; NEA2F (2013) North East Access to Finance: The Future 
Shape of Access to Finance: Strategic Overview and Recommendations. 
125 Van Ginkel et al (2013) Op cit.  
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3. THE USE OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS CO-FINANCED BY ERDF, 
COHESION FUND, ESF AND EMFF IN 2014-20 
Key findings 
x Member States planned to almost double spend on financial instruments in 2014-
20 compared to 2007-13. 
x Plans vary very widely with four Member States planning to commit more than four 
times 2007-13 levels (NL, PT, RO, SI), and others planning to reduce or even 
cease using FIs. 
x Some plan to commit more than 8 percent of OP contributions in the form of FI 
(BG, HU, LT, NL, PT, SI, UK). 
x Planned FI allocations remain predominantly under ERDF, but usage of the ESF and 
EMFF has also increased. 
x The primary focus of FIs is on SME competitiveness, but support for research and 
innovation and low carbon is also significant. 
x Around half of all OPs (except Interreg programmes) allocate funds for FI. Some 
23VKDYH SODQQHG VSHQG H[FHHGLQJ ¼P; collectively these account for 55 
percent of planned FI spend. 
x 27 OPs plan to allocate more than 20 percent of resources to FIs. 
x Approaches to ex ante assessments have been very varied, with some subject to 
revision; plans remain in a state of flux, with some increases and some reductions 
in planned FI spend. 
x Progress with implementation has been slow ± around 23 of the 160 OP planning 
FIs had operational funds by spring 2016. 
 
The overall objective of this section is to provide an overview of the rationale for, and 
intended use of, financial instruments in 2014-20. In gathering, analysing and presenting 
this information, this aims to: 
x take account of the specific nature of each of the funds: ERDF, Cohesion Fund, ESF, 
EMFF; 
x analyse information at the level of the programme, Member State, Fund, Thematic 
Objective and final recipient targeted; 
x detail the use of FIs by key Investment Area; 
x provide an overview of the main groups targeted; and 
x take account of the specificities of each Fund and, where relevant, draw comparisons 
between 2007-13 and anticipated use in 2014-20. 
The data gathering for this task drew on a number of sources, specifically: 
x Data from each Operational Programme (SFC data) on forms of finance and 
Thematic Objectives at the level of programme priorities; this data was provided by 
the European Commission for the ERDF, CF and ESF. For the EMFF, an initial scoping 
study produced under the aegis of fi-compass provides some initial insights into 
Managing Authority plans for FIs.126 
x Data from DG Regio FI survey of planned spend and progress on FI 
implementation at the level of each OP, undertaken in spring 2015. 
                                          
126 Fi-compass (2015) Scoping study for the use of financial instruments under the EMFF and 
related advisory support activities, Final Report, June 2015: https://www.fi-
compass.eu/sites/default/files/publications/EMFF_SCOPING_STUDY.pdf  
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x Excel-based fiches completed for each Priority Axis where financial instruments are 
now planned, in order to give a detailed update on actual plans for financial 
instruments and progress with ex ante assessments; this information was compiled 
on the basis of desk research by national experts. 
x Structured descriptive information on financial instruments in each Member State 
outlining the approach to and progress with financial instruments; this information 
was compiled on the basis of desk research by national experts. This was based on 
documentary analysis and also involved the collection of relevant documentation, 
including ex ante assessments and evaluations. 
x A two-part online survey of all Managing Authorities of ERDF, CF, ESF and EMFF 
programmes conducted in 24 languages with Part I to be completed by all 
respondents and Part II by those introducing financial instruments.  
x Data on financial instruments in 2007-13, based on information reported by 
Managing Authorities and collated by the European Commission.127 
Figure 3.1: Summary of data sources 
Source Unit of analysis Scope 
SFC data (European 
Commission) 
Priority Axis and below ERDF CF ESF 
DG Regio FI Unit survey (DG 
Regio) 
Operational Programme ERDF CF ESF 
Excel fiches (EPRC national 
experts) 
Priority axis and below ERDF CF ESF 
Structured descriptive 
information (EPRC national 
experts) 
Member State and OPs 
planning use of financial 
instruments 
ERDF CF ESF EMFF 
Online survey Part I 
(managing authorities) 
Operational Programme ERDF CF ESF EMFF 
Online survey Part II 
(managing authorities) 
Funds of funds (FoF), and 
funds within or outside FoF 
ERDF CF ESF EMFF 
2007-13 Summary report 
(assembled by European 
Commission from managing 
authority data in AIR) 
Holding funds, and funds 
within or outside HF 
ESF and ERDF 
Source: EPRC 
A significant challenge in working with these different data sources is that not all are 
complete or necessarily easy to reconcile with one another. For example, '* 5HJLR¶V
survey of Member States in 2015 already showed some departure from OP plans. Also, in 
some cases, the Excel fiches compiled by the national experts made clear that some 
provisions for financial instruments in the OPs were merely tentative, or that a Managing 
Authority proposed to use financial instruments for a priority that was not originally 
planned in the OP. At the same time, approaches to financial instruments are to some 
extent in a state of flux, with many ex ante assessments planned, underway or 
completed, but with very few financial instruments actually operational.  
The aim of the survey of Managing Authorities was to complement the work of the 
national experts (which involved a comprehensive review of the situation at the level of 
programme Priority Axes) with information on financial instruments at the level of each 
OP. While the response rate to the online survey was good overall (and exceptional in 
some cases) ± see Figure 3.2 - inevitably not all Managing Authorities responded, so 
                                          
127 European Commission (2015) Summary of data on the progress made in financing and 
implementing financial engineering instruments ± 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/reports/2015/summary-of-data-
on-the-progress-made-in-financing-and-implementing-financial-engineering-instruments-2014.  
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direct information on the current status of financial instruments remains incomplete. That 
said, responses were received from all Member States, with the exception of Cyprus. 
Figure 3.2: Responses to online Managing Authority survey (by Member State) 
Member State Total Non-
respondents 
Responses Response rate 
(%) 
AT 3  3 100.0 
BE 8 2 6 75.0 
BG 9 6 3 33.3 
CY 3 3  0.0 
CZ 8 1 7 87.5 
DE 33 10 23 69.7 
DK 3 2 1 33.3 
EE 2  2 100.0 
ES 45 31 14 31.1 
FI 4 2 2 50.0 
FR 40 28 12 30.0 
GR 18 14 4 22.2 
HR 3 2 1 33.3 
HU 8 4 4 50.0 
IE 4 2 2 50.0 
IT 52 35 17 32.7 
LT 2 1 1 50.0 
LU 2  2 100.0 
LV 2  2 100.0 
MT 4 2 2 50.0 
NL 6 4 2 33.3 
PL 22 1 21 95.5 
PT 12 4 8 66.7 
RO 7 3 4 57.1 
SE 12 10 2 16.7 
SI 2  2 100.0 
SK 7 5 2 28.6 
UK 13 4 9 69.2 
Interreg 72 33 39 54.2 
Total 406 209 197 48.5 
Source: EPRC online survey. 
The overall response rate to the survey was 48.5 percent of Managing Authorities. 
However, the rate was higher (51.3 percent) among those MAs that had planned to use 
FIs, as indicated in the Operational Programmes. This likely represented a presumption 
that the survey was more relevant to MAs that intended to use FIs, although the 
introductory lettHUHPSKDVLVHGWKDWµQRQ-XVHU¶YLHZVZHUHDOVRUHOHYDQW,PSRUWDQWO\the 
survey elicited a high response rate among MAs that planned significant spend of FIs. 
Indeed, respondents to the survey account for over 70 percent of planned spend ± see 
Figure 3.3. 
Figure 3.3: Responses to online Managing Authority survey (by users and non-
users of FI) 
 
Number 
of OPs 
%  
Plan to 
use FI 
%  
FI total in 
OP ¼P 
% of planned FI 
spend 
Non-
respondents 
209 51.5 78 48.8 6209.6 29.1 
Survey 
respondents 
197 48.5 82 51.3 15107.6 70.9 
Total 406 100.0 160 100.0 21317.2 100.0 
Source: EPRC online survey. 
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The respondents also provide a good representation of financial instruments by Thematic 
Objective, both in terms of numbers of OPs and spend, as illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
Figure 3.4: Responses to Managing Authority survey (by TO among users of FIs) 
 Total 
planned 
FI spend 
Planned spend 
by 
respondents 
% of 
total 
No of OPs with 
planned FI 
spend 
No. of 
respondents 
with planned FI 
spend 
% of 
total 
TO1 3668 2667 73 68 34 50 
TO2 468 404 86 5 2 40 
TO3 11320 7694 68 127 65 51 
TO4 3748 2610 70 79 47 59 
TO5 21 21 100 1 1 100 
TO6 1089 738 68 22 15 68 
TO7 190 190 100 3 3 100 
TO8 569 278 49 31 20 65 
TO9 451 388 86 21 15 71 
TO10 62 62 100 4 3 75 
TO11 8 0 0 1 0 0 
TO99 71 57 80 3 2 67 
Note: TO99 refers to multi-thematic objectives, that is Priority Axes which address more than TO.  
Source: EPRC online survey. 
The discussion that follows explores this from various perspectives, providing an 
overview of trends in relation to 2007-13, including analyses by Member State, Thematic 
Objective and Investment Area, Fund, rationale and Operational Programme. 
3.1. What are the overall trends in the planned use of financial instruments? 
In 2007-0HPEHU6WDWHVFRPPLWWHG23FRQWULEXWLRQVRIDURXQG¼ELOOLRQWRILQDQFLDO
LQVWUXPHQWVRIZKLFK¼ELOOLRQLQ6WUXFWXUDO)XQGUHVRXUFHV. Indications from 2014-
20 OPs are that Member States planned to almost double the EU amount to around 
¼21 billion. Comparisons between countries and time periods are not straightforward 
since total EU amounts vary very widely - and in some countries these have increased 
while elsewhere they have declined or remained stable.128 Nevertheless, it is useful to 
consider whether financial instruments are planned to become more or less important in 
the 2014-20 funding period, compared to 2007-13.  
Member State plans should be treated with some caution since the experience in 2007-
13 showed that only around 94 percent of OP contributions committed were actually paid 
to financial instruments,129 but Figure 3.5 suggests that in most countries financial 
instruments will become more important, though this is not universal. More 
specifically: 
x As before, IE and LU do not plan to use financial instruments. 
x CY and DK may cease using co-financed financial instruments and AT plans 
significantly to reduce their use. 
x IT and BE committed the largest shares of OP contributions to financial 
instruments in 2007-13 (10.1 percent and 7.7 percent, respectively), but 
planned amounts are reduced to 6.8 percent and 4.9 percent of OP 
contributions in 2014-20. 
x Five Member States plan to commit over 10 percent of OP contributions to 
financial instruments in 2014-20. Some ± LT, UK ± were already making 
                                          
128 See Annex 3 for an overview of the national situation in 2007-13 and 2014-20. 
129 See European Commission (2015) Op cit, Table 2. 
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significant use of financial instruments in 2007-13 (over 6 percent of OP 
contributions), but in others ± SI, PT, HU ± this represents a substantial 
increase (from under 4 percent to over 10 percent) in the share of OP resources 
planned for FIs. 
Figure 3.5: Trends in OP commitments to FIs (% of EU OP contributions) 
 
Note: These figures do not include the EFF in 2007-13 or the EMFF in 2014-20. 
Source: EPRC calculations.  
There are also important shifts in the absolute amounts of EU funds committed to 
financial instruments in Operational Programmes. These are shown in Table 3. Clearly the 
scale of contributions to FIs varies widely between countries and these cannot 
meaningfully be compared where countries differ significantly in population and/or total 
OP contributions. However, at country level, Figure 3.6 shows some significant changes 
in OP planned contributions to financial instruments between funding periods. In 
particular: 
x Seven countries plan to reduce OP commitments to FI in absolute terms (AT, BE, 
CY, DK, FI, GR, IT) with significant absolute changes in GR and IT which, as 
mentioned, committed large shares of OP contributions to FIs in 2007-13. 
x Four Member States plan to commit more than four times the 2007-13 amounts 
to FIs in 2014-20 (NL, PT, RO, SI). 
x A further six plan to more than double OP commitments compared to the 
previous period (CZ, FR, HU, MT, PL, SK). 
x Many of the remainder were already relatively significant users of FIs in 2007-13 
and plan to increase their commitments further (BG, EE, LT, SE, UK). 
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Figure 3.6: Trends in OP FRPPLWPHQWVWR),V¼DQGFKDQJH, EU amounts 
MS Planned OP contributions 
to FIs 2014-20 
Nominal change in EU 
amounts 2007-13/2014-
20 ¼P 
Change in OP 
contribution to FIs (as % 
of 2007-13) 
AT 3.0 -7.3 -70.8 
BE 98.2 -60.6 -38.2 
BG 611.9 281.8 85.4 
CY 0.0 -17.0 -100.0 
CZ 521.0 350.3 205.2 
DE 1231.5 206.8 20.2 
DK 0.0 -35.2 -100.0 
EE 240.3 115.6 92.7 
ES 1510.6 556.9 58.4 
FI 29.7 -5.6 -15.8 
FR 665.8 425.3 176.9 
GR 1058.2 -418.9 -28.4 
HR 621.8 621.8 ~ 
HU 2365.0 1586.7 203.9 
IE 0.0 0.0 0.0 
IT 2160.8 -648.5 -23.1 
LT 729.4 320.2 78.3 
LU 0.0 0.0 0.0 
LV 245.1 84.7 52.9 
MT 34.0 23.8 233.3 
NL 85.7 65.9 334.1 
PL 3736.8 2728.4 270.6 
PT 2643.7 2112.5 397.7 
RO 618.1 489.1 379.2 
SE 131.8 57.6 77.7 
SI 438.0 333.0 317.2 
SK 342.9 248.1 261.7 
UK 1194.1 483.7 68.1 
EU28 21317.2 9899.3 86.7 
Notes: (i) These figures do not include the EFF in 2007-13 or the EMFF in 2014-20; (ii) this table 
only includes EU amounts and makes no adjustment for price changes.  
Source: EPRC calculations.  
3.2. What are the main characteristics in the use of FIs at the level of Member 
States? 
For many Member States, the use of co-financed FIs is not decided at national level, and 
as the FI landscape varies greatly within countries, the picture at the level of the Member 
State may simply be an aggregation of what is happening under very different OPs. 130 
The view at Member State level may therefore obscure, rather than clarify, what is 
happening within the various OPs. That said, some broad characteristics can be 
identified: 
x There is more continuity than change in terms of how FIs are being implemented in 
some countries (e.g. DE, PL and UK (Wales), while accommodating modest to high 
increases in allocations to FIs. Sometimes continuity in existing FI implementation is 
accompanied by new initiatives ± for example, in Sweden there is continuity of the 
eight regional venture capital FIs under the regional OPs, but accompanied by an FI 
allocation under a national OP, which will include a national Fund of Funds to support 
                                          
130 See Annex 3 for an overview of the national situation in 2007-13 and 2014-20. 
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equity FIs (Swedish Venture Initiative with EIF) and a national green fund to promote 
the transition to low-carbon economy.  
x Some countries have made a strategic choice to centralise FIs within fewer OPs e.g. 
in Greece, in 2014-20 only the Competitiveness OP plans to use FIs (whereas in 
2007-13, FIs were used in 3 OPs). In Hungary, almost all FIs are now concentrated in 
the Economic Development OP. 
x Change to how OPs are structured within countries has had an impact-on FI 
implementation, again concentrating FI use. In Estonia, for example, three OPs used 
FIs in 2007-13; these have been replaced by a single national OP in which FI use has 
been doubled. In Lithuania also, where two out of four OPs used FIs in 2007-13, 
these have been replaced by a single national OP, with a significant increase planned 
in FIs. In Slovenia, one OP now covers ERDF, ESF and CF (replacing three OPs), with 
more than four-fold increase in planned FI allocations. 
x Six Member States are planning to implement the SME Initiative (BG, ES, MT, FI, IT, 
RO). This required the introduction of a new dedicated OP for that purpose with the 
whole OP allocation in the form of financial instruments. The relationship to FIs in 
other OPs has not always been clearly articulated. 
Under many Operational Programmes, the design and implementation of financial 
instruments remains in a state of flux and the final outcomes are likely to differ from 
OP plans for FIs in significant respects. In part, this is due to differences in how Managing 
$XWKRULWLHVKDYHGHDOWZLWKWKHREOLJDWLRQWRµVHWGRZQDPDUNHU¶IRU),VLQWKH23VRPH
provided an indicDWLYHDPRXQWRWKHUV UHFRUGHG µ]HUR¶DJDLQVW),VDV IRUPRI ILQDQFHRU
left the entry blank, though the narrative of the OP left the possibility of using FIs in 
future open.  
Changes in plans for FIs are also affected by the outcomes of the ex ante assessments, 
which may increase or decrease financial allocations or alter their thematic profile. DG 
5HJLR¶V),8QLWVXUYH\LQLGHQWLILHGVRPHVLJQLILFDQWFKDQJHVLQSODQQHG),VHYHQDW
that comparatively early stage. Indeed, for five OPs where no budget had been allocated 
in the OP, Managing Authorities reported significant planned spend on FIs: 
x &=23(QYLURQPHQW¼P 
x ,7123(PSOR\PHQW¼P 
x ,7123<RXWK8QHPSOR\PHQW¼P 
x 6.23,QWHJUDWHG,QIUDVWUXFWXUH¼P 
x 6.234XDOLW\RI(QYLURQPHQW¼P 
In the case of Czech Republic and Slovakia, these new FI plans represent a significant 
increase in plans to use FIs (47 percent and 38 percent increases, respectively), and 
there are notable increases in Greece (26 percent) and to a lesser extent Italy (13 
percent). However, some significant decreases in planned spend are also recorded 
(Croatia, Latvia, Finland) ± see Figure 3.7.  
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Figure 3.7: Initial changes in planned OP allocations to FIs 
 ¼PFKDQJH % change compared to OPs 
CZ  242 46.54  
DE  -98 -7.99  
EE  -25 -10.30  
FI  -8 -27.63  
GR  276 26.04  
HR  -182 -29.24  
IT  271 12.55  
LV  -60 -24.34  
PL  -218 -5.83  
SK  129 37.60  
EU28 344 1.61  
Note: Only changes of more than five percentage points are recorded here. 
Source: EPRC calculations.  
These data should be treated with caution since many Managing Authorities reported 
that, as the ex antes were not complete, the figures being reported in the interim were 
those indicated in the OP, so for most countries little change was evident at that 
particular stage.  
There is further evidence of the fluidity of FI plans in the response to the Managing 
Authority survey. Of the 82 respondents with OPs where FIs were planned, 24 (almost 35 
percent) said that their plans for FIs had changed in one or more ways (see Figure 3.8). 
Responses included both the intention to increase and to decrease planned allocations to 
FIs, plans to change the TOs under which FIs were used, and plans to change the form of 
finance to use different FI products from those originally envisaged in the OP.  
Figure 3.8: Have plans for FIs changed since OP adoption 
 
Source: EPRC managing authority survey.  
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The reasons for change vary. Managing authorities cite the results of the ex ante 
assessments, which recommended different financial allocations or decisions not to 
proceed with FIs under a particular theme. Changes in allocations to FIs have also been 
attributed to: 
x concern that market conditions are not currently conducive to implementation of co-
financed FIs (low interest rates, and domestic finance with better conditions 
available); 
x a shift in local domestic priorities requiring a shift in funding allocations within the 
OP; 
x decisions to use recycled resources to fund the planned FI; 
x analysis finding that repayable assistance would be more appropriate for the planned 
intervention; 
x a decision to concentrate on fewer instruments; 
x a change in the demarcation of the coverage of different OPs; and  
x advice from financial intermediaries that planned allocations to an FI were too high. 
With some Managing Authorities planning to update or revise ex ante assessments, 
further change can be expected. At the same, it remains challenging to capture just how 
plans are changing until the final details of operational FIs emerge. 
3.3. Which funds do Managing Authorities plan to use for financial 
instruments? ERDF, ESF and CF OPs 
In 2007-13, the use of financial instruments was mainly the preserve of the European 
Regional Development Fund. All Member States that used FIs used the ERDF to co-
finance them, with seven also using the European Social Fund. Six Member States used 
the European Fisheries Fund for financial instruments. The Cohesion Fund could not be 
used for financial instruments in 2007-13. 
In 2014-20, extension of the policy objectives for which FIs can be used potentially 
increases the scope for their use under funds other than the ERDF.131 However, as Figure 
3.9shows, planned allocations remain predominantly under the ERDF and mainly 
in the form of loans.  
                                          
131 The EMFF is dealt with separately (see 3.9) since EMFF managing authorities were not required 
to record planned expenditure by form of finance. 
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Figure 3.9: OP indicative allocations to FIs by fund - ¼P(8UHVRXUFHV 
 
Note: µ),QRWVSHFLILHG¶UHIHUVWRIXQGVXQGHUWKH60(LQLWLDWLYHZKHUHWKHSUHFLVHIRUPLVQRW\HW
determined.  
Source: EPRC calculations from OP data collated by the European Commission.  
That said, the overall increase in the planned use of EU resources for FIs under the ERDF 
and the ESF is broadly the same (approaching double). However, there are differences 
between Member States ± see Figure 3.10. In particular: 
x Some countries plan to use the ESF for FIs where they did not do so in 2007-13 ± 
namely Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia. 
x Some may cease to use ESF for FIs ± namely Estonia and Latvia. 
x Seven (of the 15 qualifying) countries plan to use the Cohesion Fund for financial 
instruments, with significant sums allocated in Poland and Portugal.  
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
20000
CF ERDF ESF
Loan
Guarantee
VC and equity
Interest rate / guarantee
fee subsidy, technical
support
Unspecified FI
Improving the take-up and effectiveness of Financial Instruments 
51 
Figure 3.10: Commitments and planned contributions by fund and country 
 ERDF 2007-13 ERDF 2014-20 ESF 2007-13 ESF 2014-20 CF 2014-20 
AT 10.3 3.0    
BE 158.8 98.2    
BG 330.1 485.2  25.0 101.7 
CY 17.0     
CZ 170.7 521.0    
DE 838.2 1149.0 126.1 82.5  
DK 13.3  9.9   
EE 118.7 240.3 6.0   
GR 1308.1 1048.2  10.0  
ES 950.1 1485.6  25.0  
FI 35.3 29.7    
FR 230.3 665.8    
HR  511.8  110.0  
HU 762.1 2310.8  25.6 28.6 
IT 2525.9 1992.0 261.3 168.8  
LT 394.7 645.4 14.5 40.5 43.4 
LV 147.5 223.9 12.8  21.2 
MT 10.2 34.0    
NL 18.5 85.7    
PL 973.1 2582.6 31.1 107.1 1047.1 
PT 375.6 2068.5  139.2 436.0 
RO 129.0 486.3  131.8  
SE 72.0 131.8    
SI 105.0 382.0   56.0 
SK 94.8 278.3  64.5  
UK 662.3 1194.1    
Total 9890.3 18653.2 461.7 930.1 1733.9 
Note: Figures for 2007-13 refer to contributions paid to funds or holding funds while figures for 
2014-20 refer to planned OP contributions. 
Source: OP data and European Commission (2015) Summary of data on the progress made in the 
financing and implementing financial engineering instruments.  
3.4. Which Thematic Objectives and Investment Areas are being addressed 
through FIs? 
Information on FIs by Thematic Objective is required in the Operational Programmes. 
This information has been partially updated by the Commission survey of Managing 
Authorities enabling, for the most part, the disaggregation FI spending plans under Multi 
TO investment priorities. This is important as it provides a clearer picture of where FIs 
are planned ± in some Member States FIs were planned under Multi TO priorities that 
were aimed at SMEs (TO3) and R&D&I (TO1). In others the focus was on urban 
development with priorities involving low carbon economy (TO4) and environment and 
resource efficiency (TO6), and sometimes social inclusion (TO9) and/or SMEs (TO3) as 
well.  
Analysis of spending plans for FIs shows that more than half of planned FI spend (52 
percent) is targeted at SMEs (TO3). A further 17 percent each is aimed at 
research and innovation (TO1) and low carbon (TO4). This means that around 87 
percent of all FI spend is planned for these three objectives. Comparisons with 2007-13 
are not entirely straightforward because investment is not targeted in the same way, but 
in general terms there is a diversification of planned spend, though SME support, not 
surprisingly, remains dominant, as Figure 3.11 shows. 
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Figure 3.11: OP indicative allocations to FI by TO - ¼PH[FOXGLQJ(0)) 
 
Source: EPRC calculations from data collated by the European Commission. Multi TO refers to 
Priority Axes that address more than one Thematic Objective.  
However, within these aggregates planned spend varies widely between countries, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.12:  
x in some Member States, planned spend on FIs for SMEs as a share of total FI 
spend far exceeds the 52 percent average ± this is the case in Austria, where FIs 
are only used under TO3, Finland (93 percent), Sweden (71 percent), United Kingdom 
(76 percent) and Spain (70 percent); 
x similarly, planned spend on R&D&I FIs as a percentage of the total 
significantly exceeds the 17 percent average in some countries ± for example, 
in the Netherlands 74 percent of FI spend is directed at TO1, Germany (29 percent), 
Estonia (33 percent) and Slovenia (29 percent);  
x the same is true of low carbon economy ± for instance in Lithuania, 57 percent of 
FI spend is targeted at TO4, and high shares are also recorded for Malta (36 percent) 
and Latvia (32 percent); 
x countries vary in the number of TOs addressed through FIs. In many Member 
States with larger ESI fund allocations (though not all), FIs are planned across six 
thematic objectives or more ± as in Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal and Slovakia, whereas elsewhere the focus is much narrower ± on just two 
TOs in Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Malta and Sweden. 
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Figure 3.12: OP indicative allocations to FI by TO - %, by Member State 
(excluding EMFF) 
Source: EPRC calculations from data collated by the European Commission.  
Turning to Investment Areas, the Investment Plan for Europe132 proposed that Member 
States should: 
³FRPPLWWR LQFUHDVHVLJQLILFDQWO\WKHLUXVHRI LQQRYDWLYHILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWV LQNH\
investment areas such as SME-support, energy efficiency, Information and 
Communication Technology, transport and R&D support. This would achieve at least 
an overall doubling in the use of financial instruments under the European Structural 
DQG,QYHVWPHQW)XQGVIRUWKHSURJUDPPLQJSHULRGIURPWR´133 
                                          
132 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the 
European Investment Bank: An Investment Plan for Europe: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2014:903:FIN  
133 Member States were recommended to deliver through FIs a percentage of the allocations made 
LQWKHLU3DUWQHUVKLS$JUHHPHQWVWRHDFKRI³WKHNH\LQYHVWPHQWDUHDV´DVIROORZVLQWKHILHOG
of SME support; 20% in the field of energy efficiency/renewables (CO2 reduction) measures; 10% 
in the field of Information and Communication Technology; 10% in the field of sustainable 
transport; 5% in the field of support for Research Development and Innovation; and 5% in the 
field of environmental and resource efficiency. The use of micro-finance facilities to provide 
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The Investment Plan was followed up by a letter to Member States from the four ESIF 
DGs in February 2015. 
As mentioned above, information on the planned form of finance and Thematic Objective 
is required in the Operational Programmes, but data are not explicitly disaggregated by 
Investment Area. However, as Figure 3.13 shows, there is a µread across¶ between the 
six Investment Areas and the Thematic Objectives (though not vice versa).  
Figure 3.13: Thematic objectives (CPR) and Investment Areas 
Thematic Objectives for ESIF (CPR)  Investment areas for FIs (Investment 
Plan for Europe) and suggested 
proportion spent 
1. Research and Innovation  ĺ RD&I (5%) 
2. ICT ĺ ICT (10%) 
3. SME competitiveness ĺ SME support (50%) 
4. Low Carbon Economy ĺ Measures related to energy 
efficiency/renewables (20%) 
5. Adaptation and Risk Management   
6. Environment and Resource 
Efficiency 
ĺ Environmental and resource efficiency (5%) 
7. Sustainable transport and network 
bottlenecks 
ĺ Sustainable transport (10%) 
8. Employment and Labour Mobility   
9. Social Inclusion and Poverty   
10. Education   
11. Institutional Capacity   
 
2QWKHEDVLVRIWKLVµUHDGDFURVV¶LQLWLDOLQGLFDWLRQVDUHWKDWRYHUDOOapart from R&D&I, 
planned spend on FIs falls somewhat short of early ambitions for FI spend by 
Investment Area. That said, again there are significant differences between Member 
States, as illustrated in Figure 3.14: 
x Reflecting the aggregate figure, many countries exceed the proposed target for 
R&D&I ± notably Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Slovenia. 
x Only Greece and Hungary exceed the proposed target for ICT and many do not 
propose to use FIs for this Investment Area at all. 
x Only the Czech Republic meets the target for SME support, but Estonia, Greece, 
Romania and Slovenia come close. 
x Six countries meet the target for energy efficiency/renewables (Hungary, 
Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Sweden and Slovenia), but a significant number do not use 
FIs to this end. 
x Five countries meet the target for environmental and resource efficiency 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Portugal and the United Kingdom), but again 
many do not plan FIs for this purpose. 
x No Member States meet the target for sustainable transport and only three 
plan FIs for this Investment Area. 
                                                                                                                                   
preferential loans was also deemed to be helpful to promote self-employment, entrepreneurship 
and develop micro-enterprises. 
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Figure 3.14: Planned shares of OP resources for FIs by Investment Area 
 
R&D&I ICT 
SME 
support 
Energy 
efficiency/ 
renewables  
Environ. & 
resource 
efficiency 
Sust. 
transport 
AT  0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
BE  9.8 0.0 17.9 10.4 5.9 0.0 
BG  10.3 0.0 36.6 7.3 11.4 0.0 
CY 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CZ  1.2 0.0 51.7 3.2 9.0 0.0 
DE  8.5 0.0 31.5 2.1 3.0 0.0 
DK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
EE  10.9 0.0 48.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ES  8.4 0.0 39.5 0.7 0.3 0.0 
FI  0.5 0.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
FR  7.2 2.1 26.3 10.0 1.3 0.0 
GR  36.7 14.2 49.0 4.0 3.5 0.8 
HR  4.5 0.0 25.8 9.4 0.0 3.8 
HU  29.9 42.4 34.4 24.4 0.0 0.0 
IE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
IT  18.1 2.7 38.0 9.8 1.1 0.0 
LT  2.6 0.0 31.3 42.3 14.8 0.0 
LU 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
LV  0.0 0.0 42.7 12.3 0.0 0.0 
MT  0.0 0.0 38.2 26.0 0.0 0.0 
NL  19.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 0.0 
PL  7.2 0.0 25.4 9.8 0.0 0.0 
PT  0.1 0.0 37.8 23.3 19.1 0.0 
RO  5.1 0.0 47.1 2.5 0.0 0.0 
SE  0.0 0.0 32.2 22.8 0.0 0.0 
SI  27.7 0.0 48.3 23.8 0.0 0.0 
SK  0.0 0.0 17.0 14.1 3.7 3.4 
UK  8.9 0.0 45.0 9.6 9.8 0.0 
EU28 8.9 3.5 34.0 9.5 3.1 0.3 
Target 5.0 10.0 50.0 20.0 5.0 10.0 
Total FI 
¼P 
3667.7 468.4 11319.7 3748.5 1089.0 189.9 
Total 
23¼P 
41104.0 13308.1 33276.3 39661.4 34993.5 58523.8 
Source: EPRC calculations. 
Overall, the rationale for using financial instruments in these areas is consistent with the 
discussion in Section 2.3. However, variations in usage suggest that it is more difficult to 
address some policy issues through FIs than others. In the areas of innovation and SME 
support, where FIs are used most, they can be seen to be addressing market 
imperfections related to informational asymmetries and risk aversion. However, there 
appears to be more difficulty in addressing externalities relating to information and 
communication technologies and environmental and energy efficiency issues, perhaps 
partly owing to the requirement for supported projects to be revenue-generating. The 
focus of this section is on the rationales for using FI; the rationale for not using FIs is 
discussed later (see Section 4.7).  
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Box 3.1: Financial instruments for ICT 
In 2014-20, only OPs in France, Greece, Hungary and Italy have made allocations for FIs under 
TO2 (Enhancing access to, and use and quality of information and communication technologies 
(ICT)). Among these, the allocation made in Hungary is by far the most significant, representing 
42.4 percent of resources available for ICT under the Economic Development and Innovation OP. 
The launch of FIs under TO2 in Hungary has been a response to the problems faced by companies 
investing in the ITC sector when they attempt to raise finance from banks. In addition to the 
problems faced by SMEs more generally in accessing funding, the assets available to this sector 
(e.g. software, broadband network cable) are not accepted by banks as collateral. Returns are only 
seen over the very long term (average 10-12 years). The ex-ante assessment highlighted some 
general constraints to broadband development, including the administrative burden (e.g. permits), 
taxes, and limited technical planning capacity, and proposed a flexible approach combining grant 
assistance with FIs, as well as a pre-seed/seed capital fund to assist companies at the early stage 
of their operation. FIs will be used to support the expansion of new-generation broadband 
networks, projects that improve the competitiveness of the ITC sector internationally as well as ITC 
upgrading of SMEs. Support is being delivered under a fund of funds: four specific sub-funds are 
planned ± three combined grant and loan FIs and an equity scheme.  
Several recommendations have so far emerged relating to FIs under TO2 from the Hungarian 
Economic Development and Innovation OP:  
x Setting up the FIs has taken longer than expected.  
x Administrative capacity required to operate FIs under TO2 is found to be unique; ICT specialists 
must be involved at various stages of implementation (e.g. call for proposals, project appraisal) 
so the fund of the funds has engaged external experts. 
x As the direction of ICT development is quite unpredictable, financing terms and calls should 
remain relatively broadly defined.  
x There is a need for support for companies to prepare for the receipt of seed/start-up capital 
(e.g. mentoring and incubation).   
x The need for marketing of the FI products among entrepreneurs is evident. 
x Lack of direct experience with TO2-related FIs may have contributed to over-ambitious targets 
having been set.  
x The use of combined grant and loan schemes increases complexity, as it involves two funding 
regimes and two calls (the MA manages the grant element). Two delivery regimes must be 
harmonised and two sets of procedures must be harmonised. 
Source: EPRC Case study research ± see Annex 1. 
The survey asked Managing Authorities to select up to five factors which were important 
in the decision to use financial instruments for a given TO (see Figure 3.15). This shows 
that more than 80 percent of Managing Authorities considered that FIs were needed to 
address a finance gap or an identified market failure (it is perhaps surprising that not all 
MAs selected this factor). The next most important factors were to improve cost-
effectiveness of spend and to reduce the dependence on grants.  
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Figure 3.15: PleDVHVHOHFWXSWRILYHIDFWRUVIRUXVLQJ),V«DOO72V 
 
Source: EPRC survey of Managing Authorities. 
Interestingly, these rationales differ somewhat by Thematic Objective, though some 
caution must be exercised given the comparatively small sample ± see Figure 3.16.  
For all TOs, the need to address finance gaps / market failures was viewed as 
the most important factor, but the emphasis varies between TOs. For TO1 
(R&D&I), 89 percent of respondents considered this one of the five most important 
factors, while for TO6 (environment and resource efficiency), just 69 percent considered 
this important.  
For TO1 (R&D&I) and TO4 (low carbon), the second and third most cited rationales were 
reducing dependence on grants and improving costs effectiveness.  
For TO3 (SMEs), the second factor was also cost-effectiveness, but the third factor was 
the view that FIs have advantages for final recipients. The ex post evaluation of financial 
instruments under Cohesion policy 2007-13 suggests that this might relate to issues such 
as the capacity to cover a larger proportion of investment requirements and/or greater 
flexibility in spending.  
TO8 (Employment and labour mobility) displays a slightly different profile from other 
TOs. Encouragement from the European Commission is more important for the use of FIs 
LQWKLV72WKDQDQ\RWKHUDQGLWLVWKHRQO\72ZKHUHµHQFRXUDJLQJILQDQFLDOGLVFLSOLQH¶LV
a significant factor underpinning the use of FIs.  
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Figure 3.163OHDVHVHOHFWXSWRILYHIDFWRUVIRUXVLQJ),V«VHOHFWHG72V 
 
Note: Only TOs where more than ten Managing Authorities proposed to use FIs are included. 
Source: EPRC survey of Managing Authorities. 
3.5. What are the key patterns in the planned use of FI at OP level? 
Aggregate information conceals an extremely varied picture of planned financial 
instruments at OP level. This is partly due to the varying structures of OPs (some 
national, some regional, some thematic, some covering more than one fund) and their 
varying size (partly a result of different OP structures, but also a consequence of country 
size and eligibility for ESI funds).  
Setting aside EMFF OPs, which are discussed separately (see 3.10 below), and Interreg 
programmes134, where no OP made plans for financial instruments, there are 315 OPs in 
total. Of these, 160 OPs allocate funds for financial instruments. However, the scale 
of planned financial instruments varies extremely widely both in absolute terms and in 
their importance within the relevant OP. 
Of the 315 ERDF, CF and ESF OPs, 14 OPs have planned FI spend exceeding 
¼P;135 collectively these 14 OPs alone account for over 55 percent of planned FI 
spend. As Table 6 shows, however, it does not follow that where planned FIs are large in 
absolute terms they also account for a large share of OP spend. For example, the Polish 
23 ,QIUDVWUXFWXUH DQG(QYLURQPHQW DOORFDWHV RYHU ¼ ELOOLRQ WR ),V EXW WKLV UHSUHVHQWV
less than four percent of OP spend. At the opposite end of the spectrum, some 50 OPs 
SODQWRDOORFDWHDURXQG¼PRUOHVVWRILQDQFLDOLQVWUXPHQWVEXWWKLVPD\DFFRXQWIRUD
large share of spend in OPs with small budgets).  
                                          
134 ,QWHUUHJLVXVHGDVWKHµEUDQGQDPH¶IRU(XURSHDQ Territorial Cooperation programmes.  
135 EU amount. 
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An important point to note here is that, under some OPs, the amounts now planned for 
FIs changed following the adoption of the OPs. In some cases these changes were 
significant. For example: 
x As noted above, OP Environment (CZ) QRZSODQV¼P on FIs which was not 
envisaged in the OP, representing over 9 percent of planned OP spend (which 
would place this OP in Figure 3.17) 
x OP Competitiveness, Entrepreneurship and Innovation (GR) has increased the 
planned allocation to FIs by almost one third WR¼PLOOLRQ 
x OP Infrastructure and Environment (PL) now plans FI spend at around half the 
planned amount on FIs FXWIURP¼PLOOLRQWR¼PLOOLRQ 
x Several OPs now anticipate reduced levels of spend on FI ± /DWYLDGRZQIURP¼
PLOOLRQWR¼PLOOLRQ&URDWLDGRZQIURP¼PLOOLRQWR¼PLOOLRQ/ombardia 
GRZQ IURP ¼ PLOOLRQ WR ¼ PLOOLRQ DQG 3XJOLD GRZQ IURP ¼ PLOOLRQ WR
¼PLOOLRQ 
Although there are examples of FI spend expected to increase (e.g. Greece), in the main, 
among OPs where plans have changed, the trend is downwards, and in some cases by 
quite significant amounts. Another important observation is the progress with 
implementation among OPs with significant FI planned budgets. As Figure 3.17 shows, 
the majority of OPs in this ranking do not have operational FIs; this has potentially 
important implications for the capacity of planned spend on FIs to be absorbed in 
practice.  
Figure 3.1723VUDQNHGE\SODQQHGDOORFDWLRQVWR),V¼P 
MS OP name FI 
Total 
¼P 
FI as 
% of 
OP 
Change 
since 
OP? 
New FI 
total 
¼P 
FIs 
opera-
tional 
HU Economic Development & Innovation OP 2235.2 28.9 N  Y 
GR Competitiveness, Entrepreneurship & 
Innovation OP 
1058.2 29.0 Y 1334 N 
PL OP Infrastructure & Environment 1047.1 3.8 Y 556 N 
PL OP Smart growth 892.3 10.4 Y 1095 N 
UK ERDF England OP 882.5 24.3 N  N 
PT ROP Norte 866.2 25.6 N  N 
ES SME Initiative ERDF 2014-20 OP 800.1 100.0 N  Y 
IT NOP Enterprises & Competitiveness 798.4 47.6 Y 864 N 
LT OP for ESIF 2014-2020 729.4 10.9 N  Y 
PT ROP Centro 582.0 27.0 N  N 
HR Competitiveness & Cohesion OP 511.8 7.4 Y 380 N 
SI OP Implementation of Cohesion Policy 
2014-20 
438.0 14.5 Y 449 N 
PT Sustainability & Resource Efficiency OP 436.0 19.4 N  N 
CZ Enterprise & Innovation for 
Competitiveness 
433.1 10.0 N  N 
RO Regional Operational Programme 336.3 5.0 N  N 
PT ROP Alentejo 269.4 24.9 N  N 
ES Smart growth ERDF 2014-20 OP 252.7 6.4 N  N 
LV Growth & Employment 245.1 5.5 Y 185 N 
EE OP Cohesion Policy Funding 2014-2020 240.3 6.8 N  Y 
IT ROP Lombardia ERDF 221.2 45.6 Y 173 Y 
IT ROP Puglia ERDF ESF 220.0 6.2 Y 131 N 
PL ROP Kujawsko-Pomorskie 2014-2020 204.9 10.8 Y 234 N 
DE OP Berlin ERDF 2014-2020 200.5 31.6 N  Y 
BG OP Innovations & Competitiveness 199.8 18.5 N  N 
  14100.5     
Note: 7KHVWRFNRIRSHUDWLRQDO),VLVDµVQDSVKRW¶(spring 2016) and is evolving. 
Source: EPRC calculations.  
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Financial instruments also vary in relative importance within OPs ± see Figure 3.18. Six 
Member States are implementing the SME Initiative, or planning to (BG, ES, MT, FI, IT, 
RO), so that the whole OP allocation is in the form of financial instruments. Beyond these 
specific cases, however, 27 OPs plan to allocate more than 20 percent or more of 
OP funds to financial instruments, making FIs a potentially significant component of 
the overall programme.  
In some cases, planned OP contributions to FI are significant in both absolute and 
relative terms ± note that 10 OPs feature in both rankings (marked in bold in Figure 
3.18) and together account for well over a third of planned OP contributions to 
financial instruments.  
Again, as noted above, progress with implementation has been rather modest, with the 
risk that some programmes may struggle to invest the sums planned for FI in the 
required timeframe, with implications for absorption under the OP as a whole, given the 
relative importance of FI within them. 
Figure 3.18: OPs ranked by planned allocations to FIs (as % of OP total) 
MS OP name FI 
Total 
¼P 
FI as % 
of OP 
Change 
since 
OP? 
New 
FI 
total 
¼P 
FIs 
opera-
tional 
ES SME Initiative ERDF 2014-20 OP 800.1 100.0 N  Y 
BG Operational Programme under the SME 
Initiative 
102.0 100.0 N  N 
IT National operational programme SME 
Initiative  
100.0 100.0 N  N 
RO Operational Programme 'SME Initiative' 
Romania 
100.0 100.0 N  N 
FI SME Initiative ERDF 2014-20 OP 20.0 100.0 N  N 
MT Stimulate private sector investment for 
economic growth 
15.0 100.0 N  N 
IT NOP Enterprises & Competitiveness 798.4 47.6 Y 864 N 
SE National ERDF OP for investments in 
growth and jobs 2014-2020 
61.9 46.5 N  N 
IT ROP Lombardia ERDF 221.2 45.6 Y 173 Y 
NL OP West Netherlands ERDF 2014-2020 62.9 33.1 N  N 
DE OP Berlin ERDF 2014-2020 200.5 31.6 N  Y 
FI Entrepreneurship and skills, Åland 
Structural Fund OP 2014-2020 
1.5 30.2 N  N 
ES Madrid ERDF 2014-20 OP 75.0 30.0 N  N 
UK United Kingdom - ERDF Northern Ireland 91.1 29.6 N  Y 
GR Competitiveness, Entrepreneurship 
& Innovation OP 
1058.2 29.0 Y 1334 N 
HU Economic Development & 
Innovation OP 
2235.2 28.9 N  Y 
PT Regional OP Centro 582.0 27.0 N  N 
PT Regional OP Norte 866.2 25.6 N  N 
PT Regional OP Alentejo 269.4 24.9 N  N 
UK United Kingdom - ERDF England 882.5 24.3 N  N 
SE Stockholm 8.0 21.6 Y 9.5 N 
IT ROP Toscana ERDF 85.2 21.5 Y 59.1 Y 
DE OP Bremen ERDF 2014-2020 21.4 20.8 Y 23.1 N 
ES Castilla y León ERDF 2014-20 OP 64.7 20.6 N  N 
IT ROP Marche ERDF 34.2 20.3 N  N 
SE South Sweden 12.2 20.0 Y 11.9 N 
NL OP South Netherlands ERDF 2014-2020 22.7 20.0 N  N 
Note: The stock of operatiRQDO),VLVDµVQDSVKRW¶(spring 2016) and is evolving. 
Source: EPRC research. 
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3.6. What is the progress with FI implementation in 2014-20? 
The Common Provisions Regulation alters the terms on which financial instruments can 
be used in ESI funds (compared to 2007-13) since it requires Managing Authorities both 
to indicate their intention to use FIs in the OPs and to conduct an ex ante assessment 
prior to introducing them. All Member States at least leave open the possibility of using 
financial instruments, though the extent to which this is being actively pursued varies.  
There are four Member States where no OPs currently have planned contributions 
to FIs. In Ireland and Luxembourg, while the option of using FIs is mentioned, there is 
no evidence of any intent to pursue this and neither country used FIs in 2007-13.136 In 
Cyprus, reference is made to the possibility of using FIs for a number of priorities, to be 
defined on the basis of an ex ante assessment. However, if the ex ante is undertaken and 
co-financed FIs introduced, it seems probable that this it would be part of the Cyprus 
Entrepreneurship Fund, through which a number of financial products are provided with 
(,%LQYROYHPHQW,Q'HQPDUNDµJDSDQDO\VLV¶ZDVFRQGXFWHGLQDQGWKLVQRWHGWKH
opportunity for co-financed FIs to address market gaps, but political consensus to pursue 
this, while also ensuring additionality to the national Danish Growth Fund, has not yet 
been reached. Both Cyprus and Denmark used co-financed FIs in 2007-13. 
The remaining 24 Member States plan to use FIs, at least in some of their 
Operational Programmes. The nature and scale of FI plans varies considerably between 
and within Member States. It is worth noting that in most countries, there is no real 
national perspective on co-financed FIs ± uptake and implementation varies markedly 
across OPs within countries, especially regional OPs.  
Progress in implementation also varies markedly within and between countries. Many 
Member States are still at quite an early stage in FI implementation (although the picture 
is continually changing and developing). For example, Croatia, which has reduced initial 
allocations planned for FIs, does not yet have any FIs at operational stage; Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Romania all 
appear to be at similarly early stages. In Greece, a comprehensive update of the ex ante 
assessments is being procured. 
Progress is mixed in France, where almost all regional OPs foresee using FIs, but only 
two are so far operational. In England (UK), the consolidation of what was formerly ten 
regional ERDF OPs in 2007-13 into one national ERDF OP, alongside the move to a 
localism approach,137 has complicated the potential use of FIs. Overall, 31 Local 
Enterprise Partnerships or Intermediate Bodies are interested in running FIs under TO3, 
these are likely to be grouped into five large funds (of a minimum of £25m ERDF) and 
four smaller stand-alone funds (ranging from £1m to over £3m ERDF each). Eleven LEPs 
are interested in the urban development or energy eIILFLHQF\ -(66,&$ µW\SH¶),s, and 
four are interested in the 0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\¶VLocal Impact Fund FI model.  
However, there are examples of faster progress among both very large and relatively 
small FIs. In Hungary, where FIs are concentrated in the Economic Development OP, and 
represent an important component of that OP (29 percent), progress has been hindered 
by difficulties with the selection process, but nevertheless a funding agreement has been 
signed for a major loan VFKHPH¼PDQGWKLVKDVQRZEHHQODXQFKHG In Austria, 
where only one (relatively small) regional FI has been launched ¼P, implementation 
has progressed quickly and awards have already reached final recipients.  
                                          
136 Note that examples of lapsed and non-users of FIs are explored as a case study in Annex 1 to 
this study.  
137 Reflecting the role of the Local Enterprise Partnerships. 
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Figure 3.19 provides a broad indication of the intended uptake of and progress with the 
implementation of FIs at the level of ERDF, CF and ESF OPs. It is important to stress that 
the number of OPs in each case does not equate to the number of ex ante assessments, 
funding agreements or financial instruments related to them ± there is no direct 
relationship between these.138 Nevertheless, it is evident that progress in implementing 
FIs has been rather modest. 
Figure 3.19: Progress with implementation of FI (by number of OPs) 
 OPs (excl 
EMFF) 
OPs 
planning 
FIs (excl 
EMFF) 
OPs with 
µex anteV¶ 
complete 
OPs with 
signed 
funding 
agreements 
OPs with 
FIs in 
set-up 
OPs with 
FIs 
operating 
AT 2 1 1 1  1 
BE 7 2 0    
BG 8 5 5 1 1  
CY 2 0     
CZ 8 3 3    
DE 32 19 15 9 2 8 
DK 2 0     
EE 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ES 45 13 6 1 5 1 
FI 3 3 2    
FR 40 26 10 1  2 
GR 18 1 1    
HR 2 2 2    
HU 7 4 0 1  1 
IE 3 0     
IT 51 24 8 7  6 
LT 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LU 2 0     
LV 1 1 1  1  
MT 3 2 1 1  1 
NL 5 2 0    
PL 22 19 19    
PT 12 11 11 8 10  
RO 7 4 2  1  
SE 11 9 9    
SI 1 1 1    
SK 7 4 3    
UK 12 5 4 5 4 1 
ETC 76 0     
TOTAL 391 163 106 37 26 23 
Notes: Data as at spring 2016. EMFF OPs are dealt with separately as they were not required to 
provide a breakdown by form of finance; figures for Spain, Poland and Germany each include an OP 
where financial instruments are provided for in the OP, but no budget is indicated. The number of 
OPs where some funds are at least notionally allocated to FIs is, therefore, 160. It is important to 
stress that this table is merely as snapshot of an evolving situation. 
Source: EPRC research. 
                                          
138 For example: one ex ante assessment may cover FIs in more than one OP; there may be more 
than one ex ante assessment within one OP; and there may be more than one funding agreement 
within an OP and/or multiple financial instruments within an OP.  
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Setting aside Interreg OPs, none of which planned FIs, of the remaining 315 ERDF, ESF 
and CF OPs, over half plan to offer at least some support in the form of financial 
instruments.139 
A significant number of ex ante assessments have been completed ± an estimated 143 
at the time of writing, though not all have been published.140 Information on ex ante 
assessments is not easy to obtain; their existence may not be known until publication, 
and patterns of publication appear patchy.141 As discussed in Section 3.7, a variety of 
approaches have been adopted to ex ante assessments, with some Managing Authorities 
undertaking ex ante assessments in blocks or stages, and other undertaking updates of 
existing studies. In addition, ex antes assessments may have been undertaken at Fund 
level (e.g. for ERDF) either within one OP or across several, for all funds within an OP, for 
specific instruments or financial products already envisaged or for specific Thematic 
Objectives. Consequently it is not straightforward to quantify progress and to assess the 
extent to which FIs planned in the OPs have been the subject of an ex ante assessment. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that if FI plans under some OPs are to be taken forward, a 
considerable number of ex ante assessments remain to be done.  
Information on funding agreements is limited, partly reflecting the sometimes 
commercially sensitive nature of contractual arrangements. In addition, more than one 
funding agreement may be required to implement a financial product within an OP, so 
the number of OPs with funding agreements provides only a partial view of the status of 
planned FIs within OPs.  
Last, results from the desk research and the online survey of Managing Authorities show 
that at least 22 OPs have operational financial instruments. Most of these are in 
either Germany or Italy, and many appear to be an extension of existing financial 
products. These are discussed in more detail in Section 3.9. 
3.7. How have ex ante assessments of FIs been approached? 
The obligation to produce an ex-ante assessment142 is one of the key novelties for the 
2014-20 programming period. While only 143 of the ex antes completed are currently 
published, from these it is possible to distinguish the variety of different methods used in 
carrying out the assessments. Figure 3.20 provides a breakdown of the available studies, 
categorising the various approaches into ex antes, which have been organised at the 
level of national and regional OPs, for specific FIs, with a thematic focus, or at the level 
of the ESI Fund. 
The most common approach taken so far is for ex-ante assessments to be 
focused on national or regional OPs, with 65, over 45%, of all ex-antes conducted at 
the level of the OP. The majority of these are regional ex-antes, reflecting both the 
significantly greater number of ROPs and the particular approach taken in certain 
Member States, with France, Poland and the UK conducting almost exclusively regional 
ex-ante assessment in line with the OPs. This proportion can be expected to increase 
                                          
139 Including FI-only SME Initiative OPs adopted in Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Malta, Romania and 
Spain. 
140 Copies of the ex ante assessments available to the research team are stored in the Strathcloud 
FI library ± see Figure 1 and Figure 2.  
141 Although ex ante assessments are required to be published within three months of completion, 
it is not clear what constitutes a complete ex ante.  
142 The completion of the survey demonstrated that there is still some confusion amongst MAs as to 
the distinction between the ex-ante evaluation of the OP and ex-ante assessment for FIs. As such, 
the reported numbers of completed ex-antes may be incorrect.   
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further as many MAs for Italian ROPs have commissioned a number of ex-ante 
assessments, which are yet to be published. 
In total, 39 ex-antes have been conducted for specific financial instruments. 
However, this is not reflective of all Member States as 36 of these are from Germany. 
This focus can be seen as the result of the prior experience of implementing FIs in the 
2007-13 period. In Germany many of the ex-antes were for specific regional instruments 
such as the ProFIT Darlehen and KMUFonds under the Berlin 2014-20 ERDF OP, which 
were operational in the previous programming period. The assessment sought to 
determine the appropriate scale and focus to continue using these FIs. The same is the 
case in Austria where the only ex-ante commissioned was to continue the HightechFonds 
operated in Upper Austria.  
Figure 3.20: Approaches to ex ante assessments 
MS NOP ROP FI Fund/ Multi-
Fund 
TO / 
Investment 
Area 
Total ex-
antes 
published 
AT   1   1 
BE  1    1 
BG 3     3 (+SMEI) 
CY      0 
CZ 5    1 6 
DE 1  36  1 38 
DK      0 
EE     2 2 
ES  4    4 (+SMEI) 
FI 1     1 (+SMEI) 
FR  16   2 18 
GR     3 3 
HR 1     1 
HU 1    5 6 
IE      0 
IT 2 4 1  9 16 (+SMEI) 
LV     2 2 
LT     2 2 
LU 1     1 
MT      0 (+SMEI) 
NL   1  3 4 
PL 1 19    20 
PT     4 4 
RO    1  1 (+SMEI) 
SK    1  1 
SI    1  1 
SE    1  1 
UK  4    4 
Total 15 50 39 4 34 142 
Notes: (i) for Greece, Revised versions of the GR ex-antes are expected as current drafts are 
considered insufficient; (ii) Almost all IT Regional OPs have ex-antes underway; (iii) Only block 1 
for England ERDF OP is complete but still included. 
Source: EPRC research. 
For all available ex-antes, 34 have approached FI provision thematically or review 
an individual Investment Area, spanning across ESI Funds and national and regional 
OPs. In Portugal, all four studies carried out are extensive thematic ex-ante assessments, 
comprising enterprise support, energy efficiency, urban development and innovation and 
social entrepreneurship. Each ex-ante covers the relevant national thematic OP and the 
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seven ROPs.143 Similarly, Hungary has produced a series of studies for each Thematic 
Objective being used for FIs, with ex-ante assessments for Thematic Objectives 1, 2, 3, 4 
and 8.  
Few ex-antes have been conducted at the level of a single ESI Fund or of multi-
funds, with only four published to date 5RPDQLD¶V RQO\ SXEOLVKHG H[-ante covers the 
ERDF and ESF, across a number of OPs and Thematic Objectives. In Sweden, an ex-ante 
focuses on all ERDF activities, focusing on one national OP and eight ROPs.  
Most published ex-antes have been conducted by private sector consultants. In 
only a very few cases the MA has carried out the assessments themselves, such as in 
Italy and the UK (Scotland). It is common that where more than one ex-ante assessment 
has been conducted in a Member State or region, the same consultant has been 
contracted to complete many of the other studies. 
The ex-ante assessment methodology also varies between Member States, with some 
using several differing methods across all ex-antes and others adopting the same 
approach for each study. In the case of Italy, where separate ex-antes have been 
conducted using a thematic, instrument and OP-specific focus, it is unclear what the 
relationship between the findings of each study is. Similarly, for the SME Initiative, a 
single Union-level ex-ante assessment has been conducted negating the need for 
Member States to carry out individual studies. However, for the Member States which 
have opted into the SME Initiative, this leads to a lack of clarity on the status of the 
findings from other ex-ante assessments conducted prior to opting in (especially those 
carried out relating to Thematic Objective 3). Again in Italy, a number of regional ex-ante 
assessments have been conducted recommending the use of FIs under Thematic 
Objective 3, and there is no indication as to the relationship between the instruments. In 
other cases such as Bulgaria and Romania, ex-ante assessments and preliminary studies 
into SME financing make the recommendation to implement the SME Initiative.  
Despite the various approaches taken, in all cases the ex-ante assessments closely 
follow the regulatory framework as laid out in the Common Provisions Regulation 
(CPR), taking each of the steps of Article 37 (2)(a)-(g). Where the ex-ante has been 
conducted after the publication of the ex-ante methodology (April 2014)144, the studies 
have cited and used the structure and approach provided. However, while the 
methodology recommends the assessors conduct the study in two blocks (first, market 
assessment and second implementation and delivery), almost all ex-ante assessments 
published have been completed in a single study. There are few exceptions, such as the 
EIB-led England ERDF OP ex-ante, conducted at the regional level and for which only 
Block One has been published to date. 
3.8. Who are the principal targets of financial instruments? 
Many OPs contain information on potential target recipients of FIs. The 
information provided varies greatly in level of detail ± while some OPs provide no 
information at all, others describe a very detailed range of potential FI recipients for 
different OP Priority Axes or Investment Areas. The descriptions of target recipients have 
generally been written prior to FI ex ante assessments being carried out, so 
including a broad potential target group gives Managing Authorities wider scope for 
tailoring future FIs according to the recommendations of any ex ante assessment. Many 
OPs have therefore not yet decided or refined their target final recipients for FIs.  
                                          
143 Regional OPs for the North, Centre, Lisbon, Alentejo, Algarve, Azores and Madeira. 
144 Fi-compass (2014) Ex-ante assessment methodology: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/thefunds/fin_inst/pdf/ex_ante_vol1.pdf  
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According to the OPs, enterprises are the principal focus of planned FI activity in 
2014-20. Support for enterprises can include a broad scope of activity, as well as, in 
some cases, very specific targets. OPs envisage FIs potentially targeting entrepreneurs, 
start-ups, micro-businesses, SMEs, mid-caps and large companies. More specific targets, 
which have been described in OPs, include: geographic targeting (e.g. within the 
Bratislava region, mountainous areas in Friuli-Venezia-Giulia and mid-caps in the 
Mezzogiorno); sectors or types of firm (e.g. creative and key technologies, high-tech 
firms, innovative firms, research-oriented firms, family businesses), and stages of firm 
development (start-ups, growth-oriented firms). Enterprise support is envisaged mainly 
under TO 3, but also under TOs 1, 2, 4, 8, 9 and the multi-TO Priority Axes. 
OP Priority Axes using FIs also often target local authorities and municipalities. Cities, 
Urban Development Funds/urban projects, and various housing-related targets also 
feature (covering a broad range of potential targets ± e.g. social housing, owners of 
residential buildings, collective properties, residents). FIs targeting individuals feature in 
ESF OPs, for example, targeting unemployed people, job seekers, economically inactive 
young people, elderly people, disabled people, migrants, addicts, students, community 
workers, volunteers, and marginalised young people and their parents. There are also 
examples of FIs potentially targeting water supply and wastewater management 
companies, energy companies, ITC companies, renewable energy professionals and social 
enterprises. 
Figure 3.21: Potential target final recipients of FIs by TO (as described in the 
OPs) 
 
Source: OP data 
It is difficult to assess ex ante whether the target group for FIs is expanding in 
2014-20. The online survey of Managing Authorities confirms the emphasis on 
TO1 
e.g. research institutions, 
competence centres, 
enterprises (micros, early 
stage, start-ups, young, 
SMEs, mid-caps, large) 
Innovarive and tech-oriented 
companies 
TO2 
e.g. enterprises, research 
bodies, local authorities 
TO3  
 
SMEs at all stages, also 
micros, enterepreneurs and 
crafts people  
TO4 
e.g. SMEs, local authorities, 
municipalities, research 
bodies, energy companies, 
ESCOs, homeowners, 
housing coops, residential 
building owners, social 
housing 
TO6 
e.g. waste and water 
companies, municipalities, 
infrastructure managers, 
resident population, urban 
projects 
TO7 
e.g. commercia l units of 
intermodal passenger 
transport centres 
 
TO8 
e.g. micro/small enterprises, 
individuals, unemployed 
people, job-seekers 
TO9  
e.g. specific targeted social 
and excluded, marginalised 
or disadvantaged groups, 
social enterprises 
TO10 
e.g. higher education 
students, young people 
within education, parents, 
tutors and lecturers, 
professional and voluntary 
youtth workers 
Multi-TO 
 e.g. SMEs micros and mid-caps, cities and their population, local authorities, municipalities, UDFs, 
residents, research, high-tech, spin-offs, higher education 
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enterprise support among the few FIs which have already reached advanced planning 
or operational stage. However, a wider range of potential recipients is already 
represented, even if at low levels, suggesting that FIs in 2014-20 may eventually achieve 
a broader reach.  
Figure 3.22: Target final recipients: FIs in operational or advanced planning 
stage 2014-20 (number of FIs) 
 
Source: EPRC survey of Managing Authorities.  
3.9. What is the scale and nature of operational financial instruments? 
Information gathering for this study took place in the period February to May 2016. This 
exercise suggests that at least 23 OPs had operational or nearly operational FIs. In 
WKLV FRQWH[W µRSHUDWLRQDO¶ RU µQHDUO\ RSHUDWLRQDO¶ PHDQV WKDW IXQGLQJ DJUHHPHQWV KDYH
been signed and funds are reaching, or will soon be available to, final recipients. Of the 
total, 20 are ERDF OPs, and three are ESF OPs. This amounts to over 60 individual FIs, 
with most OPs having launched multiple FIs, sometimes under different OP Priority Axes.  
$VPLJKWEHH[SHFWHGDPRQJWKHµILUVWZDYH¶RIRSHUDWLRQDO),s, many appear to build on 
previous experience in 2007-13. The German Länder ERDF OPs have been 
particularly successful in launching their 2014-20 FIs, all of which take the form of 
specific funds (i.e. not within Fund of Funds structures). Examples are the German 
Länder of Bayern, Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Niedersachsen, 
Sachsen, Schleswig-Holstein and Thüringen. In Germany, FIs implemented at Land level 
are in most cases managed by public entities, state banks or limited liability companies 
with public majority shares. In a few cases private enterprises have been involved in 
fund management, primarily where equity products are involved.  
With a few exceptions, the FIs that are already operational (or nearly so) largely 
address enterprise support (TO3); all types of financial product are represented ± i.e. 
loans, guarantees and equity.  
There are some examples of operational FIs for research and innovation (TO1) and 
low carbon economy (TO4). Breizh up is an equity co-investment FI launched under 
the Brittany ERDF OP (FR) which targets regional SMEs with innovation potential, in 
VXSSRUW RI WKH UHJLRQ¶V 6PDUW 6SHFLDOLVDWLRQ6WUDWHJ\ ,Q DGGLWLRQ, Berlin ERDF OP has 
launched two venture capital FIs, aimed at undertakings in the creative industry and in 
key technology fields in the seed-und start-up phase, and the ProFit loan fund for R&D 
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projects, aimed at SMEs and research facilities. Regarding TO4, several FIs have been 
launched, for example: 
x LfA Energiekredit (EFRE-Projekt 2014B) in Bavaria (DE),  
x KMU-Fonds Umwelt in Berlin (DE), and 
x the ENEF Fund of Funds (LT), which includes two specific FIs, one offering loans for 
financing renovation of central government buildings and the other providing 
guarantees for commercial bank loans for street lighting modernisation projects. The 
FIs are intended to promote the energy service companies (ESCO) market in 
Lithuania.  
Figure 3.23: Operational and near-operational FIs (as at spring 2016)  
MS OP  Fund TO No 
of 
FIs 
FI name(s) EU 
contrib. 
¼P 
AT Growth and 
Employment  
ERDF 3 1 x OÖ HightechFonds 3.0 
DE OP Bayern ERDF 3 
4 
4 x Bayern Kapital Innovationsfonds 
EFRE 
x EFRE-Projekt 2014A 
x EFRE-Projekt 2014B 
x EFRE-Projekt 2014C 
10.0 
 
7.5. 
10.0 
7.5 
 OP Berlin ERDF ERDF 1 
3 
4 
5 x KMU-Fonds 
x ProFit Darlehen 
x VC Fonds technologie 
x VC Fonds Kreativwirtschaft II 
x KMU-Fonds Umwelt 
51.7 
78.8 
30.0 
20.0 
20.0 
 OP Brandenburg ERDF 3 4 x Frühphasen-und Wachstumsfonds 
x Brandenburg-Kredit Mezzanine II 
x Mikrokredit Brandenburg 
x ProFIT Brandenburg 
(Darlehensteil) 
60.0 
22.0 
8.0 
90.0 
 OP Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 
ERDF  1 x BMV-Darlehen N/A 
 OP Niedersachsen ERDF  1 x MikroSTARTer Niedersachsen N/A 
 OP Sachsen ERDF  3 x Nachrangdarlehensfonds II zur 
Verbesserung der regionalen 
Wirtschaftsstruktur 
x Technologiegründerfonds Sachsen 
+ 
x Darlehensfonds zur 
Markteinführung innovativer 
Produkte Sachsen 
N/A 
 OP Schleswig-
Holstein 
ERDF  2 x Beteiligungsfonds für KMU (EFRE 
IV) 
x Seed- und Start-up-Fonds II 
(EFRE V) 
N/A 
 OP Thüringen ERDF  4 x 2 equity funds  
x 2 loan funds 
N/A 
 OP ESF Federal 
Germany 
ESF  1 x Mikromezzaninfonds Deutschland N/A 
EE OP for Cohesion 
Policy Funding 
ERDF  3 x ESTFund Fund of Funds 
- Venture Capital Fund 
- Expansion Capital Fund 
- Business Angel Co-
Investment Fund 
60.0 
(30) 
(15) 
(15) 
ES SME Initiative ERDF 3  x SME Initiative 800.0 
FR OP Bretagne ERDF 3 1 x Breizh up 8.0 
 OP Nord-pas-de-
Calais 
ERDF 4 1 x CAP 3ème Révolution Industrielle 12.5 
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MS OP  Fund TO No 
of 
FIs 
FI name(s) EU 
contrib. 
¼P 
HU Economic 
Development and 
Innovation 
ERDF 1 
2 
3 
4 
8 
19 x Fund of Funds Hungarian 
Development Bank  
- 19 specific funds 
2,235.2 
IT National OP 
Active 
Employment 
Policies 
ESF  1 x Revolving Fund SELFIEmployment 
(Invitalia) 
50.0 
 National OP 
Youth 
Employment 
ESF  1 x Revolving Fund SELFIEmployment 
(Invitalia) 
N/A 
 ROP Liguria ERDF 1 
3 
4 
 x Loans and guaranteed credit (IP 
3c) via Artigiancassa 
N/A 
 ROP Lombardia ERDF 1-4  x Open calls: 
x FRIM FESR 2020  
x Line R&D FM Finlombarda 
(combined) 
Line 3.b.2.1 and 3.b.2.2 on 
cultural and tourist attractors 
(combined) 
N/A 
 
 
 ROP Piemonte ERDF 1-4  x SME Fund N/A 
 ROP Toscana  ERDF 1 
3 
4 
 x Revolving loan fund and 
guarantee fund, calls are open via 
Toscana Muove  
N/A 
LT OP Structural 
Funds 
Investments  
ERDF 4 2 x Energy Efficiency Fund (ENEF) 80.0 
UK Northern Ireland ERDF 3 6 x Co-Investment Fund 
x Crescent Capital 
x Kernel Capital 
x TechStart NI SME 
x TechStart NI Queens University 
x TechStart NI University of Ulster  
23.7 
25.1 
25.1 
14.6 
1.3 
1.3 
Source: EPRC national expert research; EPRC online survey of managing authorities. 
The ENEF Fund of Funds in Lithuania is one of several Funds of Funds which have been 
launched. Of these, the Hungarian Development Bank Fund of Funds is the largest, with 
19 specific funds within it, and a total EU FRQWULEXWLRQ RI ¼ PLOOLRQ. The funding 
allocated was the maximum available under the relevant Priority Axis of the Economic 
Development and Innovation OP, which was an FI-only Priority. Due to the tripled 
allocation of resources compared to 2007-13, the OP applied a broad, open approach, 
covering TOs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8.  
In addition, FIs combining ESIF and EFSI resources have been launched in Estonia 
and Région Les Hauts de France (Nord-Pas-de-Calais/Picardie) (FR):  
x EstFund (EE) ± launched under the Estonian OP for Cohesion Policy Funds (ERDF, 
ESF, CF) LQYROYHVFUHDWLQJD)XQGRI)XQGVZLWKDEXGJHWRI¼PLOOLRQ¼PLOOLRQ
IURP(5') ZKLFKZLOO EHPDQDJHGE\ WKH (,) DQG¼PLOOLRQ IURP WKH (,)¶V FR-
LQYHVWPHQW DV ZHOO DV ¼ PLOOLRQ H[SHFWHG IURP SULYDWH LQYHVWRUV 72 7KH
Specific FIs under the FoF will provide equity to final recipients, and include a Venture 
&DSLWDO)XQG¼PLOOLRQDQ([SDQVLRQ&DSLWDO)XQG¼PLOOLRQDQGD%XVLQHVV
Angel Co-,QYHVWPHQW)XQG¼PLOOLRQ(VW)XQGZLOOWDUJHWVPDOOHUDQGHDUOLHUVWDJH
investments, operating in a complementary way to the existing Baltic Innovation 
Fund. EstFund operates as a cross-border instrument; ESIF funds will be invested in 
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Estonian SMEs and some private investor contributions can be invested outside 
Estonia. 
x CAP 3ème Révolution Industrielle (TRI) - The TRI fund launched by Région Les Hauts 
de France (Nord-pas-de-Calais/Picardie) (FR) will assist business-led investments in 
µORZFDUERQHFRQRP\¶SURMHFWV727KHWRWDOEXGJHWRIXSWR¼PLOOLRQLVPDGH
XSRI¼PLOOLRQIURP(5')¼PLOOLRQDVDQ),DQG¼PLOOLRQDVDJUDQWIURP
7$ ¼ PLOOLRQ IURP &UpGLW $JULFROH 1RUG GH )UDQFH FRPPHUFLDO EDQNSULYDWH
investor), DQGDQ(,%ORDQRIXSWR¼PLOOLRQEDFNHGE\DQ()6,JXDUDQWHH145 The 
TA element will be used to fund technical, environmental or economic studies, either 
helping project promoters implement their projects or providing independent 
performance evaluation.  
Additional details on a selection of operational FIs are provided in Annex 4.  
3.10. What are the plans for and progress of financial instruments under the 
EMFF?146 
In the last planning period, use of financial instruments under the European Fisheries 
Fund (EFF) was limited. Six Member States set up FIs under the EFF in 2007-13, 
accounting for just 1.5 percent of EFF funding.147 Half of the FIs set up were guarantee 
schemes, the other half were loans ± see Figure 3.24.  
Figure 3.24: European Fisheries Fund FIs in 2007-13 
Member State FI name Product 
type 
Budget  
¼P 
Bulgaria Guarantees for aquaculture SMEs guarantees N/A 
Estonia Loans for aquaculture SMEs loans 36 
Greece Guarantees for aquaculture, processing and 
vessel modernisation 
guarantees 35 
Latvia Latvian Credit Fund (combined with EAFRD) loans 7.2 
Netherlands Netherlands Fisheries Investment Fund loans 3.5 
Romania Guarantees for aquaculture SMEs guarantees 17.5 
Source: Based on data in Scoping study (2015) 
The scoping study carried out for fi-compass reviewed Partnership Agreements (PA) and 
draft EMFF OPs, and carried out a consultation exercise WR DVVHVV 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶
intentions for FI use in 2014-20. At that time (May 2015), nearly two-thirds of Member 
States reported firm or tentative plans to use FIs. However, only three Member States 
had at that point completed or initiated the relevant ex ante assessments.  
Looking to 2014-20, the approved OPs and the online survey of managing authorities 
suggest that planned FI use under EMFF has not changed significantly from the 2015 
scoping study outcomes: 
x Only five Member States outlined definite plans to use FIs in their EMFF OPs.148  
                                          
145 https://www.fi-
compass.eu/sites/default/files/publications/presentation_20160322_paris_ESIF_Virginie-
Dubart_Guillaume-Thome_EN.pdf 
146 Note that the potential use of FIs under EMMF is also explored as a case study ± see Annex 1.  
147 Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management Ltd, Eurofish International Organisation, Framian BV 
and Vivid Economics Ltd (2015) Scoping study for the use of financial instruments under the EMFF 
and related advisory support activities, Final Report, fi-compass. https://www.fi-
compass.eu/sites/default/files/publications/EMFF_SCOPING_STUDY.pdf  
148 Defined as having allocated a budget for FIs in the OP. 
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x Of these, only three have commissioned ex ante assessments (EE, ES and NL). These 
have been completed, and those for Spain and Estonia have been published. 
However, no funding agreements have yet been signed, and no EMFF FIs are 
operational.  
x $PRQJWKHµWHQWDWLYH¶23VRQHH[DQWHDVVHVVPHQWLVLQSURJUHVV+5 
Figure 3.25µ3ODQQHG¶),VDQGH[DQWHDVVHVVPHQWVXQGHUWKH EMFF 
Ex ante status Tentative FI plans Definite FI plans (budget assigned) 
No ex ante yet BE, EL, IE, LV, RO, UK IT, LT 
Ex ante underway HR  
Ex ante completed  EE, ES, NL 
Source: EPRC research 
Among the five EMFF OPs with definite plans for FIs, arounG ¼ PLOOLRQ KDV EHHQ
earmarked, with Spain allocating the largest absolute amount, but more significant 
allocations in Estonia and the Netherlands as a proportion of the EMFF total. 
Figure 3.26: Scale and progress of planned EMFF FIs 
Member State Ex ante 
assessment status 
¼PLOOLRQ Proportion of OP (%) 
Estonia Completed 10 9.9 
Italy None 20 3.7 
Lithuania None 2 3.2 
Netherlands Completed 5.5 5.4 
Spain Completed 42.75 3.68 
Total  80.25  
Source: EPRC research 
In Estonia, the EMFF OP states that FIs are planned for supporting the implementation 
of productive investments, especially for µfacilitating developmental leaps¶ and reducing 
distortions of competition. The rationale provided is to improve the availability of capital 
for investments and help to ensure sustainable aquaculture development because 
fishermen and aquaculture firms (which are all self-employed and micro/ small 
enterprises) continue to experience difficulties in accessing loans that would enable 
investments to be made prior to receiving EMFF support. Based on the positive 
experience of using EFF FIs in 2007-13, and considering that commercial banks are not 
LQWHUHVWHG LQRIIHULQJ ORDQVRI OHVV WKDQ¼(VWRQLa planned (as of 2015) to use 
around 8 percent of the EMFF budget for FIs (equity and loans) for SMEs in the Estonian 
aquaculture and processing sector. An ex ante assessment was published in 2014;149 it 
recommended four types of financial product:  
x a growth loan for micro and small enterprises, 
x a long-term investment loan, 
x guarantees, and  
x equity investments. 
The online survey confirms that the Estonian Managing Authority plans to introduce loans 
to support productive investment in fishing and aquaculture sectors, and processing and 
marketing activity by aquaculture enterprises. FIs will address TOs 3 and 8. The following 
were given as the main rationales for using FIs in both TOs to:  
x address identified market failures or funding gaps, 
x improve cost-effectiveness because the funds are repaid,  
                                          
149 This was commissioned by the Ministry of Rural Affairs and carried out by Ernst & Young Baltic. 
It covered both the Estonian RDP and EMFF OP. 
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x attract funding within or outside the OP, 
x encourage financial discipline in supported projects, and  
x reduce the dependence on grants. 
In Italy, where no ex ante assessment has yet been carried out, the EMFF OP foresees 
the potential use of: 
x loans: to enhance the added-value of fishing activity and its quality, foster energy 
efficiency investments, support productive investments in aquaculture and invest in 
product processing, 
x micro-credit: to promote the diversification of fishing income through investments in 
complementary activities and support young fishers in making the initial investment 
to start a business, 
x guarantees: to secure loans for investments in innovation, aquaculture and 
preservation of bio-marine resources, and  
x equity: to fund fast-growing businesses in the sector (technological innovation, 
productive processes).  
The rationales given for using FI use in Italy include: the need to facilitate credit access 
and address the undercapitalisation of fishing and aquaculture businesses; the promotion 
of FIs by the European Commission; the revolving nature of FIs and their ability to 
attract leverage; and their less distortive effect in the market (compared to grants).  
The EMFF OP for Lithuania foresees the potential use of FIs in 2014±20 and close links 
with the implementation of FIs funded under the Rural Development Programme. Indeed, 
the fund manager of FIs implemented under the two programmes was expected to be the 
same. The OP indicates that FIs can potentially be used in the implementation of a range 
of different measures, including: 
x the reduction of the impact of fishing on the marine environment, 
x improvement of knowledge of maritime conditions, 
x protection and regeneration of marine biodiversity, and 
x processing of fishery and aquaculture products.  
The use of EMFF±funded FIs in Lithuania is expected to lead to faster and more effective 
implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy and to improved access to finance in the 
fisheries sector. Soft loans are mentioned in the OP, but types of FIs are expected to be 
agreed after the completion of the ex ante assessment. $ µIUHH±VWDQGLQJ¶ H[±ante 
assessment was begun for EMFF co±funded FIs. However, it was discontinued and no 
conclusions regarding EMFF co±funded FIs were reached. A new ex ante assessment may 
be commissioned, but no information is available about the timing of any new 
assessment. 
In Spain, the ex ante evaluation of the EMFF OP highlighted the opportunity to make use 
of FIs in the measures for diversification and new sources of income, added value, quality 
of products and productive investments in aquaculture. Following this recommendation, 
FIs will be centralised in CDTI and SEPIDES (two Spanish public companies). The 
evaluation also highlighted that a combination of FIs with grants would be the most 
effective form of intervention. Publicity and information about EMFF FIs were identified as 
key to effectiveness. Therefore, the OP foresees an increase in technical assistance 
related to FI use. The rationale provided for using EMFF to fund FIs relates to liquidity 
and access to finance issues faced by Spanish fisheries firms (especially SMEs), due to 
the ongoing economic crisis, and consequent reduction in the budgets of the Spanish 
administration and a lack of public finance. FIs are seen as important to improve 
competitiveness, promote entrepreneurial initiatives and private investment. FIs are also 
seen as important for the implementation of innovation and technological development 
projects at national and international level. FI support is foreseen for two types of 
initiative:  
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x business innovation projects which support the practical implementation of scientific 
and technologic know-how in the productive system. These projects are carried out in 
cooperation with research institutes, technological centres or universities. 
x loans at subsidised interest rates for technology investment projects carried out by 
companies. Eligible initiatives include the incorporation and active adaptation of 
emerging technologies, creating processes of adaptation of technologies to new 
markets, industrial design and the implementation of new or significantly improved 
production methods, including significant changes in techniques and/or ICT 
applications. 
An ex ante assessment for EMFF FIs in Spain was carried out by PwC and published in 
November 2015. The assessment recommends the set up of three FIs: 
x guarantee instrument for finance in the fisheries sector, 
x loan instrument for finance in the fisheries sector, and  
x loan instrument for technological development and innovation.  
In addition to the developments at national level, in the framework of the Spanish 
autonomous communities, the Department of Rural Matters and Sea in collaboration with 
the Galician regional development agency (IGAPE) foresees the creation of a regional FI 
co-financed by the EMFF. During the course of the programming period, new EMFF FIs 
could be set up at regional level for different aims such as local participatory 
development. 
Future EMFF FIs in the Netherlands will depend on the outcome of an evaluation of the 
pilot revolving fund launched in 2014.  
)RU 0HPEHU 6WDWHV ZLWK RQO\ µWHQWDWLYH¶ SODQV IRU ),V, there is limited information 
available on planned FIs. This includes:  
x Belgium: possible use of guarantees linked to the national FI for fishery and 
aquaculture (FIVA). 
x Ireland: potential FIs in the seafood processing and aquaculture sectors. 
x Romania: addressing difficulties in accessing finance by fishermen, producers and 
entrepreneurs, an issue that was emphasised during consultations with local fisheries 
stakeholders, potentially by using guarantees. 
x United Kingdom: consideration of long term loans to support processing and 
marketing, productive investments in aquaculture, diversification in fisheries and 
innovation in all sectors.  
In all cases, however, decisions await the findings of any ex ante assessment.  
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4. PRACTICAL, LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES IN THE USE OF FINANCIAL 
INSTRUMENTS CO-FINANCED BY THE ESI FUNDS 
KEY FINDINGS 
x Different forms of support suit different project types ± MAs view SME 
development (TO3), low carbon economy (TO4) and research and innovation 
(TO1) as most appropriate for FIs. 
x MAs perceive that the key disadvantage of FIs is their administrative complexity. 
x FIs are considered by MAs to be harder to administer than grants due to lack of 
experience, the quality of the regulatory framework and the associated 
administrative burden. 
x Financial intermediaries can lessen the administrative burden of FIs. Some MAs 
also consider that for final recipients the administrative burden of FIs is lower than 
grants.  
x Value for money is not intrinsic to the form of support. Sometimes grants can 
offer better value for money than FIs, because of administration costs.  
x FIs are perceived by MAs to have economic impacts on several levels and 
sometimes for less outlay than grants.  
x The choice of financial product by MAs is driven primarily by the outcome of the 
ex ante assessment.  
x Competition or overlaps between forms of finance can be minimised by 
appropriate programme design. 
x Overall the main reasons for not using FIs is their unsuitability for planned 
projects (e.g. non-revenue-generating); however, under TO3 and TO4, where FIs 
are most used, the main reason for not using FIs is the perceived lack of demand 
among final recipients.  
x Views on Off-the-Shelf FIs are broadly positive, but uptake has been low due to 
timing of the Regulation and a desire for greater domestic flexibility. 
x MA perceptions of the new legislative framework are mixed. A key concern is the 
uncertainty arising from the scope to interpret the Regulations.  
x The obligatory ex ante assessment is viewed very positively.  
x MAs would like more, and more effective, direct contact with the Commission for 
guidance on specific needs.  
x Factors that could improve the uptake of FIs include changes to the State aid 
rules, simplification, improved communication with the Commission, training, 
information and advice. 
 
The overall objective of this section is to identify the practical, legal and administrative 
capacity issues which influence the use (or non-use) of co-financed financial instruments. 
The section draws on the outcome of the online survey and policymaker interviews and is 
structured around a series of issues and questions that arise from the terms of reference 
and which are also explored in a series of case studies which are annexed to this report.  
Historically, grants have been the mainstay of support under the Structural and Cohesion 
Funds, but increasingly the Commission has promoted other forms of support, especially 
financial instruments, across a wider range of policy areas. The Common Provisions 
Regulation (CPR) provides that:150  
[t]he ESI Funds shall take the form of grants, prizes, repayable assistance and 
financial instruments, or a combination thereof. 
                                          
150 Regulation 1303/2013, Article 66.  
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In exploring perceptions of different forms of support, it is important to note that the 
extent to which Member States have experience of the various instruments varies widely: 
although financial instruments are rising in importance, they account for just six percent 
of OP commitments in the new period and are used in just 160 OPs (from a total of 412); 
prizes and repayable grants are used even less.  
Figure 4.1: Planned spend by form of support 
 
Source: European Commission. 
Reflecting this, in many cases the analysis of the survey responses from Managing 
Authorities distinguishes between the perceptions of those MAs using, or planning to use, 
financial instruments in 2014-20, and those with no such plans.  
4.1. How and why are different forms of support more appropriate for 
different objectives?  
Policymakers in Managing Authorities identified a number of advantages and 
disadvantages of the different forms of support. In general, little was known about 
prizes, and as mentioned these are little used, however views on the different forms of 
support were not primarily conceived in terms of pros and cons, but rather in terms of 
the type of project for which they were suitable. That said, the key disadvantage of 
grants is perceived to be their lack of sustainability and the risk of creating a subsidy 
culture while the key disadvantage of financial instruments is considered to be their 
administrative complexity. 
Policymakers in MAs identified several project characteristics which they considered made 
grants the most appropriate choice to support a particular project:  
x Activities with small or no profits for the recipient, but which have wider benefits, 
such as positive environmental effects. 
x Projects with particularly long cost recovery times. 
x High risk projects ± particularly the early part of the innovation cycle (fundamental 
research and proof of concept). 
x Projects which require an incentive effect or which aim to change the behaviour of 
recipients ± i.e. they are in the wider interest, but would not be undertaken in the 
absence of a grant. 
Grant 
92.7% 
Repayable 
grant 
1.2% 
Financial 
instrument 
6.0% 
Prize 
0.1% 
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x Construction of public infrastructure (research centres, universities) where the 
recipients are public bodies and the infrastructure will remain public. 
x Areas of public policy interest like social exclusion or social development that are not 
commercially oriented. 
x Special sectors - energy, environment and water management, some public services 
or projects are not commercially viable but for some reason important (projects that 
do not generate enough financial flows). 
Some respondents also noted that grants could be more appropriate in the current low 
interest rate climate:  
³In the current market environment with large amounts of liquidity in the system and 
low interest rates, some FIs could be considered as redundant, as they do not offer 
much value added for final beneficiaries. In these cases, FIs could be substituted by 
grants.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
Others note the suitability of different instruments in relation to the domestic context: 
³)LQDQFLDOLQVWUXPHQWVPD\EHWRRDGYDQFHGIRURXUPDUNHW)URPWKHDQDO\VLVFDUULHG
RXWZHQHHG WR LQWHUYHQH LQZKDW LV XVXDOO\ WKHRUHWLFDOO\ UHIHUUHG WR DV WKH µGHDWK
YDOOH\¶SHULRG«LI>ILUPV@FDQQRWSDVVWKLVVWDJHWKH\ZLOOVXUHO\GLVDSSHDUDQGgrants 
could help in this respect.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
While a few considered that grants were the only suitable instruments: 
³$OO DFWLYLWLHV XQGHU (7& SURJUDPPHV DUH EHWWHU VXLWHG WR JUDQWV &RRSHUDWLRQ LV
RSSRVLWH WRZKDW \RX FDQ FDOO µEDQNDEOH¶« you cannot set up a cooperation project 
ZLWKDORDQ´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³*UDQWV DUH PRUH DSSURSULDWH IRU ERWK SXEOLF DQG SULYDWH DFWLYLWLHV 7KH YROXPH RI
subsidy is much higher, they bring immediate liquidity without increasing the level of 
debt, and they help improve the rating through the increased own capital and thus to 
decrease the interest rate burden. In particular for public activities, FIs are pointless 
as the public bodies are either first class debtors or cannot take on any more loDQV´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
Respondents also noted that (typically) grants are more attractive to recipients and 
better understood by applicants, though these features do not, of themselves, make 
grants more appropriate.  
Several characteristics of FIs make them potentially attractive as an option for using in 
ESIF programmes, particularly the revolving nature of funds, access to a wider range of 
financial tools for policy delivery, private sector involvement and expertise, and the 
potential to attract private sector support (and funding) for public policy objectives.151 In 
terms of specific projects supported by ESIF programmes, financial instruments are 
considered most suitable for activities that are likely to make a financial return, or 
generate savings for the recipients, but also for activities which have the scope to attract 
additional resources from the private sector or sources such as the EIB.  
³),VDUHparticularly interesting for start-ups and technology spin-offs«ZRUNLQJZLWK
other VC provLGHUV LVSURPLVLQJ«RWKHUNLQGVRIJUDQWVZRXOGQRW UHDFK WKLVVFHQH´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
                                          
151 European Commission (2014) Financial instruments in ESIF programmes 2014-2020. A short  
reference guide for managing authorities. 
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In this regard, the activities or targets most consistently cited as suitable for FIs are SME 
development (TO3), supporting the shift to a low carbon economy (TO4) and, to a lesser 
extent, research and innovation (TO1). In part, this is because MAs already have some 
experience of using FIs in these areas. Also, MAs consider that suitable projects with the 
necessary features (ability to generate a return or savings, ability to attract additional 
resources) are most likely to be found under these TOs. These areas are where funding 
JDSV KDYH EHHQ PRVW FOHDUO\ LGHQWLILHG 7KHUH LV DOVR D FOHDU µILW¶ ZLWK QDWLRQDO DQG
regional priorities. At the same time, the wider investment climate is considered to have 
an impact on the suitability of FIs:  
³),V IRU 72 DUH EHLQJ PRGLILHG DW SUHVHQW DQG WKH FXUUHQW ),V GR QRW ZRUN /RZ
interest rate loans for CO2 measures are not an incentive on account of the generally 
low inteUHVWUDWHV´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
Some considered that support for entrepreneurs under TO9 (social inclusion) could be a 
suitable target for FIs, but others considered that grants (or a combination of grants and 
microfinance) would be more appropriate. Similarly, there were mixed views on support 
for vocational training, with some Managing Authorities taking the view that this could 
generate suitable returns, and other considering that it would take too long or be unlikely 
to do so.  
Some Managing Authorities also note that the suitability of FIs for certain types of 
projects (as opposed to Thematic Objectives or Investment Areas) depends on the 
administrative capacity of the Member State to implement such instruments and 
deal with the audit requirements; others noted concerns at being able to absorb funds in 
the form of FIs because of the complexity of the instruments concerned. 
Perspectives on repayable grants are more mixed. Many Managing Authorities have 
no view, having had no experience, but some were dissuaded from using repayable 
grants owing to the administrative conditions, or because they had no experience of 
using them.  
³Repayable assistance is not indicated in the OP and is not used, however, it was 
considered. Main factors against using it were conditions linked to implementation of 
repayable assistance ± implementation must follow rules for grants, not rules for FIs 
which imply more important administrative burden.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
Others consider that repayable grants could be useful in specific circumstances ± this 
case for low carbon: 
³Repayable grants are now being considered for TO4 as a way to convince potential 
beneficiaries to invest in energy efficiency - if there is no return on 
investment/energy savings, they do not have to repay the grant´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\
interview). 
Some take the view that repayable grants have some of the advantages of FIs: 
³Repayable grants would be applied for SME and in the area of cohesion. Managing 
authority is proposing the use of FI firstly, and in case, when FI are not appropriate 
because of the lack of financial feasibility of the projects, the use of repayable grants 
is foreseen. The administrative burden is high and administration system of repayable 
grants is quite complicated as in case of grants but this form of support is marked 
with the advantages of FI related to efficiency of investments and possibility to 
finance more projects.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
However, others are less convinced and suggest that there is little point in using 
repayable grants if FIs are used. Some are more critical: 
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³0RUHRIDJLPPLFNWKDQDQ\WKLQJ± didn¶WVHHPWRGHOLYHUDQ\JUHDWHUEHQHILWWKDQD
W\SLFDOJUDQW´ (Managing Authority interview). 
³5HSD\DEOH JUDQWV KDYH QR SURV FRQV DUH they are ambiguous, complex, open to 
PLVXVH«(the deliberate setting of) targets/triggers/milestones for payback which will 
never be achieved.´ (Financial intermediary) 
4.2. Ease of administration: how do different forms of support compare? 
An important issue that emerges from the discussion on the relative merits of different 
forms on intervention is how easy or otherwise they are to administer. Figure 4.2 
summarises the perceptions of Managing Authorities by Fund and by form of support.  
Figure 4.2µEDVHRIDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶DOOUHVSRQGHQWVE\)XQG 
 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
Lack of familiarity with some instruments is reflected in the high proporWLRQ RI µGRQ¶W
NQRZV¶ H[FHSW LQ WKH FDVH RI JUDQWV +RZHYHU D FOHDUHU SLFWXUH HPHUJHV ZKHQ WKRVH
without an opinion are excluded.  
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Figure 4.3µEDVHRIDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶DOO)XQGVH[FOXGLQJµ'.V¶) 
 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
On this basis, Figure 4.3 shows that over 80 percent of Managing Authorities considered 
µHDVHRIDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶RIJUDQWVWREHJRRGRUYHU\JRRGE\FRQWUDVWRYHUSHUFHQW
of ManaJLQJ $XWKRULWLHV WKRXJKW µHDVH RI DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶ RI ILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWV WR EH
poor or very poor. Experience with a given form of support is an important dimension to 
perceptions of ease of administration. As Figure 4.4 shows, FI users are markedly more 
positive about ease of administration of financial instruments than are non-users of FI: 
over 80 percent of non-users perceived FI ease of administration to be poor or very 
poor152 compared with fewer than 50 percent among FI users.  
Figure 4.4µEase of administUDWLRQ¶(5')0$VH[FOXGLQJµD/KV¶) 
 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
                                          
152 Around two-thirds of non-XVHUVRIILQDQFLDOLQVWUXPHQWVDQVZHUHGµGRQ¶WNQRZ¶WRSHUFHSWLRQVRI
WKHµHDVHRIDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶RI),V 
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Also interesting, is how Managing Authorities which use financial instruments consider 
them in comparison with grants. Figure 4.5 shows that MAs with experience of both 
types of support consider FIs to be significantly harder to administer than 
grants. 
Figure 4.5µEaVHRIDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶(5')0$VXVLQJ),VH[FOXGLQJµ'.V¶) 
 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
While the online survey results provide some quantification of perceptions of ease of 
administration, interviews with Managing Authorities and financial intermediaries provide 
some more qualitative insights. In general, as reflected in the survey, financial 
instruments are considered to be harder to administer than grants; this is consistent with 
findings in other studies.153  However, a key issue concerns the lack of experience 
among Managing Authorities in dealing with support other than grants.  
³a combination of Cohesion Policy related capabilities must be coupled with financing-
banking knowledge and skills. Such a skills mixture can only be built up through 
implementation experience.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³&DSDFLW\DWDOOOHYHOVLQFOXGLQJ the EC, is inadequate as the combination of Cohesion 
Policy implementation and banking experience is rather rare.´ (Financial intermediary 
interview) 
³Ensuring the skills mix of Cohesion Policy implementation and banking is a continued 
challenge´)LQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\interview) 
³,QFUHDVHG UHTXLUHPHQWV RQ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH FDSDFLW\ QRW RQO\ LQWHUQDO QHFHVVLW\ WR
HQJDJHDOVRH[WHUQDODFWRUV´0DQDging Authority interview) 
³The main disadvantage is the lack of experience in using FIs and the procedures that 
have to be followed.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³&RQV ± WKH\ DUH FRPSOH[ UHTXLUHV KLJKO\ VSHFLDOLVW VWDII´ )LQDQFLDO LQWHUPHGLDU\
interview). 
                                          
153 Wishlade, Michie R, Familiari G, Schneidewind P and A Resch (2016) Op cit. 
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³Delivering JEREMIE helped to create a pool of experts; however the overall capacity 
is not very robust yet.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
Among financial instruments, there was generally more confidence about the capacity to 
deliver loan and guarantee schemes than equity products. 
³Regarding capacity, equity finance is a relatively new phenomenon´ )LQDQFLDO
intermediary interview) 
³Guarantee institutions are highly specialised. They have to better understand EU 
regulations; this challenge is not substantial though.´ )LQDQFLDO LQWHUPHGLDU\
interview) 
³We have used FI beforehand as well and that is why we have already enough 
experience in this field. That is why we were able to open loans and guarantees so 
quickly´)LQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\interview) 
³Administrative capacity for loan and guarantee finance is adequate generally.´
(Financial intermediary interview) 
Another issue that emerges from the interviews concerns the quality of the regulatory 
framework and how that affects the ease of administration of financial instruments as 
opposed to grants. The regulatory framework is discussed in more detail in 4.10 below 
where the issue is addressed explicitly. The following remarks were unprompted: 
³&RQVRIFIs are that the regulatory framework is not yet fully developed. In many 
cases this results in legal XQFHUWDLQW\´,QWHUPHGLDWHERG\LQWHUYLHZ 
³«WKHUHJXODWRU\IUDPHZRUN LV still better suited to non-repayable grants. This is an 
obstacle to the successful management of FIs.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³lack of adequate regulations (2017-13) has now been replaced by overregulation 
and the logic of grants management has prevailed in many areas of FI rules (e.g. 
transaction based audit, monitoring and reporting system) (Financial intermediary 
interview) 
³the private sector is very sensitive to setting up of clear conditions; however the EU 
regulatory framework still has not been completely clarified.´ 0DQDJLQJ $XWKRULW\
interview) 
The administrative burden was generally thought to be higher for financial instruments 
as opposed to grants. The most frequently mentioned issue relates to the burden on 
financial intermediaries and final recipients ± perhaps comparing the administrative 
burden related to monitoring and reporting obligations attached to the use of publically-
funded FIs, as compared to private sources of finance.  
³A drawback of FIs is that the process required is time-consuming and that it is 
intensive in coordination tasks.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³The main drawback is the administrative burden attached to FIs. For instance, 
eligibility requirements and audit procedures are problematic.´ 0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\
interview) 
³*UDQWVHDVLHUWRLPSOHPHQW once agreed not much work left for MA. FIs: creates 
more work, e.g. making sure money is paid back, reusing recycled funds etc.´ 
(Financial intermediary interview) 
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³Sometimes it is difficult for the financial intermediary to identify the applicable 
regulations. This results in the circumstance that financial intermediaries often draft 
very heavy legal documents in order to be on the safe side. Audit visits are also 
cumbersome and time consuming.´)LQDQFLDOintermediary interview) 
>),V FDUU\ D@ ³Kigh administrative burden for the intermediary and the final 
recipients.´)LQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
³It is much cheaper and easier to deliver grant programmes than FIs especially equity 
funds´)LQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
However, this view was not universally held and some considered that (certain) financial 
instruments had advantages over grants in terms of administration, or that the 
difficulties were overstated. 
³Administrative burden is biggest in the case of grants and least in the case of 
guarantees.´)LQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
³Some experience is required when it comes to implementing instruments but FIs are 
not as complex as is sometimes suggested.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
Some Managing Authorities also noted that the involvement of financial intermediaries 
lessened their administrative burden: 
³An additional pro is that financial intermediaries helped the marketing of the product 
through their branch offices.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
In addition, some respondents distinguished different aspects of the administration 
process, noting that, for final recipients, the process of applying for a financial instrument 
may be quicker and simpler than applying for a grant, notably where an experienced 
financial intermediary was involved in administering the FI.  
³Speed RI DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ« «guarantees are administered in one or two weeks´
(Managing Authority interview) 
³*UDQWV KDYH D KLJKHU DGPLQLVWUDWLYH EXUGHQ IRU DSSOLFDQWV WKDQ ),V´ 0DQDJLQJ
Authority interview) 
Other administrative aspects of FIs were sometimes considered more straightforward 
than grants: 
³Quick certification of resources, which is important for achievement of milestones in 
2018´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
Last, in spite of the new provisions on phasing of payments to FIs, financial instruments 
were still felt to be helpful in smoothing financial flows and avoiding decommitments. 
4.3. Value for money: how do different forms of support compare? 
Value for money has been a growing concern in public policy for many years, and this 
has led many to question the role of grants to promote economic and social 
development. Indeed, the notion that financial instruments provide better value for 
money because sums are repaid and reinvested is one of the key arguments put forward 
by the Commission for their use. Perhaps surprisingly, then, the survey of Managing 
Authorities did not bear out this perception (see Figure 4.6). A large proportion of 
respondents had no opinion on the value for money of repayable grants, prizes or 
financial instruments, probably owing to lack of experience in their use. However, some 
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respondents perceived that all instruments other than grants offered very poor value for 
money.154  
Figure 4.6µVDOXHIRUPRQH\¶DOOUHVSRQGHQWVE\)XQG 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
([FOXGLQJWKHµGRQ¶WNQRZV¶IURPWKLVDQDO\VLVFKDQJHVWKHSLFWXUHVRPHZKDW± see Figure 
4.7. On this basis, over 40 percent of those with a view consider prizes to be poor or 
very poor value for money, but the perception is also fairly negative for financial 
instruments, where almost 30 percent take this view.  
                                          
154 Except in the case of financial instruments for EMFF. 
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Figure 4.7µVDOXHIRUPRQH\¶DOO)XQGVH[FOXGLQJµD/Ks¶) 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
Importantly, the survey took account of the views of both users and non-users of 
financial instruments, and as Figure 4.8 shows, these two groups have different views of 
the value for money of FIs: over 65 percent of non-users of FIs considered that FIs 
offered poor or very poor value for money, but fewer than 10 percent of FI 
users shared this view. 
Figure 4.8µVDOXHIRUPRQH\¶(5')0$VH[FOXGLQJµ'.V¶) 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
Figure 4.9 shows the perceptions of value for money for both grants and FIs among MAs 
which use FIs. At first sight the outcome may be surprising since the results are broadly 
similar for the two types of instrument. However, the interviews with Managing 
Authorities who use both types of instrument make clear the importance of tailoring 
support to project requirements. In other words, in some contexts, grants may well offer 
good value for money because the administration costs would be too high if financial 
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instruments were used for the same purpose. In short, value for money is not inherent in 
a certain type of support, but is related to the purpose for which it is used.  
Figure 4.9µVDOXHIRUPRQH\¶(5')0$VXVLQJ),VH[FOXGLQJµ'.V¶) 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
Beyond the survey, interviews with Managing Authorities and financial intermediaries 
provide some further insights into their perceptions of value for money of grant and 
financial instruments, in particular. The key point that emerges is the sustainability of 
financial instruments and, related, the ability to support more projects:  
³From a MA perspective the greatest advantage of FIs is that they are revolving and 
therefore more can be done with a relatively small pot of money. There is some risk 
that loans will not be paid back but the estimation is that around 75 percent will be 
returned for re-investment.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³From the standpoint of public authorities, FIs have the advantage of reutilising funds 
and, therefore, a more sustainable policy.´)LQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
³>WKH NH\ DGYDQWDJH RI ),V is] their revolving character, allowing for directing 
resources to KLJKHUQXPEHURIEHQHILFLDULHV´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
It is worth noting that in 2007- WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI UHWXUQV  WKH µUHYROYLQJ HIIHFW¶
tended to become more prominent on the agenda of MAs as the programme period 
SURJUHVVHG µ5HYROYLQJ¶ of funds does not tend to happen until later in the period (as 
loans are repaid/equity investments mature) and  few MAs had an explicit strategy 
upfront for dealing with (or reporting) revolving funds. Also, attention in the earlier years 
of the programme period was heavily focused on the administratively demanding set-up 
and implementation stages of FIs. As returns started to be received (and re-invested), 
this aspect of FIs was increasingly valued.155 
Also perceived to be key is the scope to attract private sector resources and 
expertise and increase the leverage of the intervention: 
                                          
155 Wishlade, Michie R, Familiari G, Schneidewind P and A Resch (2016) Op cit. 
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³Possibility to obtain additional resources for energetic savings due to potential 
agreement with the EIB on possible investment´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³They give the option of using the private sector to assist, using their skills in 
assessment and due diligence so you don't lose as much. Use of FIs builds capacity 
for recipients. (Managing Authority interview). 
³The main advantage is that access to finance is improved by leveraging private 
resources´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
That said, respondents also noted that the value for money of financial instruments 
depended on the economic context: 
³,n the times of low interest rates, limited possibility of providing much preference in 
cost, limited interest of ultimate beneficiaries.´)LQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
As well as having the required critical mass in relation to management costs and 
fees:  
³«critical mass to reach economies of scale is important to be able to support the 
high management costs associated with FIs´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
4.4. Economic impact: how do different forms of support compare? 
Among the arguments for financial instruments is that their economic impact can be 
greater not only because funds are recycled and support more projects, but also because 
the use of repayable funding can improve project quality.156  
Figure 4.10: µEFRQRPLFLPSDFW¶DOOUHVSRQGHQWVE\)XQG 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
Figure 4.10 suggests that Managing Authorities harbour doubts about the economic 
impact of all types of support. However, except in the case of grants, most Managing 
$XWKRULWLHVµGRQ¶WNQRZ¶DERXWWKHHFRQRPLFLPSDFW 
                                          
156 7KHVHDQVZHUVDUHEDVHGRQ0$V¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIµHFRQRPLFLPSDFW¶ZKLFKZDVQRWGHILQHGLQ
the survey question.  
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Figure 4.11µEFRQRPLFLPSDFW¶DOO)XQGVH[FOXGLQJµ'.V¶) 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
Taking account only of those with an opinion, Figure 4.11 suggests that grants are 
considered to have the highest economic impact ± with over 90 percent considering the 
LPSDFWWREHµJRRG¶RUµYHU\JRRG¶FRPSDUHGZLWKXQGHUSHUFHQWLQ the case of prizes.  
Figure 4.12 considers only ERDF MAs, but distinguishes between those using, or planning 
WR XVH ILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWV DQG µQRQ XVHUV¶ 7KLV VKRZV WKDW over 97 percent of 
those using FIs consider that the economic impact financial instruments is good 
or very good FRPSDUHG ZLWK MXVW RYHU  SHUFHQW RI µQRQ-XVHUV¶ ,W LV KRZHYHU
important to note that the majority of non-users expressed no opinion. Somewhat 
curiously, about two percent of those MAs planning to use FIs considered their impact 
poor or very poor.  
Figure 4.12µEFRQRPLFLPSDFW¶(5')0$VH[FOXGLQJµ'.V¶) 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
Figure 4.13 compares perceptions of grants and financial instruments, but only among 
ERDF MAs that are users of financial instruments.  
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Figure 4.13µEFRQRPLFLPSDFW¶(5')0$VXVLQJ),VH[FOXGLQJµ'.V¶) 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
Similar to perceptions on value for money, there is not a great deal of difference between 
WKHWZRZLWKDVOLJKWO\KLJKHUSURSRUWLRQFRQVLGHULQJ),VWRKDYHDµYHU\JRRG¶HFRQRPLF
impact. The reasons underlying this are not clear from the quantitative data alone. 
However, it may be related to different forms of support being tailored to the needs of 
the OP, and both forms perceived as being capable of delivering equally good economic 
impacts in relation to the targets for which they are designed. 
Interviews with Managing Authorities and financial intermediaries suggest that FIs are 
perceived to have economic impacts on several levels. At the micro level, a large number 
of respondents note that FIs have a positive impact on the competitiveness of 
financial recipients or were more likely to attract high quality applicants than 
grants:  
³)LQDO UHFLSLHQWVRI),VDUHPRUH OLNHO\ WREHFRPHPRUHFRPSHWLWLYHDQGJDLQHDVLHU
DFFHVVWRFRPPHUFLDOORDQVLQIXWXUH´(Managing Authority interview) 
³Use of FIs builds capacity for recipients. If you don't have a track record then banks 
won't look favourably on you but you can give your credit rating a boost using ERDF 
FIs successfully, then move on to get money commercially.´ 0DQDJLQJ $XWhority 
interview) 
³3UHSDUHVSURMHFWVIRUFRPPHUFLDOIXQGV´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³FIs foster business-like thinking´)LQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
³7KHUHLVPRUHVFRSHWRSURYLGHH[SHUWDGYLFHDORQJVLGH),VWKDQWKHUHLVIRUJUDQWV´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
³:hen using FIs additional assistance, such as experts' advice can be provided´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
³5HODWLYHO\HDV\WRGHFLGHLIDSURMHFWLVJRRG± the capacity of a project to repay aid 
LVDVLJQRIWKDW´ (Managing Authority interview) 
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Financial instruments were also felt to have wider economic benefits. These included 
the multiplier effect arising from the reinvestment of returned funds and the absence of 
deadweight perceived to be present in the use of grants.  
In addition, respondents also pointed to the benefits for financial markets. Some 
respondents noted that ESIF FIs help develop the private financial sector, and diversify it, 
especially into risk capital (even in countries with relatively developed financial markets 
overall, as these markets tend to be geographically concentrated). One Managing 
Authority noted that FIs could be co-financed from national pension funds, which would 
otherwise be invested in foreign markets.  
Last, several respondents cited the capacity of FIs to have greater economic impact for 
less outlay:  
³FIs enable public authorities to carry out policy actions of high impact with few 
resources.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³More important environmental effects for the same amount of resources´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
4.5. What factors influence the choice of financial product in OPs using FIs? 
7KH WHUP µILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQW¶ KDV EHFRPH D µFDWFK DOO¶ IRU IRUPV RI VXSSRUW WKDW DUH
repayable, unlike grants. In practice, however, this term encompasses a variety of forms 
which may have little in common with one another. By convention, financial instruments 
are divided into three groups: 
x Loans, or debt - these may be provided directly by Managing Authorities or through 
financial intermediaries. 
x Guarantees ± where capital is wholly or partially secured in the case of a default. 
These may also be provided directly by Managing Authorities and aim to encourage 
commercial lenders to provide capital to borrowers lacking adequate collateral or 
perceived to be too high risk. 
x Equity ± where a holding or share is taken in the capital of a firm. Equity or venture 
capital cannot be implemented directly by Managing Authorities. 
In practice, there are many variants on each of these forms in relation to the terms on 
which they are offered, the mechanisms through which they are implemented and the 
extent to which they are combined. For example, mezzanine finance can be considered a 
hybrid of debt and equity, and may be structured as a loan to the final recipient or as a 
shareholding in the final recipient. Microfinance, conventionally used for start-ups 
especially to encourage entrepreneurship among marginalised groups, often takes the 
form of guarantees and loans in combination. Guarantees may be offered directly to the 
borrower, or in the form of counter guarantees to smaller lenders.  
Box 4.1: The use of equity FIs in ESIF programmes 
In 2007-13, the vast majority of products disbursed to final recipients via FIs were loans (either 
awarded directly as loans or supported through the provision of guarantees). Equity FIs are those 
which involve the investment of capital in a firm, either directly or indirectly, in return for total or 
partial ownership of that firm.  
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The use of equity FIs in 2007-13 was concentrated in a few countries (e.g. DE, PT, SE and the UK). 
By the end of 2015, 5,505 equity and quasi-equity investments had been made in 2007-13 OPs, 
ZLWKDWRWDOYDOXHRI¼PLOOLRQRXWRIZKLFK¼PLOOLRQZDVIURm the Structural Funds.157  
Equity FIs tended to be used to support innovative firms and business start-ups with high growth 
potential (and therefore high returns), but also high risk (and potentially high losses). According to 
the ex post evaluation of FIs, equity FIs attracted higher levels of private sector participation than 
other instruments, but performance was difficult to assess as few exits had yet taken place (most 
equity FIs were established for a set period of 10 years). However, there were clear signs of ERDF 
support having helped the creation of a venture capital market in areas where it was poorly 
developed.158 While most of the equity FIs in 2007-13 were regional in scope and comparatively 
VPDOOVL]HGLGYDU\JUHDWO\UDQJLQJIURP¼3RODQGWR¼PLOOLRQ*HUPDQ\ 
In 2014-SODQQHG23FRQWULEXWLRQVWRHTXLW\),VDPRXQWWRF¼PLOOLRQDURXQGSHUFHQW
of the total planned allocation to FIs. This represents a doubling in the planned use of equity 
instruments, although, as with all FIs, the actual amounts committed will vary depending on the 
results of the ex ante assessments and other factors.  
Historically, there is less experience with implementing co-funded equity FIs, and what there has 
been is concentrated in a few Member States. A number of barriers to further uptake of equity FIs 
exist - HTXLW\LVDµQLFKH¶SURGXFWDQGZLOORQO\HYHUEHDWWUDFWLYHWRDYHU\VPDOOSURSRUWLRQRIKLJK
growth firms in any given Member State or region. MAs have found that selection of projects for 
equity investment takes longer and is more expensive, due to the in-depth due diligence required. 
Also, venture capital markets in target regions/Member States may be poorly developed and lack 
the required capacity in terms of fund management. 
Source: EPRC Case study research ± see Annex 1. 
Interviews with Managing Authorities showed that a number of factors determined the 
choice of financial product. Chief among them, not surprisingly, was the outcome of the 
ex ante assessment. This highlights the importance of a new compulsory element in 
the 2014-20 regulations. Decisions on financial products could not be taken until the ex 
ante assessment had been complete, providing the evidence required. This could differ 
from what had originally been envisaged in the OP (potentially requiring a programme 
modification to be made).  
³From FIs only loans are proposed. The ex ante assessment recommended also some 
other types of FIs. The final choice was influenced esp. by foreign experience, 
experience of responsible persons of specific interventions, knowing well situation of 
the market.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³The choice for the financial products offered was the result of the ex ante 
assessment. The market environment and the capabilities of the Ministry of Finance 
were taken into account.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³The main factor influencing the type of FI made use of was the advice from 
consultants and the results of the ex ante evaluation.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³The financial product was chosen as a result of the ex ante assessment's 
conclusions. In addition, the EIF offered guidance regarding the most appropriate 
type of financial product.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKority interview) 
³Use of different financial products depend on the development stage of an enterprise 
(new or growing), operational focus (innovative or life style business), its needs, 
purpose of investment, collateral requirements, costs of FI, etc. Before the ex ante 
assessment was conducted the [MA] had a vision for using particular financial 
                                          
157 European Commission (2015) Summary of data on the progress made in financing and 
implementing financial engineering instruments co-financed by Structural Funds, September 2016. 
158 Wishlade F, Michie R, Familiari G, Schneidewind P, Resch A (2016) Op cit.  
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products for the OP, which were further analysed in detail in the ex ante assessment. 
Aspects of the ex ante assessment, as well as previous experience implementing FIs 
were taken into account, when drafting OP.... The decision on particular financial 
products was taken after negotiation process with the Commission´ 0DQDJLQJ
Authority interview). 
³The main driving factor was the ex-ante assessment - advice from consultants 
responsible for preparation of this document. Additionally, prior experience in 
applying FIs. Finally, decisions to concentrate mostly on supporting capital 
investments (VC investment formats) - fiQDQFLQJ RI HDUO\ VWDJHV´ 0DQDJLQJ
Authority interview). 
In addition, experience or administrative capacity of the Managing Authority also 
played a significant role for many:  
³The main factor that influenced the choice of financial product was prior experience. 
³0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³«factors: previous experience, conservative approach´ 0DQDJLQJ $XWKRULW\
interview). 
³experience from previous periods.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³secondary (after type of products were decided upon), experience and capacities of 
involved institutions in final design of financial products.´ 0DQDJLQJ $XWKRULW\
interview). 
³When choosing between lending and equity schemes, on the consideration of 2007-
13 experience, preference of the MA goes for loans; they are smaller size, more 
straightforward to manage and EULQJ DERXW OHVV DXGLW ULVNV´ 0DQDJLQJ $XWKRULW\
interview). 
³The choice of instrument has been driven by the ex ante assessment taking in to 
account what has worked in certain areas before´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
In some cases the type of financial product was determined at the EU level: 
³The ESF FI implemented is a facility put in place by the Commission and managed by 
the EIB. This has resulted in great advantages, mainly because the Commission 
provided certainty on the programme and because the EIB provided management 
know-how. If the FI would have been designed by the Intermediate Body, the process 
would have been much more cumbersome.´,QWHUPHGLDWHERG\ interview,).  
In other cases the choice was based on specific objectives or demand: 
³«opted for a venture capital fund, mainly given the fact that it can attract private 
resources. The revolving nature is not specific to venture capital but it has motivated 
the choice for FIs. « a venture capital fund has a significant value-added, given the 
needs of the region.´,QWHUPHGLDWHERG\LQWHUYLHZ 
³The ministry has traditionally offered loans (matched with non-repayable aid) and 
guarantees. Microfinance is less suitable for centrally coordinated measures. 
Regarding equity one of the limits encountered is the lack of demand´ 0DQDJLQJ
Authority interview). 
Improving the take-up and effectiveness of Financial Instruments 
92 
³«RSWHGIRUQRWXVLQJORDQ and guarantees since they offer less value-added for the 
beneficiaries in the region than venture capital financing possibilities.´ 0DQDJLQJ
Authority interview). 
4.6. Do different types of support compete and if so, what drives this? 
The relationship between different forms of support is an important one. Unless the 
various instruments are appropriately tailored to meet policy and market requirements, 
and dovetailed with one another, there are risks that measures compete, overlap or 
leave some needs unmet.  
Some respondents considered that there was no competition between different types of 
support, at least in their own programmes, though sometimes this was simply because 
forms other than FI are not offered, or because programmes have been shaped to ensure 
different forms of support work alongside one another.  
³Different forms of support are complementary to each other. In the case of FIs - 
beneficiaries can receive whole amount of financing, when starting the project« which 
needs to be repaid, but in the case of grant - beneficiary needs to attract co-financing 
and pre-financing, which may need to be repaid in case of failure. Therefore, 
attractiveness of grants versus FI is questionable« specific support criteria are being 
designed, which determine if the project can receive FIs or grants. Competitiveness of 
the project determines which form of support should be used in each case. In this 
respect different forms of support can't be iQFRPSHWLWLRQZLWKRQHDQRWKHU´ 
³In relation to TO9 there is no competition as support is only offered through FIs´ 
³The current division of financing forms is done in a way to make sure the 
instruments are not in competition each to the other. From the point of view of final 
recipients grants are more attractive, but - basically - they are not offered in TO 3 
which is the most important objective in which we plan to use financial resources.´ 
³The OP is designed in such a manner that FIs and grants are not compatible. There 
iVQRFRPSHWLWLRQ´ 
In the main, Managing Authorities considered financial instruments and other forms of 
support to complement one another, and some had explicit mechanisms to ensure this.  
Box 4.2: Mechanisms to ensure complementarity of forms of support 
³The MA endeavoured to set up the implementation system so that grants and FIs were 
complementary (ex ante assessment was very helpful). The MA uses mechanisms:  
(1). assessment of projects according to internal rate of return at the level of projects (used for 
projects focused on energy savings. This rate is assessed by independent auditor. The beneficiary 
can run for credit in all cases but the project is eligible for grants only in case that the internal rate 
of return is below a predefined level) 
(2). regional mechanism (e.g. for technologies - technologies are supported via FIs in all regions 
and grants are available only in regions with specific problems).´ 
Source: Managing Authority interview. 
Other were less explicit in their explanations, but made clear that steps had been 
taken to ensure complementarity, especially in the light of experience in 2007-13. 
³No, the different forms of support are designed to be in complement with one 
another´. (Managing Authority interview) 
³No. This has been made impossible, because the whole process of setting-up FI is 
participatory (with regions and the Ministry for Economic development). Firms 
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themselves see these instruments as complementary (this emerged from interviews 
and focus groups).´ (Managing Authority interview) 
 ³grants and FIs can be combined. Therefore, they complement each other´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
³« this was a common problem in the 2007-2013 programming period, where ERDF 
and other types of support often were cannibalised. In the 2014-2020 programming 
period this issue will be resolved by the ex ante assessment´ 0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\
interview) 
³From the entrepreneurs' point of view grants could be competing with FIs, as grants 
are cheaper source of funding. However, different FIs are focused to different 
objectives and, therefore, they don't overlap and provide an opportunity to select the 
most appropriate type of support for a particular project. Entrepreneurs can select the 
most appropriate form of FIs taking into account his/hers needs and possibilities.´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
³Specialised calls are useful«>WRSUHYHQWFRPSHWLWLRQEHWZHHQIRUPVRIVXSSRUW@ The 
risk is over-specialising that usually results in a markedly narrow scope of potential 
beneficiaries. Ideally, different forms of support could be offered for companies which 
have achieved different phases in the project lifecycle. Disbursement of grant 
assistance for R+D+I projects may have reduced, hopefully temporarily, the interest 
LQDSSO\LQJIRUORDQILQDQFH´ (Managing Authority interview) 
Other Managing Authorities take the view that different forms of support do 
compete. In part this owes to overlap in the objectives of the measures concerned, but 
is also due to the preference of final recipients, who often continue to prefer grants. 
Some respondents also noted that FIs were potentially disadvantaged by the amount of 
time they took to establish.  
³To some degree the FIs are considered to be in competition with grants, they are 
more risky «environment is not used to this form of the assistance« time 
disadvantage of the FIs ± the EC does not clarify sufficiently all the conditions and 
that makes the MAs start with grants.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\interview) 
³In relation to TO4 there can be some competition but it mainly depends on the 
strength of the business case of the project whether a project would be considered for 
grants or FIs.´(Managing Authority interview) 
 ³When similar activities are financed using grants and FI, grants reduce the 
attractiveness of the financial instruments.´(Managing Authority interview) 
Although there is often a presumption that grants would be more attractive to final 
recipients, this is not always thought to be so.  
³there is also some path dependence among final Recipients, as they prefer grants 
rather than FIs´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³beneficiaries would mostly opt for FIs since procedures are significantly reduced in 
comparison with grants. For grants you need specialized consultants, not just for 
application but also for the implementation and reporting. For FI, loans for example, 
beneficiaries approach banks in ordinary fashion as if no EU funds are concerned. FIs 
are complicated to set-up and monitor implementation but only for involved 
institutions, once launched FIs are quite fast and simple for final recipients.´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
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³Not only different but the same forms of support may compete. Project promoters 
optimise and always look for finance with the most favourable terms. Long-term 
grant beneficiaries are now shifting towards combined products (grant + loan). Also, 
an SME can apply for support under various TOs; they will scrutinize price and 
administrative burden and are likely to devise their application to fit into the scheme 
with the lowest costs and simplest administration. Pricing helps the elimination of 
competition, e.g. the interest rate under TO3 related lending schemes is at 0% while 
the interest rate of the loan element of the combined product under the same TC is 
2,5%. Grant rate is to be maximised, probably around 30% for the SME combined 
product. Early repayment is now penalised to exclude project promoters who want to 
access grants through the scheme and who are actually LQ QR QHHG RI D ORDQ´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
Last, although the emphasis on respondents was on grants and FIs, competition is not 
limited to grants and FIs: 
³Experience with equity investors in the previous period revealed potential 
competition between equity and loans, too. Equity funds diversified their portfolio as 
a natural way to reduce the relatively high risk they bear. Consequently, these funds 
also undertook investments that could have proven bankable should the company 
have approached a EDQN´ (Managing Authority interview) 
Box 4.3: What drives competition between different delivery modes? 
There are clearly risks that different forms of intervention that target the same or similar activity 
can overlap or undermine one another. The key issues in relation to competition between financial 
instruments and other modes of intervention include: 
x The need for grants and FIs, if both exist, to have a different focus. For example, grants to 
support general investment by SMEs could readily be substituted by loans; if the two co-
exist, there is likely to be a preference for grants. 
x The need for grants to target investments where a clear incentive effect is required so that 
intervention alters the behaviour of the recipient ± for example, to undertake a risky 
innovation project that would not have happened otherwise. 
x The need for applications for FI support to be no more complex than those for grants. 
The need for FIs to be up-and-running early in the programming period. 
Competition may also be present among guarantee mechanisms and or loans, depending 
on the coverage or interest rate, and there is some evidence of perceived competition 
between ESI Fund co-financed FIs and those funded through EFSI. This is discussed in 
more detail in Section 5 below. 
4.7. What underlies decisions not to use financial instruments? 
Some Managing Authorities do not plan to use FIs at all, whereas others use or plan to 
use them under some, or even all, Thematic Objectives. As mentioned earlier, several 
Member States do not use co-financed FIs at all and there are some MAs that have 
ceased to use FIs in 2014-20, but did in 2007-13. Some of these are presented as a case 
study (see Annex 1).  
The online survey of Managing Authorities sought to understand why financial 
instruments had not been used. For each Thematic Objective where FIs were not 
planned, Managing Authorities were asked to indicate up to five reasons for this. Figure 
4.14 shows that, across all TOs, the single most important reason for not using FIs 
LVWKDWWKH\DUHGHHPHGµXQVXLWDEOHIRUSODQQHGSURMHFWV¶.  
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Figure 4.14: Reasons for not using financial instruments  
 
Note: (i) Where Managing Authorities were not using financial instruments for a given Thematic 
Objective, they were invited to select up to five reasons why not. (ii) Figures refer to % of 
respondents citing the reasons above (iii) An ex ante assessment for FIs may or may not have 
been carried out; if an ex ante assessment has been carried out, there will be some overlap 
between categories. 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
Figure 4.14 shows that the outcomes differ slightly among Interreg MA authorities. These 
account for a significant proportion of non-users of FIs (no Interreg respondents to the 
survey proposed to use FIs). These outcomes suggest that among Interreg OPs, lack of 
suitability for planned projects, lack of demand from final recipients and insufficient 
critical mass are more important reasons for not using FIs than for OPs as a whole.  
Figure 4.15 breaks this down by TO (excluding Interreg OPs from the analysis). This 
VKRZVWKDWZKLOHµXQVXLWDEOHIRUSODQQHGSURMHFWV¶LVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWUHDVRQDFURVVDOO
Thematic Objectives, this is not the case for TO1 (research development), TO3 (SME 
competitiveness) or TO4 (low carbon). The outcomes for TO3 and TO4 are interesting as 
these are areas where FIs were typically used in 2007-13. 
For TO3, the most important reasons for not using FIs are: 
1. µODFNRIGHPDQG¶IURPILQDOUHFLSLHQWVSHUFHQW 
2.   µXQVXLWDEOH IRU SODQQHG SURMHFWV¶ µLQVXIILFLHQW FULWLFDO PDVV¶ µODFN RI
adPLQLVWUDWLYHFDSDFLW\¶SHUFHQWHDFK 
In the case of TO4 (low carbon economy), the most important reasons are: 
1. ¶ODFNRIGHPDQGIURPILQDOUHFLSLHQWV¶SHUFHQW 
2. µLQVXIILFLHQWFULWLFDOPDVV¶SHUFHQW 
$OWKRXJK µXQVXLWDELOLW\¶ VFRUHG KLJKO\ LQ ERWK TO3 and TO4, these scores are low 
compared to other TOs, reflecting the fact that FIs are used more for these policy areas 
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than others. EU regulatory issues appear comparatively important for not using FIs under 
72DVGRHVµDGPLQLVWUDWLYHFDSDFLW\¶DOVo for TO4).  
,QJHQHUDO µQHJDWLYHH[SHULHQFH LQ-¶GRHVQRW VFRUHKLJKO\DVD UHDVRQ IRUQRW
using FIs in 2014-20, but six percent of MAs cite this as a reason for not using FIs under 
TO4 in the current period.  
Figure 4.15: Reasons for not using financial instruments by Thematic Objective  
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Unsuitable for planned 
projects 43 28 45 26 19 43 48 43 44 52 52 67 
Ex-ante assessment did not 
recommend FIs 25 34 28 4 17 23 23 40 19 26 25 24 
Lack of demand from final 
recipients 24 30 26 39 30 17 32 25 14 20 20 19 
No suboptimal investment 
situation 18 15 19 17 17 15 16 18 19 19 21 19 
Insufficient critical mass 
(e.g. OP too small) 16 21 14 26 25 15 18 3 19 15 12 14 
Sufficient domestic finance 
to meet finance needs 13 21 12 17 21 15 10 5 9 13 10 10 
Lack of administrative 
capacity 11 9 7 26 21 9 11 3 13 10 9 5 
Availability of EU level 
instruments  7 17 2 9 6 2 0 5 10 11 5 5 
Lack of political 
support/consensus 7 2 7 4 8 6 6 10 6 8 7 24 
Audit risk too high 
 7 8 3 13 6 4 5 3 11 10 7 0 
EU regulatory issues are an 
obstacle 6 17 7 22 8 4 5 3 3 5 4 0 
Domestic regulatory issues 
are an obstacle 4 9 7 9 9 2 5 3 0 2 4 0 
Negative experience in 2007-
2013 2 6 0 0 6 2 2 3 3 2 1 0 
Other 13 13 12 17 17 11 13 18 17 13 10 10 
Note: (i) Where Managing Authorities were not using financial instruments for a given Thematic 
Objective, they were invited to select up to five reasons why not. (ii) Figures refer to % of 
respondents citing the reasons above, but excluding Interreg MAs. (iii) An ex ante assessment for 
FIs may or may not have been carried out; if an ex ante assessment has been carried out, there 
will be some overlap between categories.  
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
µ2WKHU¶ UHDVRQV ZHUH PDLQO\ WKDW WKH H[ DQWH DVVHVVPHQW KDG QRW \HW EHHQ ILQLVKHG
though some further points are noted: 
³We prefer to have total control of the funds´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\VXUYH\UHVSRQVH 
³Tighter controls on monitoring and reporting than for other forms of assistance´
[presumably referring to the administrative burden] (Managing Authority survey 
response) 
Interviews with Managing Authorities confirmed the reasoning given in the surveys, but 
some yielded more detailed insights. Some of these were quite context specific, as Box 
4.4 shows. 
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Box 4.4: Impediments to using FIs for water quality and low carbon projects 
Within the intervention focused on improving of water quality loans or equity were recommended in 
WKHH[DQWHDVVHVVPHQW«WKH0$GHFLGHGQRW WRXVH WKH),VKHUH IRUPDQ\UHDVRQVHVSHFLDOO\
less experience, risks of low absorption capacity (for this form of assistance), political reasons (fear 
of increasing of water rates and sewer rates as a result of market setting of projects). The decisive 
factor in case of intervention focused on decreasing of emissions from heating consisted in 
administrative burden (and management costs) in comparison with capacity of intermediary 
organisation and in the fact that the rate of grants was increased and the loans would be too small. 
Source: Managing authority interview. 
For Interreg, there are also specific impediments: 
³The biggest issue is the kind of projects undertaken and that they are not income 
generating usually. Also, the amounts ± you need a minimum amount ± a critical 
PDVVWRUXQDILQDQFLDOLQVWUXPHQWDQG(7&SURJUDPPHVDUHWRRVPDOO«>WKHUHLVD
clash] a set of indicators meant for a different kind of project. If the COM wanted ETC 
programmes to use FI it would have to impose it and then provide a mechanisms 
where ETC programmes would contribute to an EU level fund with money from the 
SURJUDPPH´ (Managing Authority interview). 
Other constraints were related to the nature of the beneficiaries, implying, for example, 
that large undertakings and public institutions might not be suitable targets for 
FIs: 
³complicated rules and type of beneficiaries and their expectations ± e.g. high-speed 
access to internet (rules very complicated already for grants, beneficiaries are big 
companies).´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³FIs are considered as a very useful form of support, but not feasible for certain types 
of projects or type of beneficiaries. For instance, it's very hard to use FIs for public 
institutions support´(Managing Authority interview) 
³Most of OP's TOs are related to improvement of public infrastructure and investing in 
social objectives, which wouldn't be appropriate for using FIs.´ (Managing Authority 
interview) 
Past experience, especially in relation to TO4, is also relevant, a finding from the 
interviews that is consistent with the online survey: 
³There were some attempts to implement FIs in TO 4 but the experiences have often 
EHHQQHJDWLYH´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³The possibility of implementing a FI in TO4 for energy efficiency was considered. 
However, this type of support is carried out by a regional agency already and the 
possibility was discarded. In addition, the experience with JESSICA in the 2007-2013 
programming period has not been satisfactory.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³The possibility of implementing a FI for energy efficiency in TO 4 was considered. 
However, that idea was discarded since [the regional development agency] has still 
limited experience with FIs and operational risk would be too high.´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
The interviews also revealed that Managing Authorities considered the possible use of 
FIs under TO1 (R&D&I) to be challenging: 
³),SUHSDUDWLRns under TO1 have quickly revealed the particular capabilities required, 
including the need to involve highly specialised experts in various phases of 
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implementation (starting from the appraisal of the applications).´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
³TO1 - extremely low levels of investments in R&D in both private and public sector, 
potential beneficiaries should be motivated to invest more with grants, since no one 
will take a debt instrument for investment in R&D when return on investment is not 
guaranteed´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³«grants are important for research based projects, renovation of commercial 
buildings, etc. Grants stimulate faster and larger scale activities in those areas where 
financing isn't accessible. Using FIs wouldn't be appropriate in such cases. In 
addition, it is essential to introduce financial instruments in line with the market 
practice, therefore FI are not implemented under TO1 due to sectoral restrictions.´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
³Using FIs for thematic objectives where no such instruments have been employed 
before is a major challenge. Problems occurred at a fairly early stage, in the absence 
of experience, policy planners could only provide limited inputs for FIs. Absorption 
capacity for new products is often a dilemma, e.g. could equity resources which are 
made available for R+D+I be absorbed when equity funds have been traditionally 
looking for innovative companies anyway´ (Managing Authority interview) 
More generally, some respondents only considered FIs relevant to some TOs, 
notably SMEs and low carbon: 
³),VDUHQRWDSSOLFDEOHIRURWKHU72VH[FHSW72DQG72«0DLQEDUULHUVDUHUHODWHG
to type of project, its scale, as well as type of beneficiary - public persons or 
entrepreneurs.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYiew) 
Other concerns were more general, notably practical or administrative and capacity 
considerations, including loss of control and coordination problems, and the cost of 
conducting an ex ante assessment. On capacity: 
³missing experience in some areas (e.g. microloans for social enterprises).´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
³The main reason for not using FIs is the lack of experience of public authorities.´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
Regarding coordination and control: 
³The main drawback is that with FIs, and especially when financial intermediaries are 
involved, control over the policy intervention is given up. This has caused some 
Ministries to opt for grants as opposed to FIs.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³The main problem to not go ahead with some plans for FIs are coordination 
problems between the different regional administrations (...regional government, 
agencies, etc.), rather than a lack of potential/demand.´ (Intermediate body 
interview) 
³it is difficult to articulate a large number of policy interventions. This is an additional 
reason for not using more FIs.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³the main difficulty when designing the FIs was the delimitation with other types of 
support carried out by other public entities.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
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Last, some respondents mentioned other practical issues such as those associated with 
the size of the market, in relation to the size of the region, or the nature of the 
programme: 
³In the case of equity products there is a problem of target market scope. Being 
limited to investing only in [the region] makes it difficult to reach an appropriate size. 
This is also a problem when attracting financial intermediaries, as they tend to focus 
on target markets larger than [the region].´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³:H
UH WDONLQJ DERXW D FRRSHUation programme with non-EU countries! We already 
find it hard to deal with ERDF Regulations in the regional programme and we would 
certainly not launch FIs with non-EU countries which would doubtless lead to controls 
and checks which would be impossible to verify in countries where administrative 
practices are far from those in Europe´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\QRQ-user) 
4.8. How useful are off-the-shelf instruments and how could they be 
improved? 
In the 2014-20 regulations, the Commission introduced the option for MAs to use 
template FIs which comply with standard terms and conditions.159 The template models 
are intended to facilitate FI set up; if the template is adhered to, MAs can be assured of 
the compliance of the proposed FIs across a range of regulatory issues, including 
selection of financial intermediaries, funding agreements, State aid and management 
costs and fees. This topic is also explored in a separate case study ± see Annex 1. 
The first three standardised instruments were made available in 2014 and included a 
portfolio risk sharing loan, a capped portfolio guarantee, and a renovation loan. These 
were joined by a further two models in 2016 - a co-investment facility and an Urban 
Development Loan Fund.  
The online survey of Managing Authorities explored the use and planned use of OTS FIs, 
barriers to their use and scope for improvement.  
                                          
159 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 964/2014 of 11 September 2014 laying down 
rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council as regards standard terms and conditions for financial instruments; OJ L271; 12.9.2014; 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1157 of 11 July 2016 amending Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 964/2014 as regards standard terms and conditions for financial instruments 
for a co-investment facility and for an urban development fund; OJ L192; 16.7.2016.  
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Figure 4.16 3ODQV WR XVH µRII-the-VKHOI¶ LQVWUXPHQWV 0DQDJLQJ $XWKRULWLHV
planning to use FIs) 
 
Note: 15 MAs reported planned OTS instruments, of which two were SME Initiatives; seven MAs 
reported OTS FIs in set up, of which one was an SME Initiative.  
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
Figure 4.16 suggests that the uptake of off-the-shelf instruments has been rather 
limited. At the time of the survey, it appeared that 13 OTS FIs were planned and six 
were in set up (excluding the SME Initiative, which some respondents considered as OTS 
FIs). However, it did not appear that any of the OTS FIs were operational at that stage. 
Although uptake of OTS FIs was somewhat limited, the survey also made clear that OTS 
FIs were of interest in general terms and might be considered for other purposes later. 
This was confirmed by the Managing Authority interviews, which revealed generally 
positive views, despite the low take-XS7KH276),VZHUHGHVFULEHGDVµFRPPHQGDEOH¶
µKHOSIXO¶ DQG µLQFRUSRUDWLQJ EHVW SUDFWLFHV¶ 7KHLU SRWHQWLDO WR VSHHG XS LPSOHPHQWDWLRn 
and facilitate management is widely accepted. 
³[The OTS FIs] make the use of FIs accessible to public authorities in a simple way.´ 
(Managing Authority interview)  
³[They] remove the vast majority of risks.´ (Managing authority interview) 
³[They are] especially suitable if an MA does not have prior experience of FIs´ 
(Managing authority interview) 
6HYHUDO 0$V VWDWHG WKDW WKH\ KDG XVHG WKH 276 LQVWUXPHQWV DV µLQVSLUDWLRQ¶ WR KHOS
design final products tailored more closely to their own needs.  
As Figure 4.17 shows, the main reason for not using OTS FIs was a preference for 
building on existing FIs. This is hardly surprising since many Managing Authorities 
took considerable time to establish appropriate instruments in 2007-13. Moreover, the 
available OTS FIs contain no State aid, which means that may be less generous than FIs 
which MAs have designed themselves and which build on the scope for compatible aid 
under the GBER.  
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Yes - planned
Yes - in set up
Not currently planned but will consider in
future
None planned
What best describes the use of 'off-the-shelf' instruments for this OP? 
Improving the take-up and effectiveness of Financial Instruments 
101 
Figure 4.17: Barriers to take-XSRIµRII-the-VKHOI¶LQVWUXPHQWV 
 
Note: 0$VSODQQLQJWRXVH),VEXWQRWµRII-the-VKHOI¶),V 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
Managing Authorities also noted that the Regulation had not been ready soon enough for 
them to establish whether it would be useful, and many considered the mechanisms 
proposed to be too simple for their needs. However, a large number of MAs cited other 
considerations beyond those suggested in the survey.  
The main reason by far was that the design of the OTS FIs available do not meet the 
current needs of the OP, for a variety of reasons:  
³The program does not provide support to companies that could benefit from these 
instruments´(Managing authority interview) 
³:H planned instruments tailor-made to regional needs´ (Managing authority 
interview) 
³All OTS financial instruments are unsuitable because they cover risks which do not 
exist here.´ (Managing authority interview) 
³Not suitable for our needs´ (Managing authority interview) 
³Not suitable for the market failures identified´ (Managing authority interview) 
Another reason for not using OTS FIs was related to timing. Specifically, that the ex 
ante had not yet been concluded or the type of financial product to be used had not been 
decided. 
Two more specific reasons were also mentioned. First, that the OTS FIs require too 
great a contribution from financial intermediaries and are therefore unattractive to 
them. Second, that OTS FIs are inflexible ± they do not offer scope to adjust or amend 
elements that do not fit well with the national context. This second point, while 
understandable at one level, also presents a circular problem since the very purpose of 
OTS FIs is that, by following the letter of the Regulation, the MA is assured that the FI 
complies with the relevant State aid, procurement and selection criteria. Clearly this 
assurance cannot hold if those terms have been amended. 
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Figure 4.18,PSURYHPHQWVWRµRII-the-VKHOI¶ LQVWUXPHQWV0$VSODQQing to use 
FI) 
 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
4.9. What are the key steps in the decision to establish FIs? 
The first steps to establishing FIs within an ESIF programme are governed by provisions 
in the CPR: 
x The ex ante evaluation should provide a rationale for the form of support proposed 
(Article 55(3)(h)) 
x MAs should indicate planned use of FIs in the OP (Article 96(2)(b)(iii)) (although it 
can also be introduced after OP adoption) 
x an ex̻ante assessment must be completed before the MA decides to contribute OP 
resources to an FI (Articles 37(1)̻(2) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 964/2014 
Article 3(1)). 
Prior to, and alongside these steps, a number of activities can take place which have an 
impact on whether FIs are established (see Figure 4.19):  
1. Discussions before the OP is drafted - the use of FIs may be discussed before the 
OP is drawn up, potentially in parallel with Partnership Agreement negotiations 
(depending on the procedure in the Member State /region concerned); high-level 
analyses may take place, evaluation results of previous FIs may be incorporated, and 
discussion take place to inform and develop the approach (even when no FIs are 
ultimately chosen in the OP).  
³More intensive debate on the form of the assistance appeared before finalization of 
the OP ± when specific objectives were outlined. In 2014, the MA commissioned 
general analysis of potential usage of FIs and findings of this document were 
developed in following discussions.´QDWLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
Discussions with the EIF/EIB may play a role at this stage, as well as with the 
Commission. At this and later stages, wider political concerns (political support for FIs 
within the region/MS) have an influencing role.  
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Could the current 'off-the-shelf' instruments be improved? 
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³The EIF played a crucial role in deciding to set up FIs.´QDWLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
³Recommendations about possible financial proportions for each TO were provided in 
the EU Structural Funds evaluations carried out in the period 2007±2013. So it was 
relied on the recommendations of these evaluations as well.´ (national Managing 
Authority)  
2. During the OP drafting and approval process ± the OP must make reference to 
FIs if there are plans to use them, although this can take the form of only very general 
LQIRUPDWLRQ D µSODFHKROGHU¶ 7KH&RPPLVVLRQSOD\VD VWURQJ UROHDW WKLV VWDJHGXULQJ
the negotiation process.  
³Very general information was in the programme document but it was not very 
concrete. The main reason was not WR ³FORVH WKH GRRU´ WR SRWHQWLDO ),V
implementation.´QDWLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\  
³Negotiations with the Commission affected planners' thinking, pressure from the 
Commission was apparent though not absolute´(national Managing Authority) 
Previous use of FIs is a strong indicator of future use, at least, where that previous 
experience was positive.  
³It was a natural continuation of past experience and the use of FI was proposed 
while negotiating and drafting OP.´QDWLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
³The approach therefore was a natural continuation of the past and the concepts has 
been present in the strategic thinking process from the commencement of the 
programming exercise.´(national Managing Authority) 
³It was a natural decision´UHJLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRrity) 
³The decision to make use of FIs was logical«the positive experiences of the 2007-
2013 programming period have been a decisive factor to choose FIs for the 2014-
2020 programming period´UHJLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
In the OPs, the indicative amount allocated to FIs tends to be influenced by the total 
budget available, the OP priorities, expected absorption capacity, and other 
resources available, including amount of revolved funding. The OP figure must be 
indicative only, as funds cannot be allocated to FIs until an ex ante assessment has taken 
place. 
³The level of funding allocated to FIs was decided based on past experience, expected 
absorption capacity, recommendation of the EC.´QDWLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
³The financial allocation to the 2014-2020 FIs was determined by the amount of 
revolving resources obtained from the 2007-2013 programming period.´ (regional 
Managing Authority) 
"The level of resources allocated to FIs has been determined by the level of resources 
previously devoted to grants. There has been a transition between types of support 
but the budget has not been substantially altered.´UHJLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
³Mainly related to experience from the past but also based on the level of co-
financing that is available´UHJLRQDO0Dnaging Authority) 
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3. The ex ante evaluation of OP may confirm the approach taken in the OP or 
challenge it. This was not mentioned by MAs as having been a strong influencing factor 
on the decision whether or not to use FIs.  
4. The decision to procure an ex ante assessment. A wide range of approaches 
have been taken to this process among Member States (a more detailed analysis is 
provided in the First Interim Report). They have variously been conducted at OP level 
(regional and national), Priority Axis level, Fund level, for individual FIs (mostly in 
Germany), or have reviewed individual Investment Areas, spanning across ESI Funds and 
national and regional OPs. 
5. The recommendations of the ex ante assessment ± if an ex ante assessment 
goes ahead, the MA may decide to accept its recommendations in full, to adapt them, or 
QRWWRDGRSWWKHPDWDOO7KHH[DQWHDVVHVVPHQW¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVPD\RUPD\QRWEH
consistent with proposals made in the OP, and may require a change in plans ± in the 
amount allocated, in the type of FI proposed and in the TO(s) being addressed. 
³The ex ante is still in progress and only with its finalisation the level of funding 
allocated to FIs will be determined.´UHJLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
³Definitely yes, the ex ante assessment was important resource for discussion on 
future FI implementation. Other factors: previous experience, recommendation of the 
EC.´QDWLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
³discussions were based on past absorption capacity, findings of ex ante assessment 
and expected engagement of other resources, the discussions with the EC influenced 
the level of funding [for a specific measure].´QDWLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
³The OP is fully in line with the ex ante assessment's findings. TOs, types of financial 
products and allocations have remained unaltered.´UHJLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
³There are some thematic differences (e.g. the ex ante assessment recommended to 
support renovation and construction (within energetic savings) via FIs, the MA 
decided to focus only at renovations) or differences linked to forms of FIs ± equity 
recommended but not implemented (considered as a too strong for applicants who 
are not sufficiently familiar with the FIs within 2014-2020 programme period).´
(national Managing Authority) 
³There have been adjustments to what was originally planned in the OP. The OP was 
intentionally drafted in a quite generic manner to leave room for adjustments.´
(national Managing Authority) 
³7KH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI),V LVQRW IXOO\ FRQVLVWHQWZLWK WKH236RPHH[LVWLQJ LGHDV 
were discarded and some new were added after the OP was drafted.´ (regional 
Managing Authority) 
³The implementation of FI is consistent with recommendations of the ex±ante 
assessment. For example, in case of support for SME, all recommendations provided 
in the ex±ante assessment were implemented. There were defined the selection of 
type of FI, the financial allocations for implementing FI selected, establishment of 
IXQGRIIXQGV´QDWLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
³The only change was diminishing some of the allocation previously planned for [a 
specific priority] - after the assessment we decided that there will not be enough 
demand for financial products in this sphere.´UHJLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
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Figure 4.19: Decision process - using FIs in the OP 
 
Source: European Commission and EIB (2015) Developing an action plan Design, set-up, 
implementation and winding-up of financial instruments, fi-compass https://www.fi-
compass.eu/sites/default/files/publications/ESIF-factsheet-developing-action-plan.pdf  
4.10. Does the current legislative framework facilitate or hinder the uptake of 
FIs? 
The 2014-20 Regulations underpinning the use of FIs are a step change from those 
applicable in 2007-13, partly in response to Member State concern at the absence of 
detail and lack of clarity in those rules in the previous planning period.  
The general perception of Managing Authorities on the new legislative framework is 
rather mixed, though it is fair to say that it is generally found to be challenging. Some 
respondents were positive on the new Regulations: 
³9HU\KHOSful and better than 2007-´ILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHrview) 
³The 2014-2020 Regulations are clearly a step forward compared to the 2007-2013 
Regulations. In that sense, they are more helpful.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³The 2014-2020 Regulations are assessed as sufficient, including of the level detail´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
³The 2014-2020 Regulations are definitely better and more detailed with respect to 
FIs and this is appreciated´ (Managing Authority interview) 
However, the view that the Regulations could be improved was more widespread. A key 
area of concern is the uncertainty associated with the scope for interpretation in the 
Regulations: 
³-20 Regulations [are] too onerous, detailed, bureaucratic, complex ± more than 
in the 2007-SHULRG´ILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
Improving the take-up and effectiveness of Financial Instruments 
106 
³Too detailed and especially not always clear interpretation (and very limited 
possibilities how to check the correctness of the interpretation due to lack of follow-up 
communication with the EC´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³The 2014-2020 Regulations are extraordinarily complex and do not offer much 
flexibility. In particular, there are different perceptions in the private and public 
sectors. When FIs involve the private sector, the Regulations are not appropriate. For 
instance, there is too much unnecessary bureaucracy and problems arise from the 
rules on eligibility. These obstacles have resulted in [financing] FIs with own funds 
(the revolving from past programmes), as opposed to ERDF resources.´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
³FI management is very complex. There is legal uncertainty in control audits that 
FRXOGDIIHFWWKHH[HFXWLRQ«7KHJUDQWLQJDQGPRQLWRULQJRIDQ),VKRXOGQRWKDYH
many more controls than those who have a loan from a bank. The management and 
control of an FI should encourage their use, rather than discourage it.´ (Managing 
Authority survey, user). 
³The 2014-2020 Regulations have been helpful to some extent. However, when it 
comes to complex legal questions there is often room for interpretation.´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
³Although there has been progress in addressing the legal uncertainty experienced in 
the previous period, the volume of regulations is a general concern. The complexity of 
the regulations, difficulties of overseeing the regulatory landscape are great 
prREOHPV´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³The Regulations set the MA off in one direction on the selection process, but the 
selection gXLGDQFHKDV MXVWEHHQDSSURYHG«>RXU@ interpretation of the Regulations 
implied the MA could use calls but this was negated by the guidance when it 
emerged´ (Managing Authority interview) 
Another major concern is with timing. This relates both to the Regulations themselves 
and to guidance issues in support of them: 
³Regulations are considered as useful, only they were issued late´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
³« have found piecemeal way they came out difficult, the same for the guidance that 
then interpreted the Regulations.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³The EC frequently responds late, sometimes not at all and concurrently the EC 
pushes the member states to implement the FI as soon as possible.´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
³« guidance documents appear late, too late. When we started our FIs ex-ante 
analysis some of thHP ZHUH QRW SUHVHQW« now we have to change / revise the 
analysis. There is an important need for better coordination of these processes on the 
EU level.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³Commission's procedures are too long and complicated. For example, the guidance 
for selection of intermediaries implementing financial instruments are approved just 
in the second part of 2016. There is also 2 years timing gap between the approval of 
the Commission's Regulations and issuing more detailed explanations, which create a 
lot of discussions, additional questions, delays and dissatisfaction «.´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
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The introduction of obligatory ex ante assessment to underpin the use of financial 
instruments was generally viewed very positively.  
³obligatory ex ante assessment is considered useful´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³Obligatory ex-ante assessment is considered as a very useful tool, it shows the 
fundamental perspective how to deal with FIs.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³Ex ante assessment was considered as very useful « ZRXOG UHFRPPHQG LW IRU
JUDQWV´ (Managing Authority interview) 
However, some expressed concerns at the time involved and considered that the 
Commission should have a role in feeding back on the ex ante assessment: 
³ex ante assessment is not evaluated and approved by the Commission, which leaves 
a lot of questions open, i.e. related to mechanisms for implementing FIs. Feedback 
from the Commission on the ex ante assessment would be very useful.´ 
³the ex ante « should be instrumental in clarifying issues not resolved by the 
documents already provided but it is too time-consuming«the implementation is 
delayed and efficient management is hindered.´ 
In addition, while the ex ante assessment was generally welcomed, some expressed 
concern at the level of detail required and questioned whether market needs could 
realistically be predicted on such a long term basis. 
³NH\FKDOOHQJHVVHHPWREHHFRQRPLFRQHVGXHWRWKHIDFWWKDWH[-ante assessment 
was carried out in 2014 based on data from 2012-13. (FRQRPLF FRQGLWLRQV« KDYH
changed substantially since tKHQ´ILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
There are also mixed views on the rules concerning management costs and fees. 
Some considered these to be a constraint on policy design, while others were content at 
the new provisions: 
³«management costs and fees are QRW FRQVLGHUHG DV D FRQVWUDLQW´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
³The decrease of management costs and fees is understandable but finally very 
radical. The MA has to resolve covering of real costs with intermediary.´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
³the current management fee and costs provisions require a very complex calculation 
method. The performance focus is welcome, however there are many dilemmas 
concerning their application. The previous model is perceived to have been simpler, 
more transparent and market-friendly, priced by market actor in line with market 
practices.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³Management costs and fees: these are a constraint, but a necessary constraint. They 
don't give flexibility for certain types of fund to operate effectively but it is right to 
have set fees and costs. A little more flexibility in certain circumstances where it 
could be justified might be desirable.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³,Q - WKH IHHV DQG FRVWV«KDYH EHHQ OLPLWHG WR  7KLVPHDQVZH FDQQo 
ORQJHUFRYHURXUFRVWV«7KHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHFRVWVVKRXOGEHFRYHUHGE\UHSD\PHQWV
and gains. This was confirmed by the Commission in a long communication process 
EXWLWLVQRWFOHDULIWKHODWHULQVSHFWRUVZLOODFFHSWWKHHPDLOVRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ«DV
a basis for their inspection (financial intermediary interview). 
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³5LGLFXORXVO\ ORZ JLYHQ WKH ULVN DQG OLDELOLW\ DVVXPHG´ ILQDQFLDO LQWHUPHGLDU\
interview). 
³$V WKHFRVWVRIPDQDJLQJD), LVQRWXQLIRUPDFURVV WKH\HDUVSURYLVLRQVRI OLQHDU
MC&F are damaging especially for in-house financial bodies. This creates financial 
reporting problems, whenever the payment of activities in a year is delayed to the 
following years(s). Technically it is incorrect to have active costs in a year which are 
reported/claimed H[SRVW´ (financial intermediary interview). 
³$GHTXDWH«EXW SHUKDSVQRW VXIILFLHQWO\ IOH[LEOH IRU ORZHU VFDOH ),V ± many private 
sector fund managers may not be willing to engage in smaller funds due to the 
limitation on proportional remuneration. Minimum DEVROXWH DPRXQWV FRXOG KHOS´
(financial intermediary interview). 
Another area that elicited comments from Managing Authorities concerns phased 
payments, these provisions were new in 2014-20 and designed to counter the 
overcapitalisation of funds that had occurred in 2007-13, partly as a mechanism to 
postpone possible decommitment. Whilst generally accepted (or not commented to any 
large extent) some specific issues emerged: 
³Phased payments ± it is a good idea, however due to very hard conditions (the third 
applications for payment can only be submitted once 85% of the amounts have been 
spent) and even more national rules make it rather a constraint. More flexible system 
would be more beneficial.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³the provisions on phased payments are not realistic in the private sector since 
capital calls are made on a rolling basis usually.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³When the implementation of FI is very successful (because of high demand and a 
large quantity of projects), the threshold of 25 percent is too low, as there is a lack of 
funds « lack of resources also arises because of the limitation imposed by the Article 
41 of CPR on the second and subsequent disbursements, which depends on the 
incurred eligible costs (by 60 and 85 percent). Periods of lack of funds basically show 
that the fund could operate more efficiently, but it is limited by Regulation.´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
Some detailed eligibility issues were also mentioned: 
³VRPHRIWKHUXOHVDUHQRWPDUNHWEDVHGe.g. those related to property. ERDF states 
that you cannot put more than 10% grant towards property. I can understand this for 
grants, BUT if you have a business which is planning to buy a property instead of 
renting and wants to use FIs, this should be differHQW´ ILQDQFLDO LQWHUPHGLDU\
interview). 
Last, the implementation options also attracted comment, with some respondents 
considering the EIB and EIF to be in privileged position in relation to domestic financial 
intermediaries, but others having a more positive view: 
³7KH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ options are not favourable for in-KRXVH ILQDQFLDO ERGLHV«in-
house financial bodies are disadvantaged compared to private/other operators. Again, 
WKH(,%(,)PRGHO LV ODUJHO\ LQFHQWLYL]HG«7KH(,%KDV OHVVDGPLQLVWUDWLYHEXUGens 
PRQLWRULQJ DQG FRQWURO DQG WKH ZKROH PDQGDWH VHHPV WR EH OHVV WUDQVSDUHQW´
(financial intermediary interview). 
³3URYLVLRQVRQSXEOLFSURFXUHPHQWDUHLQDSSURSULDWHIRUWKHVHOHFWLRQRILPSOHPHQWLQJ
ERGLHVLQWHUPHGLDULHV«2QHRIWKHPDMRUobstacles oI WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQSURFHVV«
the aim of the selection is to choose the provider with the highest quality, not the 
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cheapest offer. Requirements for the selection simply cannot be fully respected in the 
JLYHQOHJDOIUDPHZRUN´ILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLew).  
³IURPRXUH[SHULHQFH WKHselection process for intermediaries, from the EIF, is very 
WUDQVSDUHQW´ILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
4.11. To what extent does the available guidance and advice address support 
needs? 
The legislative framework for financial instruments in 2014-20 has been characterised by 
considerably increased emphasis on support, notably through fi-compass, and on written 
guidance issued by the Commission. Nevertheless, a significant number of Managing 
Authorities think that more guidance is needed in certain areas. The emphasis of these 
QHHGVYDULHVEHWZHHQWKRVH0$VXVLQJ),VDQGµQRQ-XVHUV¶ ODUJHO\UHIOHFWLQJWKHH[WHQW
of their experience with implementation (see Figure 4.20). 
Figure 4.20: Advisory support needs among Managing Authorities 
 
Source: EPRC online survey of Managing Authorities. 
There were a number of other comments on advisory support from the survey, mainly 
from non-users identifying specific needs: 
³Best practice of other countries in detail´(Managing Authority, non-user). 
³Experience from ETC programmes (Interreg) that have used FIs would be interesting 
to understand if they would be relevant for us. Currently the understanding of FIs is 
very limited in ETC and thus it is difficult to assess the potential benefit.´0DQDJLQJ
Authority, non-user). 
³Financial instruments in cross-border (Interreg) context are again much more 
difficult, as regulations of several countries apply´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\Qon-user). 
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In addition, some FI users commented on possible other advice, focussing on the need 
for guidance to be tailored to national circumstances and dealing with specific needs: 
³«masses of written guidance will not be as useful as a unit which deals with reality 
on the ground - someone we can speak to about making the best use of the funds 
rather than an over-reliance on rules would be fantastic. i.e. helping us work within 
the rules not just regurgitating them at us.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\VXUYH\XVHU 
³IL-compass could include more examples of good practices on how other regions / 
countries deal with the implementation of FI. On fi-compass they could also publish 
EC documents, which are under development, so that potential users had access to 
them during their GHYHORSPHQW´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\VXUYH\XVHU 
³The guidelines established at the European Commission do not translate into legal 
solutions at the national level. We do not see any simplification of the implementation 
of ),V« FI organization is more complicated than it was in the 2007-2013 financial 
perspective.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\VXUYH\XVHU 
³7KHQHZO\HVWDEOLVKHG:LNLSHGLD>5HJLRZLNL@LVEHWWHUEXWVRPHOLQNVDUHQRWDOZD\V
visible or they are not linked. Nevertheless, the Wikipedia represents a step in the 
ULJKWGLUHFWLRQ´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
In addition, some expressed the view that the issue was not with the guidance, but with 
the underlying regulations.  
³The problem of the financial perspective 2014-2020 in the field of financial 
instruments is not strictly the lack of counselling support, but over-regulation 
system.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ survey, user). 
³If Managing Authorities need advice, it is because the system is too complex. It 
would be better to simplify the system WKDQWRGHYHORSDGYLFH´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
survey, non-user). 
These perceptions are line with the wider views gathered at interview which suggest 
three main issues associated with guidance: timing, tailoring and status. 
Regarding, timing, there has often been a significant gap between the regulation being 
issued and guidance being available.  
³The only problem mentioned was timing. It was issued late.´ 0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\
interview) 
³«it takes too long to issue official Guidelines´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³The timing of the selection guidance was extremely late, the final version issued in 
mid-summer 2016; meanwhile MA completed a public procurement process in order 
to be able to commence lending. Also, « there was no real opportunity to influence 
the content.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³The main problem is that the guidelines are drawn up late. They are approved when 
the financial instruments are already being implemented.´ (Managing Authority 
interview) 
³Written guidance provided by the Commission could be closer to Regulations 
timewise.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
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³Timewise the ex ante guidelines were delayed and received after the ex-ante 
assessment was already prepared and for this reason it had to be revised´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
³Guidance was generally good but late. This can't be helped because of the lengthy 
negotiation period. Also for the 2014-20 period there seem to have been an unusual 
high amount of implementing and delegated acts which delayed things considerably´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
³Unhelpful when it comes out at a different time from the Regulations and where it 
muddies the water. Guidance should be available at the same time as the 
RegXODWLRQV´ (Managing Authority interview) 
The second, main issue raised is tailoring. Many MAs consider the guidance to be too 
general for their needs, and often too theoretical or lacking in practical examples and 
would like more, and more effective, direct contact with the Commission on their specific 
needs.  
Box 4.5: Managing Authority experience with guidance and communication 
³7KHJXLGDQFHGLGDQVZHUWKHNH\TXHVWLRQVEXW«WKHV\VWHPLVYHU\FRPSOLFDWHGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI
some points is not clear and the MA has not a good experience with follow-up communication with 
WKH(&««HJQRUHDFWLRQVRQFRPPHQts, no reflection of comments and no explanation why they 
ZHUHZHUHQRWUHIOHFWHG7KHZULWWHQJXLGDQFHZDVLVVXHGODWH´ 
Source: Managing Authority interview. 
Specifically on the SMEI, one Managing Authority noted: 
³7KHUH LVDOPRVWQRZULWWHQJXidance about the SME Initiative´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\
interview). 
³2QHRIWKHSUREOHPVZLWKWKH60(,LVWKDWLVGRHVQ¶W OHDYHEHKLQGDQ\H[SHUWLVHRU
capacity with the national authorities´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
Box 4.6: Participation in the SME Initiative 
One of the innovations introduced by the CPR in 2014-20 for ESIF FIs is the possibility for 
Managing Authorities to make a contribution to a financial instrument set up at Union level. .The 
SME Initiative is an example for a financial instrument set up at Union level implemented by the 
EIB Group which aims to stimulate SME financing by providing partial risk cover for the SME loan 
portfolios of the participating originating financial institutions. Alongside ESIF resources contributed 
by Member States, the SME Initiative is supported through COSME and/or Horizon 2020 resources 
at EU level, as well as EIB Group risk cover.  
The initiative offers two products: an uncapped portfolio guarantee instrument and a securitisation 
instrument and operates via financial intermediaries selected by the EIF in the Member State 
concerned via an open call for expression of interest. The financial intermediaries undertake to 
provide SME loans, leasing and/or guarantees at favourable terms (for example, reduced interest 
rates and collateral requirements for the final recipients). 
SME Initiative OPs have so far been approved by the Commission for Spain, Malta, Bulgaria, Italy, 
Finland and Romania. The uncapped portfolio guarantee instrument is being used in BG, ES, FI, MT 
and RO, while the securitisation option has been chosen in IT. Challenges so far identified stem 
from the newness of the tool and the learning curve associated with an unfamiliar initiative. The 
ODFNRIFODULW\RQWKH0$¶VUROHDQGWKHODFNRIZULWWHQJXLGDQFHZHUHUDLVHGDVLVVXHV 
Source: EPRC case study research ± see Annex 1. 
More generally: 
³7KHJXLGHVSXEOLVKHGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQZHUHRf help to some extent. However, the 
guides are drafted in view of 28 Member States and they sometimes are not 
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applicable to our OP with its own particularities. A way to improve the guides could be 
to add more examples.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³The written guidance is helpful only to a limited extent. For some of the more 
complex issues the information provided therein is too basic.´ (Managing Authority 
interview) 
³The written guidance was used to some extent to get acquainted with FIs but it does 
not resolve complex issues which arise in practice when implementing FIs.´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
³The written guidance provided by the European Commission could be improved by 
incorporating practical examples and less theory.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³Guidelines are perceived as useful and thorough. Examples made can sometimes be 
useful, but oftentimes they don't fit the specific context of this OP.´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
³It should also be possible to have in place fast consultation mechanism with the 
Commission personnel responsible for FIs.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
The third issue is the status of the guidance, the impact this can have on audit, and the 
perception that the Commission sometimes applies stricter rules in the guidance than is 
implied by the regulations themselves.  
³In theory, the application of guidance is not mandatory, nevertheless experience has 
shown it being a reference document for EC auditors. Therefore, any draft needs to 
scrutinised by the MA for potential audit risks.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³There are cases where the guidelines are more restrictive than Regulations. They 
impose restrictive conditions which were not specified in the Regulations.´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
³Without guidance the regulatory risks are too high to decide on implementation of 
any financial instruments. And more, the guidance (helps of course) but still open 
URRPIRUYDULRXVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQV«DV\VWHPLQZKLFKDUHJXODWLRQQHHGVJXLGDQFHRI
unknown legal power) is somehow, say, incorrect.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³«WKHJXLGHOLQHVVKRXOGEHELQGLQJDQG- if changed - should not work to the past (be 
retroactive) - this is a basic condition that must be secured´ (Managing Authority 
interview) 
³We do the things based on our best understanding, we do not have any security that 
we do things correctly.´LQWHUYLHZ)LQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\ 
³:ULWWHQJXLGDQFHLVLVVXHGUDWKHUODWHU$OWKRXJKWKH(&JXLGHOLQHVDUHQRREOLJDWRU\
the auditors seek full conformance with them and some of the measures were already 
implemented due to the time constraints´ (Managing Authority interview).  
³FODULILHGJUH\DUHD1HHGVWREHZDWHUWLJKW:ULWWHQJXLGDQFHRSHQHGXS
quite some discussion. Does not help when it comes to audit.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\
interview)  
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4.12. What changes to the legislative environment would assist FI 
implementation or encourage FIs where they are not used? 
In considering what changes to the legislative context might facilitate the use or take-up 
of FIs, one specific topic - State aid regulation - was cited by a number of Managing 
Authorities, and three broad themes emerged from the interview programme. These are: 
communication with the Commission; training, information and advice; and 
simplification.  
The concerns about State aid expressed in interviews are consistent with the outcome of 
the Managing Authority online survey in which State aid emerged as the single most 
important area about which more support was needed (see Figure 4.20). 
³State aid was only applied in the form of de minimis in the previous programming 
period, experience of other State aid provisions has been missing.´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
³Simplification in relation to State aid regulations is needed. EC State aid regulations 
are creating a lot of problems for both intermediaries and beneficiaries´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
³Compatibility with State aid is crucial. Colleagues in other departments are 
discouraged by the complexity of FI, in particular with reference to State aid.´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
³The Commission should expand the options for off-the shelf instruments (FI models), 
compatible with State aid. ³(Managing Authority interview) 
³'HILQLWLRQVDQGUHJXODWLRQVDUHQRWXQLIRUPO\GHILQed under the different funds. For 
H[DPSOHLQUHODWLRQWRVXEVLGLHVDQGGHPLQLPLV´ (Managing Authority interview) 
Communication between the Commission and Managing Authorities is evidently a 
source of frustration to MAs, and several note that improving this would facilitate the use 
of FIs in future:  
³Possibility of direct consultations with the European Commission (some issues were 
not sufficiently clear, especially at the moment of the process of setting up of the 
system).´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³Better communication with the EC, modification of some conditions (e.g. those of 
repayable assistance).´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³Better communication with the EC, more practical information, feedback for specific 
issues.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHrview) 
³Better consultation mechanism, if detailed interpretations are needed, without 
"notes" underlying that no one is responsible for what was settled in this consultation 
mode.´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
Information, training and exchange of best practice were also cited as measures 
that would facilitate the use of FIs in future, or encourage their use, and the following 
points were among those that emerged from interviews with Managing Authorities: 
³The EIB-EC's fi-compass platform was evaluated positively and further workshops 
should be organised [here]. Training should be tailored to [our country].´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
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³Further development of fi-compass. However, it must be noted that there is a 
conflict of interests, since the EIB Group provides information and at the same time 
has an interest in product marketing.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³Further development of the fi-compass platform would be evaluated positively, to 
strengthen the suSSRUWIRU0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULWLHV´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³Exchange of best practices of successfully implemented FI in other Member States 
with practical examples and hints how to aYRLGPRVWFRPPRQPLVWDNHV´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
³The establishment of an efficient Advisory Centre would be useful as well as the 
dissemination of the good practice.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³$FFHVV WR D ZHOO-organized data base of examples, how FIs may be adopted in 
various policy areas.³ (Managing Authority interview) 
³Institutions still do not know how to use [financial instruments] properly (there are 
not many experts on this topic in public administration). This requires further support 
(trainings, examples on the use, support in implementation, better promotion).´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
Also, awareness raising about the availability of FIs was mentioned: 
´«PRUHDZDUHQHVVVKRXOGEHUDLVHGRQWKHVHSURGXFWVYLV-à-vis banks and firms. For 
instance, I am not sure how many commercial banks know that there are several 
products for municipalities or for energy-efficiency that can now be accessed. This 
awareness should be increased through marketing campaigns as well as through 
SROLWLFDO PHVVDJHV IURP QDWLRQDO JRYHUQPHQWV DQG FHQWUDO EDQNV´ (Managing 
Authority interview) 
Specifically regarding EMFF one Managing Authority noted that: 
³$ QDWLRQDO HYHQW WDLORUHG WR WKH ILVKHULHV VHFWRU ZRXOG EH H[WUHPHO\ ZHOFRPH DV
would an off-the-shelf-instrument tailored specifically to the needs of the fisheries 
VHFWRU´ 
Simplification is currently high among Commission priorities and echoes the desire of 
many Managing Authorities to find easier ways of implementing policy. However, the 
scope for financial instruments to contribute to the simplification agenda appears rather 
limited at present. Most Managing Authorities did not have a view on the role that FIs 
could play in simplification in the current period, but among those that do, the perception 
is that FIs have a negative impact, as Figure 4.21 shows. Moreover, on some issues, the 
perceptions of MAs are more negative among those who currently use or plan to use FIs 
than among non-users. 
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Figure 4.21: Perceptions of the impact of FIs on simplification (all Funds) 
 
Source: EPRC Managing Authority survey. 
Notwithstanding current views, a wide range of general and specific simplification issues 
were identified during the interview programme. Some related to specific aspect of FIs, 
such as monitoring, possible off-the-shelf instruments, selection of intermediaries and 
eligibility: 
³the verification/monitoring procedures are quite cumbersome and should be 
simplified.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³the off-the-shelf instruments should be opened up to more types of activity 
supported.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³a wider range of off-the-shelf instruments could facilitate making use of more FIs in 
areas where they are currently not being used.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³Selection of financial intermediaries: it would be useful to implement the selection 
procedures in accordance with good practice [of the] EIF and to run an open and 
transparent bidding process. Now public procurement rules are applied. The bidding 
process would be better because FI should be flexible. Besides, it is difficult to 
determine the right (with unlimited competition) selection criteria. It has to be noted 
that public procurement procedures limit the financial feasibility of the measures.´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
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³It is important to provide opportunities for supporting large enterprises (limitations 
of ERDF regulation).´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³7KHSURJUDPPH¶V HQG WLPHGLIIHUHG IURP WKH LQVWUXPHQW¶V RQH 7KH IXQG OLIH F\FOH
was expanding until after 2020. One investor could not therefore participate to the 
IXOOF\FOHZKLFKPDNHVQRILQDQFLDOVHQVH«,WZRXOGEHJRRWKDWRQFHSDLGWRDIXQG
(but not invested) OP money be repaid in a more flexible manner: not at the end of 
the programme period but at the end of the LQVWUXPHQWF\FOH´ILQDQFLDOLQWHrmediary 
interview)  
Other issues were more general, such as the need for better coordination, shorter 
texts and more proportionality: 
³European Institutions should be more swift in their coordination tasks. Some 
procedures are too time-consuming.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³Reducing administrative burden for FIs is crucial, too. It is repayable, actual aid 
accounts for a small fraction of grant assistance while the volume of administrative 
requirements for these two types of support forms have become very similar.´ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
³In order to guarantee the efficiency of the financial instruments, it should be relied 
on financial institutions practice and refuse accumulating and storing excess 
documents, which increase the administrative burden.´ (Managing Authority 
interview) 
³Regulation should be more concise´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³specific needs of the final beneficiaries and reducing of the administrative burden 
have to be taken into account´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³Rationalization of legal framework´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³A shortcoming is in the excessive fragmentation in the regulations. Different rules 
and procedures spread out in several implementing regulations and guidelines. This 
should have been rationalized.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³More stable "legal" environment on the level of guidelines concerning using FIs.³ 
(Managing Authority interview) 
³The 2014-2020 Regulations have room for improvement. Simplification is needed in 
terms of compatiELOLW\EHWZHHQ),VDQGJUDQWVDQGUHSRUWLQJUHTXLUHPHQWV«LWLVQRW
reasonable to impose the same reporting requirements to operations of different 
size.´ (Managing Authority interview) 
³Various caps and targets. Understand where this is coming from. We do our best to 
achieve them, but subject to market. Sometimes unfair that penalties apply when we 
have already said that we believe that market is very small. Lots of funds didn't meet 
targets last time, so now targets tighter, better to stagger payments so not 
overexposed. However, if it becomes ridiculous - intermediaries will withdraw. 
Financial intermediaries are not making money from these schemes; it¶s because we 
may make some new business from this. On a CBA the bank struggles to justify its 
involvement - it's only because of the possibility of generating new business, not 
because of the income generated. All recommendations to tighten up follow the CoA 
report. Be cautious or you will kill the involvement of the financial intermediaries´ 
(Interview financial intermediary). 
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Some had sector-related concerns regarding uptake: 
³6Secifically for transport, the FIs could be excluded from the calculation of the 
EXGJHWGHILFLW´ 
Last, and perhaps controversially, differentiated rules to reflect experience were 
suggested by one Managing Authority interviewee. 
³)RUVRPHOHVVHUGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHVWKHGHWDLOHGUHJXODWLRQVDUHSHUKDSVKHOSIXODQG
they provide clarity and certainty. However, they do not leave enough room to tailor 
the FIs to the needs in the Member State. Also [our] politicians are not used to this 
high level of rules and it can be quite difficult to explain to them why they can or 
cannot implement a certain FI. Perhaps there should a pre-exam which would allow 
those OPs that have a lot of experience to implement FIs using less stringent 
UHJXODWLRQV"´0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
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5. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ERDF, COHESION FUND, ESF AND EMFF 
FIS AND EU LEVEL INSTRUMENTS AND EFSI 
Key findings 
x The funding landscape is complex and becoming increasingly so. Managing 
Authorities generally believe ESIF FIs and domestic sources of funding (public and 
private) complement one another. 
x MAs now have a wider range of options for implementing FIs ± contributing to a 
financial instrument set up at Union level such as SMEI, seeking synergies with 
COSME, InnovFin, and EaSI, as well as the newer EFSI.  
x The relationship between ESI Fund FIs and other EU instruments of various kinds 
is not well understood.  
x MAs where an ex ante has been completed are better able to form an opinion 
about the relationships between ESIF FIs and other instruments; these MAs are 
more likely to perceive there to be competition between ESIF FIs and other 
instruments than those MAs where no ex ante has been done. 
x There are concerns about the relationship between ESIF FIs and other EU sources 
of finance, especially concerning the competitiveness of the former. 
x There are overlaps between ESIF and EFSI and while some think there are 
opportunities for synergies, most consider these to be highly challenging.  
 
ESI Funds are part of a complex landscape of funding mechanisms, including from 
private and public, domestic and EU-funded sources and at regional, national and EU 
levels. MAs can contribute ESIF resources to a financial instrument set up at Union level 
such as the SME Initiative, and other EU-level instruments (often managed by the EIB 
Group).  
The scale of funding under the various measures is often difficult to determine, partly 
due to overlaps between initiatives, but can also be quite fragmented, as illustrated in 
Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1: Estimating the scale of EU FIs by source and objective 
R&D&I
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EU level instruments EFSI ESIF
H2020 (Φ2.8 billion) TO1 (Φ3.7 billion)
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TO4 TO5 TO6 (Φ4.9 billion)
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TO8, 09, 10
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Notes: The boxes representing budget commitments are broadly to scale. In the case of EFSI, the 
breakdown of commitments as at November 2016 has been used as a proxy to disaggregate the 
commitment by objective for illustrative purposes, though clearly the past may not be a guide to 
the future.  
Source: EPRC calculations based on Regulations underpinning the various initiatives and OP 
budget commitments for ESIF. 
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Figure 5.1 also illustrates that there is considerable overlap between the high level 
objectives of spend; moreover, although the sources are presented as distinct, in practice 
there is scope for overlap here too.  
Indeed, the CPR makes specific reference to the possibility of contributing (ERDF and 
EAFRD) resources to the SME initiative. This enables MAs to contribute resources to FIs 
set up at EU level. So far, uptake of the initiative has been fairly limited; only Bulgaria, 
Finland, Italy, Malta, Spain and Romania have signed up to it. Part of the explanation for 
limited uptake may be contextual changes: the scheme was introduced to address 
liquidity problems in banks but these have been less severe than expected.  
There is also a wider set of centrally managed EU-level FIs with which there are 
potentially important synergies with Cohesion policy activities, including COSME, which 
aims to improve access to finance for SMEs through loan guarantees and equity; 
InnovFin, the Horizon 2020 equity sharing and risk sharing instruments for innovative 
SMEs, and the Connecting Europe Facility, which provides finance for energy, transport 
and digital projects. These instruments have a long history and have been operating in 
various forms over several programming periods. The framework to facilitate MAs making 
contributions to EU-level FIs was introduced in the Financial Regulation and CPR for the 
2014-20 period.  
Another development at EU level is the introduction of the European Fund for Strategic 
Investments (EFSI), which was set up by the European Commission and the European 
Investment Bank as the cornerstone of the new Investment Plan for Europe. The 
Commission published guidance on ensuring coordination, synergies and 
complementarity between the two sources of funds in April 2016.160 Alongside EFSI and 
financial instruments set up at Union level (including the SME Initiative), the EIB Group 
manages an extensive lending programme to support cohesion objectives; this includes 
direct loans, framework loans, intermediated loans and global loans.  
In practice, however, the Managing Authority survey suggests that somewhat limited use 
is being made of the opportunity to contribute to these sources. 
Box 5.1: ESIF FIs Combined with EFSI 
There is potential scope for synergies or complementarities between EFSI and ESIF FIs, and there 
are several examples where this is being pursued:  
(VW)XQG LQ (VWRQLD LQYROYHV FUHDWLRQRI D IXQG RI IXQGV )R)ZLWK D EXGJHW RI ¼PLOOLRQ ¼
PLOOLRQ IURP(5') DQG ¼PLOOLRQ IURP WKH (,)¶V FR-investment (under EFSI) DVZHOO DV ¼
million expected from private investors. The ESIF contribution includes returned funds from 2007-
13. The FIs under the FoF will provide equity to final recipients, and include a Venture Capital Fund 
¼PLOOLRQDQ([SDQVLRQ&DSLWDO)XQG¼PLOOLRQDQGD%XVLQHVV$QJHO&R-Investment Fund 
¼PLOOLRQ (VW)XQG ZLOO RSHUDWH DV D FURVV-border instrument; ESIF funds will be invested in 
Estonian SMEs and some private investor contributions can be invested outside Estonia. The EIF 
manages the FoF, fund managers for the FIs are currently being sought. 
CAP 3ème Révolution Industrielle (TRI) launched by Région Les Hauts de France (Nord-pas-de-
Calais/Picardie) will assist business-OHG LQYHVWPHQWV LQ µORZ FDUERQ HFRQRP\¶ SURMHFWV 7KH WRWDO
EXGJHWRIXSWR¼PLOOLRQLVPDGHXSRI¼PLOOLRQIURP(5')¼PLOOLRQDVDQ),DQG¼
PLOOLRQ DV D JUDQW IURP 7$ ¼ PLOOLRQ IURP &UpGLW $JULFROH 1RUG GH )UDQFH FRPPHUFLDO
EDQNSULYDWHLQYHVWRUDQGDQ(,%ORDQRIXSWR¼PLOOLRQEDFNHGE\DQ()6,JXDUDQWHH7KH7$
element will be used to fund technical, environmental or economic studies, either helping project 
promoters implement their projects or providing independent performance evaluation.  
                                          
160 European Commission (2016) European Structural and Investment Funds and European Fund 
for Strategic Investments complementarities, Ensuring coordination, synergies and 
complementarity 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/thefunds/fin_inst/pdf/efsi_esif_compl_en.pdf 
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The Swedish Venture Initiative is an SEK 582 million fund of funds initiative launched in April 2016 
to support access to equity capital for Swedish early-stage high-growth enterprises. The Swedish 
Venture Initiative will invest in several early stage venture capital funds which will then invest 
primarily in Swedish enterprises. The Funding Agreement was signed with the EIF in April 2016, 
EIF are now looking for three funds managers, to be selected by an open call for expression of 
LQWHUHVW7KHVHOHFWHG IXQGPDQDJHUVZLOO UHFHLYHD µFRUQHUVWRQH LQYHVWPHQW¶ LQWR WKHLU IXQG IURP
the combined resources of the Swedish Venture Initiative and co-investment by the EIF.  
Source: EPRC case study research ± see Annex 1.  
Figure 5.2: OP contributions to EU-level initiatives 
 
Note: From 194 respondents to this question, 155 did not plan to contribute to any EU level 
LQLWLDWLYH 7KH µRWKHUV¶ PHQWLRQHG ZHUH 60( ,QLWLDWLYH /,)( DQG SODQV WR FRPELQH (6,)()6,
funds  
5.1. What is the relationship between ESI Fund FIs and domestic sources of 
finance? 
ESI Funds contribute to a mosaic of funding sources at national, regional and local levels, 
and from the public and private sectors. However the relationship between ESI Fund FIs 
and domestic funding sources is not fully understood by Managing Authorities. Figure 5.3 
suggests that around 40 percent of all Managing Authorities are unable to comment on 
the extent to which commercial and or domestic sources compete with ESI Fund 
resources. However, these overall perceptions are skewed by survey respondents from 
Managing Authorities which do not plan to use FIs, which were less likely to have an 
opinion on other instruments. Figure 5.3 distinguishes between all Managing Authorities, 
and those where an ex ante assessment has been completed. As would be expected, the 
latter are significantly better placed to express a view, although this varies by 
instrument.  
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Figure 5.3: Relationship between ESI Fund FIs and other instruments  
 
Notes: Managing Authorities, all funds, distinguishing those that have undertaken an ex ante 
assessment. 
Source: EPRC Managing Authority survey. 
Looking at the views of all MAs, among those who do have an opinion, around 63 
percent consider that ESI Funds and commercial banks complement one another, with 24 
percent considering that they compete. For other sources of domestic funding, perceived 
complementarity is higher, with over 70 percent considering the sources complementary 
(and 16 percent considering that they compete). 
An interesting finding is that where an ex ante assessment has been carried out, MAs 
generally perceive there to be more competition between ESIF FIs and other 
instruments. This is illustrated in Figure 5.4 which shows that MAs that have 
completed an ex ante assessment are more likely to take the view that ESIF FIs 
compete with publicly backed instruments at domestic or European levels. 
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Figure 5.4: Do ESIF FIs compete with other instruments?  
 
Notes: Managing Authorities, all funds, distinguishing those that have undertaken an ex ante 
assessment. 
Source: EPRC Managing Authority survey. 
Interviews with Managing Authorities suggest that, on the whole, ESIF FIs are considered 
to be additional and complementary to other domestic sources: 
³ZHDUHFRQYLQFHGWKDWWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI),V«ZLOORIIHUDVXSSO\RIILQDQFHWRVHOHFWHG
beneficiaries that otherwise would not be available from private sources or other 
LQVWUXPHQWV SURJUDPPHG RQ WKH QDWLRQDO OHYHO´ 5HJLRQDO 0DQDJLQJ $XWKRULW\
interview). 
³WKHUH LV DOZD\V SRWHQWLDO IRU FRPSHWLWLRQ EXW WKH H[ DQWH VKRXOG IOXVK WKDW RXW´
(National Managing Authority interview) 
³IXQGLQJRSSRUWXQLWLHVZHUHVcarce in the private sector. In terms of the public sector, 
WKHUHZHUH VRPHRWKHU SURJUDPPHVEXW QRW UHDOO\ UHOHYDQW IRU WKH DLPV RI WKH ),´
(Intermediate Body interview). 
³FRPSDWLELOLW\ RI ), ILQDQFHG IURP (6,) DQG QDWLRQDO IXQGV LV HQVXUHG WKURXJK
monitoULQJFRPPLWWHHV´1DWLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
³RQWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHO),VDUHHVWDEOLVKHGIRUQLFKHVZKHUHSULYDWHPDUNHWSOD\HUVGR
QRW DFW DQG WKH\ DUHQ¶W FRPSHWLQJ ZLWK RQH DQRWKHU (8 OHYHO IXQGLQJ VRXUFHV DUH
complementary for Member States funding´ (National Managing Authority).  
However, some noted the impact of the changed economic climate: 
³,QWKH ODVW\HDURUWZRWKHUHKDVEHHQWRRPXFK OLTXLGLW\RQWKHPDUNHWWKHUHIRUH
bank products financed from FIs are less relevant. There is competition between 
ILQDQFLDOSURGXFWVIRUHQHUJ\HIILFLHQF\LQKRXVLQJ´ILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
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³7RDYRLGFRPSHWLWLRQZLWKFRPPHUFLDOIXQGLQJ\RXQHHGFRQVWDQWPRQLWRULQJRIWKH
implementation process to trace whether the market failures defined and being 
aGGUHVVHGDUHVWLOOLQSODFH´ILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
And other considered there to be an overlap between policy tools at national and regional 
levels: 
³7KHUHDUHVHYHUDOLQVWUXPHQWVSXUVXLQJYHU\VLPLODUREMHFWLYHVZKLFKPD\UHVXOWLQ
some conIXVLRQIRUWKHSRWHQWLDOUHFLSLHQWV´ILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
One area singled out by some where instruments funded from other sources could 
complement ESIF FIs concerns large firms, which are excluded from eligibility for ERDF 
and for which, in some Member States, domestic funding sources are insufficient.  
5.2. What is the relationship between ESI Fund FIs and other EU sources of 
finance? 
The relationship between ESI Fund FIs and other EU instruments of various kinds is less 
well understood than the relationship with domestic funding. It is evident that some 
European level sources of funding are simply not known to Managing Authorities, which 
explains why they were unable to express an opinion (see Figure 5.3). That said, there 
are strong indications that MAs perceive COSME to be in competition with ESIF FIs. As 
Figure 5.4 shows, over 10 percent of all MAs, and almost 20 percent of MAs where an ex 
ante has been done coQVLGHU WKDW&260( LV LQ FRPSHWLWLRQZLWK(6,)),V:KHQ µGRQ¶W
NQRZV¶DUHHOLPLQDWHGWKLVILJXUHULVHVWRDURXQGSHUFHQWRIUHVSRQGHQWVLUUHVSHFWLYH
of whether an ex ante has been completed).  
Interviews with Managing Authorities confirmed the general lack of knowledge of 
other EU sources among some, especially at the regional level.  
³7KH ODQGVFDSH LV UHDOO\ ZLGH SHUKDSV HYHQ WRR ZLGH ,W LV GLIILFXOW WR JHW D JRRG
WKRURXJKRULHQWDWLRQ´5HJLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³:H GR QRW KDYH FOHDU understanding of details concerning these instruments. 
Definitely lack of information. The information available is always general. For 
instance, it is always difficult to figure out what could be the costs of using these kind 
RILQVWUXPHQWV´UHJLRQDO0DQaging Authority interview) 
³Specifically relating to the relationship between ESIF and EFSI, there is a perception 
that EFSI is relevant to large infrastructure-type projects, but less awareness of its 
activities in the field of SME support, for example.´ (Regional Managing Authority 
interview) 
Box 5.2: ESIF FIs and EaSI 
The ESIF regulations provide MAs with the option of making a financial contribution to FIs set up at 
EU level, managed directly or indirectly by the European Commission. This includes FIs which are 
SDUW RI WKH (8¶V (PSOR\PHQW DQG6RFLDO ,QQRYDWLRQ (D6, SURJUDPPH 7KH (D6, SURJUDPPH LV
managed directly by the European Commission with the objective of promoting a high level of 
quality and sustainable employment, guaranteeing adequate and decent social protection, 
combating social exclusion and poverty and improving working conditions.161 The programme has 
three axes; the third axis concerns Microfinance and Social Entrepreneurship and provides supports 
                                          
161Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 
2013 on a European Union Programme for Employment and Social Innovation ("EaSI") and 
amending Decision No 283/2010/EU establishing a European Progress Microfinance Facility for 
employment and social inclusion. 
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the provision of microloans to vulnerable groups and loans to social enterprises via microcredit 
providers and social investors through FIs implemented by the European Investment Fund.  
So far, the only OPs identified which have considered a contribution to EaSI financial instruments 
are in Spain - the national ESF OP for Employment, Training and Education and the ESF OP for 
Madrid. According to interview data, the financial allocation considered to the EaSI FI from the ESF 
OP for Employment, Training and Education would be approximately 15 percent of total OP funding 
WKLVZRXOGHTXDWHWRMXVWXQGHU¼PLOOLRQ:LWKLQWKH0DGULG23DVHSDUDWHSULRULW\D[LVKDV
EHHQFUHDWHGWRFRQWULEXWH¼PLOOLRQ WR(D6,7KHFRQWULEXWLRQWR(D6, LVFRQVLGHUHGDSLlot, to 
test out this new form of intervention for ESF.  
Source: EPRC case study research ± see Annex 1. 
Financial intermediaries generally had a more comprehensive perspective on funding 
sources, but often agreed that the landscape was crowded and confusing.  
³$ZRUNLQJJURXSZRXOGEHQHHGHGWRLQRUGHUWRFHQWUDOLVHDQGSURYLGHDQRYHUYLHZ
RIWKHGLIIHUHQWUHJLRQDODQGQDWLRQDOLQWHUYHQWLRQVDQG(8IXQGLQJVRXUFHV´ILQDQFLDO
intermediary interview). 
The advantages claimed for using FIs at EU-level include: potential multiplier effects; 
capacity building (national and local institutions benefitting from EU-level entrusted 
HQWLWLHV¶ NQRZ-how in relation to the design and implementation of financial schemes); 
ability of FIs to address market fragmentation; avoidance of duplication of effort; and 
minimised risks of failure in areas where it would be difficult for individual Member States 
to achieve the required critical mass. Making ESIF contributions to EU-level instruments 
may also save time and resources for the MA in the set-up phase, as use is made of the 
EU-level instrument delivery system. MAs are thus relieved of some of the administration 
related to design, tendering, and State aid compliance issues. Some, but not all of these 
claims are reflected in the view of Managing Authorities.  
Where such mechanisms are familiar to MAs, there are different views on the 
relationships between the different sources, with some pointing to complementarity 
between EU funding sources: 
³7KHUROHRI()6, LVFRPSOHPHQWDU\ to OP financing. EFSI provides opportunities for 
attracting additional funding. At the moment possibilities to use InnovFin funding 
KDYHEHHQFRQVLGHUHG´QDWLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
³7KH(8IXQGLQJODQGVFDSHLVFRQVLGHUHGYHU\DSSURSULDWH(DFKSURJUDPme targets a 
VSHFLILFIXQGLQJJDS()6,ZLOOSOD\DVLJQLILFDQWUROH«EXWLWVWLOOKDVWREHFRPHIXOO\
RSHUDWLRQDOVLQFHIXUWKHUPDUNHWLQJDPRQJWKHSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHVHFWRUVLQQHHGHG´
(Intermediate body interview). 
³$UDQJHRI IRUPVRIVXSSRUW LVUHJDUded as positive. Synergies are sought with the 
(,%´QDWLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
³7KHUHDUHVHYHUDOIXQGLQJVRXUFHVIRFXVLQJRQVLPLODUREMHFWLYHV+RZHYHUFRQGLWLRQV
DUH WRR GLIIHUHQW DQG WKHUHIRUH WKH\ GRQ¶W FRPSHWH ZLWK RQH DQRWKHU´ QDWLRQDl 
Managing Authority) 
³()6, SURYLGHV RSSRUWXQLWLHV IRU DWWUDFWLQJ DGGLWLRQDO IXQGLQJ´ QDWLRQDO 0DQDJLQJ
Authority) 
Others noted an overall shortage of funding or an uneven distribution thereof: 
³0RVW RI WKHVH >()6,@ IXQGV are being absorbed by larger Member States. When 
planning the OP, possibilities to complement resources from other funds are taken 
LQWR DFFRXQW +RZHYHU WKHUH DUH WRR IHZ IXQGLQJ RSWLRQV ZKLFK ZH FRXOG XVH´
(national Managing Authority interview) 
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Among the potential challenges of using EU-level FIs are overlaps between FIs at 
European and national levels, lack of synergies among different kinds of expertise, and 
insufficient understanding of EU Regulations amongst actors involved. Moreover, 
managing authorities may have concerns over the lack of flexibility and control in the EU-
level instruments, or over the added-YDOXH RI DOORFDWLQJ IXQGV µEDFN XS¶ WR WKH 8QLRQ
level.  
A number of respondents considered that, in general terms, various sources of EU 
funding overlapped: 
³()6,(6,)DQG+Rrizon 2020 can be used to fund similar project now this makes it 
YHU\FKDOOHQJLQJ´5HJLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\LQWHUYLHZ 
FKDRWLFHQYLURQPHQWZKHUHSOHQW\RI),VDUHSURSRVHGTXLWHIUHTXHQWO\´0DQDJLQJ
Authority interview) 
³7KH SRVLWLYH SRLQW LV D ULFh offer of funding options, the negative point is missing 
complementarity or even internal logic. (Managing Authority interview) 
³7KH(& LQVLVWVRQGHPDUFDWLRQZLWKJUDQWVZKLOHDW WKHVDPHWLPHSODQQLQJVLPLODU
instruments on EU level as most of the Member States in national ESIF OPs. (national 
Managing Authority)  
Some Member States have taken steps to address information and coordination issues: 
³7KHUH LVRYHUODS UHJDUGLQJ WKHJXDUDQWHH UHODWHG),V LPSOHPHQWHG RQ WKH(8 OHYHO
(COSME). A Co-ordination BoaUGLQYROYLQJ(,))R)HWFKDVEHHQHVWDEOLVKHG´ 
And concern at the lack of understanding of the overall financial landscape with 
evidence of a lack of communication about other planned interventions: 
³WKH(,)SXEOLVKHGDSURJUDPPHWKH0$ IRXQGRXWDERut it from the press and it 
ZDVTXLWHVLPLODUWRWKHSODQQHGLQWHUYHQWLRQ«´: 
³6RPH RI WKH ),V LPSOHPHQWHG RQ KRUL]RQWDO OHYHO E\ WKH (,) DQG (,% &260(
InnovFin) are similar in their structure to one implemented on national level. MS do 
not have a mechanism to receive an overview of their implementation and future 
SODQQLQJ´ 
However, there is also evidence of competition between EU level instruments and ESIF 
FIs and/or domestic financing, and a perception that ESI Funds are disadvantaged 
compared to other EU funding sources: 
³7KH\ VKRXOG EH FRPSOHPHQWDU\ EXW WKH\ DUH QRW 7KHUH LV FRPSHWLWLRQ´ UHJLRQDO
managing Authority) 
³,QGHHGWKHUHLVFRPSHWLWLRQDQGRYHUODSV± not necessarily under one OP but under 
ESIF and EU general programmes e.g. SME Initiative and COSME/InnovFin, 
microfinancing guarantees and EaSI. There is a clear overlap with a number of 
H[LVWLQJQDWLRQDOVFKHPHV´ILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
³&RPSHWLWLRQ LV«IRXQGWKRXJK OLPLWHGEHWZHHQ),VHVWDEOLVKHGXQGHUWKH23VDQG
FIs co-financed by the EC, EIB, EBRD and other IFIs, for example targeted [at] SMEs 
XQGHU WKH23 DQG60(V HOLJLEOH IRU ILQDQFLQJXQGHU WKH (&¶V FR-investment facility. 
However, competition is believed to have a catalysing effect rather than threatening 
FI implementation DQGSURJUHVV´ILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ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 ³(&OHYHOPHDVXUHVDUHLQFRPSHWLWLRQZLWKQDWLRQDOILQDQFLQJDOORFDWHGWR),GXHWR
significantly better financing conditions (due to the fact that the EC-level measures 
are not considered as State aid). In accordance with the current regulation, national 
FI has no possibility to compete with the EU FI and ultimately may be partially 
UHMHFWHG« 
³«&260(DQG+RUL]RQLPSOHPHQWHG),DUHQRWFRQVLGHUHGDV6WDWHDLGDQGWKLV
gives a great advantage. FIs fLQDQFHG IURP (6,) DUH QRW VR DWWUDFWLYH´ QDWLRQDO
Managing Authority interview). 
 ³7KH(8 OHYHO LQVWUXPHQWVDUHVRPHKRZSULYLOHJHG± less regulatory burden put on 
them, compared to all the regulation concerning ESIF (national and regional 
LQVWUXPHQWV«Whis does not help, rather complicates the landscape)  
Figure 5.5: What are the incentives and disincentives of the various modes of 
intervention? 
Mode Incentives Disincentives 
ESIF financial 
instruments (ERDF 
ESF CF EMFF) 
under shared 
management (Off 
the shelf, tailor 
made) 
x Control 
x Capacity to tailor to 
regional needs 
x Greater certainty over 
legacy 
x Taking full responsibility 
for implementation 
x Regulatory complexity 
(especially State aid and 
procurement) 
x Lack of experience 
(EMFF, especially, also 
many ESF) 
SMEI 
x Co-financing 
x Delegation of 
responsibility 
x Administrative simplicity 
(procurement) 
x Loss of control 
x Lack of regional 
differentiation for 
national SMEI OPs 
x No development of 
administrative capacity 
x Absence (so far) of 
successful pilots 
x Overlaps with other EU 
and/or domestic 
measures 
Contributions to 
other EU level 
instruments 
(COSME, H2020, 
EaSI) 
x State aid and 
procurement 
x Loss of control 
x Lack of regional 
differentiation 
x Lack of knowledge 
x Administrative 
complexity 
x Lack of certainty over 
funding destination 
x Different accounting and 
audit systems 
 
These concerns were shared by some financial intermediaries responsible for 
administering ESI Fund FIs: 
³ZH DUH FRQFHUQHG DERXW + (,) DUH RIIHULQJ FRPSHWLWLRQ WR RXU ),V«>ZH DUH@
giving guarantees to banks. In the same way, EIF can give guarantees to banks. We 
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FDQQRWFRPSHWHZLWKWKHPWKH\DUHRIIHULQJEHWWHUFRQGLWLRQVWREDQNV«,IWKHUHLV
not enough need for our guarantees now, we have to close down the product. If EIB 
VXGGHQO\ OHDYHV WKH PDUNHW WKHQ ZH GR QRW KDYH DQ\ DOWHUQDWLYH DQ\ PRUH«
European funds are competing against each other. EIF should not compete with us 
but supplement out schemes ± WKH\ FRXOG JLYH XV WKH JXDUDQWHHV´ LQWHUYLHZ
Financial intermediary).  
³(,)± State aid regulations do not apply to them. Their conditions are much closer to 
the market. For banks it mean lower level of administrative burden and that is why 
they prefer EIF. But it is actually unfair treatment ± for us one rule applies and to EIF 
WRWDOGLIIHUHQWRQHV´LQWHUYLHZ)LQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\ 
³7KHUHLVDKLJKULVNRIFRPSHWLWLRQHVSHFLDOO\ LQVRPHUHJLRQVZLWKORZDEVRUSWLRQ´
(interview Financial intermediary). 
³7KHUHKDVEHHQFDQQLEDOLVDWLRQLQODUJHSURMHFWV´LQWHUYLew Financial intermediary). 
³), GHOLYHUHG E\ (8 LQVWLWXWLRQV DUH 6WDWH DLG IUHH DQG FRXOG EH FRQVLGHUHG LQ
FRPSHWLWLRQZLWKRQHVIURP(6,)´LQWHUYLHZ)LQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\ 
³,Q VRPH DUHDV ± SME guarantees ± WKH\ FRPSHWH WR D ELJ H[WHQW´ LQWHUYLHZ
Financial intermediary). 
³3UREOHPRIJXDUDQWHH LQVWUXPHQWVDYDLODEOH IURPEDQNV«FRPSHWHVZLWKJXDUDQWHH
LQVWUXPHQWVEDVHGRQ()6,´LQWHUYLHZ)LQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\ 
³7KH\ FRPSHWH LQ WKH VHQVH WKDW WKHUH DUH VWURQJ OREE\LQJ JURXSV ZKR VHHN WR
maximise their oZQSDUWLFXODUIXQGLQJVWUHDP´LQWHUYLHZ)LQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\ 
³7KHPDLQLVVXHRIFRQFHUQUHODWHVWRWKHGLIIHUHQWFRQGLWLRQVLQZKLFK(6,)),VDQG
EU level / EIB group instruments function. EIB/EIF are dealing with the same kind of 
),V EXW LW¶V SRVVLble to implement them easier / faster as there are not so many 
constraining rules (whereas the rules for implementing ESIF FIs are much more 
RQHURXV«GDPDJHVSHUFHSWLRQRI(6,)),V:K\DUHUXOHVPRUHRQHURXVIRU(6,)),V"
(financial intermediary interview). 
³7KHUH LV D ODFN RI LQVWLWXWLRQDO FRRUGLQDWLRQ IRU KDQGOLQJ GLIIHUHQW IXQGLQJ
options«GHVSLWHVLJQLILFDQWHIIRUWVE\&20WRHQVXUHFRPSOHPHQWDULWLHV«DQGGHVSLWH
WKHVWURQJV\QHUJLHVUKHWRULFRQSDSHU«DQGWKLVLVSURMHFWHGRQWRWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHO
as wHOO´ILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
³EU level instruments don't provide incentives to financial intermediaries. There is 
competition on the ground e.g. SMEI and CIP [meaning COSME, probably]. EIB was 
already providing liquidity but market already liquid. In EFSI there is an opportunity, 
especially in infrastructure, but EFSI is offering 50% cover under InnovFin when there 
are already two banks offering 75% cover under EU-backed schemes. It doesn't make 
sense, it's politics and the need to have all MS participating in EFSI. EFSI is not 
market driven - the intermediary which took this on must have looser terms than 
under ESIF cofinanced FIs. It's sad because there is a gap in the market and it relates 
not to SMEs and H2020, where the market is very small, but on infrastructure where 
for example, EFSI could play a significant role in improving energy infrastructure in 
the Mediterranean, but it won't do that because it seems to be limited strictly to EU 
infrastructure.´financial intermediary interview). 
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5.3. What are the potential synergies between ESI Funds and other EU funds? 
ESI Fund FIs and those funded from other others source overlap in some respects, but 
also address somewhat different objectives, as well as operating with distinct governance 
mechanisms and thematic targets. By way of example, the ESIF and EFSI funding are 
mapped against one another in Figure 5.6. 
Against this background, issues which may hinder complementarity or synergies between 
the two sources have been identified:162 
x the objective of EFSI is efficiency in targeting market failures and suboptimal 
investment situations;  the aim is to fund economically and technically viable projects 
and as EFSI is a market driven initiative there are no territorial pre-allocations; 
x concerns that ESIF funding will be crowded out by EFSI; and 
x potential for conflict between applicable rules due to different legal frameworks.163 
However, a recent survey among national actors,164 suggests that some expected 
significant benefits, including: 
x Increase of private sector investment (France, Finland and Poland); 
x attract EFSI financing to leverage the EU Cohesion Policy funds (Lithuania);  
x additional infrastructure and energy efficiency investments (Slovenia); 
x opportunity to develop large scale and more ambitious projects either directly or 
indirectly affecting ESIF programmes (UK, Poland and Portugal) but also potential 
difficulties in terms of losing control over project (UK); and 
x use of EFSI to mitigate the risk absorption of financial instruments to be created 
under the 2014-20 Operational Programme (Lithuania). 
                                          
162 Mendez C and Bachtler J (2015) Permanent revolution in Cohesion Policy: restarting the reform 
debate, European Policy Research Paper No.93, European Policies Research Centre, University of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
163 European Court of Auditors (2015) Opinion No. 11/2015 (pursuant to Article 287(4) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) concerning the proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the European Fund for Strategic Investments and 
amending Regulations (EU) No. 1291/2013 and (EU) No. 1316/2013, Luxembourg. 
164 Van der Zwet A, Bachtler J (2016) Review of the Role of the EIB group in European Cohesion 
policy, report to the European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies 
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Figure 5.6: Similarities and differences between the EFSI and the ESIF 
 EFSI ESIF 
Objectives 
x To resolve difficulties in financing 
and implementing strategic, 
transformative and productive 
investments with high economic, 
environmental and societal added 
value contributing to achieving EU 
objectives. Finance projects with 
higher risk profile.  
x Strengthening economic, social and 
territorial cohesion, particularly 
reducing disparities and 
backwardness of less-developed 
regions. 
x Contributing to Europe 2020 
objectives. 
Funding 
x ¼ELOOLRQDQG¼5 billion from the 
EIB) guarantee from the EU budget) 
with an expected leverage of 15 
WLPHV¼ELOOion of total 
investments).165 
x ¼ELOOLRn (dedicated EU budget 
KHDGLQJRIZKLFKDURXQG¼
billion in indicative OP allocations to 
FIs. 
Spatial 
targeting x No geographical targeting / pre-
allocations. 
x Concentration on less-developed 
countries/regions through pre-
allocated envelopes. 
Thematic 
targeting 
x No thematic pre-allocations/ring-
IHQFLQJDOWKRXJK¼.5 billion (out of 
EUR 21 billion) reserved for SMEs. 
x Strategic infrastructure (including 
digital, transport and energy, 
education, research, development 
and innovation, renewable energy 
and resource efficiency) and support 
for smaller businesses and midcap 
companies. 
x Ring-fencing of allocations to 
thematic objectives and investment 
priorities. 
x 11 thematic objectives (RTDI, ICT, 
SMEs, low-carbon economy, climate 
change, environment and energy, 
transport, social inclusion, 
education, training, employment, 
public administration efficiency).  
Financial 
instruments x Loans, guarantees, private equity 
and venture capital. 
x Non-reimbursable grants, mainly 
Financial instruments (guarantees, 
loans, private equity and venture 
capital)  
Forms of 
assistance 
x Projects (of higher-risk profile than 
the EIB finances), financial 
instruments and/or investment 
platforms 
x National and regional programmes. 
x 0DMRUSURMHFWV!¼Pfunded by 
ERDF/CF and subject to Commission 
decision). 
Management 
x Centralised management by EIB 
with Steering Board including EIB 
and Commission representation 
x Financial intermediaries selected 
through open call 
x Shared management between 
Commission, Member States and 
regions. 
x financial intermediaries are 
selected in compliance with 
public procurement law. There 
are situations where an open call 
is also possible (this will be the 
case eg where the manager of a 
FoF is the EIB/EIF or a body 
already selected through public 
procurement) 
Project 
selection x Project selection by EU-level 
Investment Committee of experts. 
x Project selection by national and 
regional managing authorities and 
implementing bodies. 
Timeframe x 3 years (2015-18) with option for 
extension. Update! 
x 7 years (2014-20). 
                                          
165 Note that there is currently a proposal to double EFSI both in terms of duration and financial 
capacity (COM(2016) 597 final) https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-
597-EN-F1-1.PDF  
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 EFSI ESIF 
State aid  x EFSI support does not constitute 
State aid 
x Must comply with State aid rules ± 
either no aid, de minimis, GBER or 
notification 
Source: adapted from Van der Zwet A, Bachtler J (2016) Review of the Role of the EIB group in 
European Cohesion policy, report to the European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal 
Policies. 
Synergies with EU level instruments are being sought under several OPs, for example 
with Horizon 2020: 
³As the overall management of EU funds and programmes (H2020) is under the 
umbrella of the same regional ministry, they expect to reach a broad level of 
cooperation among different funds in the same strategy for economic growth´.  
³7KHYDULHW\RIIXQGLQJRSWLRQVLVRYHUDOOSRVLWLYH&RPSDQLHVKDYHDFKoice and it is 
not difficult to navigate between the different funding options and determine what is 
DSSURSULDWH« 7KH SURFHGXUHV DURXQG + DUH QRW YHU\ HDV\ EXW VWLOO LW RIIHUV
FRQVLGHUDEOHDGYDQWDJHV´ILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
However, interviews with Managing Authorities and financial intermediaries alike suggest 
that this is extremely challenging to achieve: 
³This phenomenon is more theoretical then practical.´ 
³7RDODUJHH[WHQWSURJUDPPHVGRQRWKDYHDFOHDULQYHVWPHQWVWUDWHJ\WKDWLVthey 
DUHQRWWDLORUHGWRDVSHFLILFPDUNHWEHQHILFLDULHV´UHJLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
³7KH YDVW DPRXQW RI SURJUDPPHV FUHDWHV FRQIXVLRQ DPRQJ SRWHQWLDO EHQHILFLDULHV´
(regional Managing authority) 
³7KH23LVH[SORULQJRSWLRQVWRLQFOXGH()6,DVSDUWRIDn FI but this is proving to be 
very challenging. The main barrier is the different governance structures which are 
QRWFRPSDWLEOH´UHJLRQDOPDQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
³7KHPDLQSUREOHPRIWKHODUJHQXPEHURIIXQGLQJVRXUFHVLVWRPDWFKSURMHFWVZLWK
the most apSURSULDWHVRXUFHV´UHJLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
³'XHWRWKHODFNRILQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHSDUWLFXODUSURJUDPPHVSRWHQWLDOV\QHUJLHVDUH
XQFOHDU´QDWLRQDO0DQDJLQJ$XWKRULW\ 
³'RQ¶W ILQG DQ\ UHDO FRUUHODWLRQ RU MRLQLQJ XS 7KHVH WKLQJV H[LVW« WKH\ WU\ QRW WR 
FRPSHWHRUGXSOLFDWH«H[DQWHKHOSV«EXWLWLVFOHDUWKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQVKRXOGKDYH
WKRXJKWDERXWLWIURPWKHRXWVHWLQVWHDGRIUHWURILWWLQJV\QHUJLHV´LQWHUYLHZILQDQFLDO
intermediary) 
³&RPPLVVLRQ'*VDOOVHWXSWKHLURZQVWDQGDORQHSURJUDPPHVZKLFKDll have slightly 
GLIIHUHQWREMHFWLYHVEXWRYHUODS´LQWHUYLHZILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\ 
³7RRPDQ\IXQGVWRRPDQ\SURYLGHUVWRRFRPSOLcated. EIB could play an important 
UROHLQVLPSOLI\LQJWKHIXQGLQJODQGVFDSH´(interview financial intermediary) 
³3RWHQWLDO for synergies is high but there is a lack of guidance for the establishment of 
MRLQWLQLWLDWLYHV´(interview financial intermediary) 
³WKH ODQGVFDSHVHHPVWRKDYHEHHQWKHUHVXOWRIHYROXWLRQUDWKHU WKDQ ILUPGHVLJQ´
(interview financial intermediary) 
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³,Qprinciple EU programmes are complementary, but in practice it is not so. Rules 
should be more homogenous in order to achieve complementarity. Juncker plan bring 
even more complexity: huge mass of funding which follows a different model. The 
SME instrument under H2020 is overly complex both in terms of eligible subjects and 
in terms of State aid compatibility. The SME initiative may have a positive effect for 
EDQNV EXW OHVV VR IRU EXVLQHVVHV« WKH DSSURDFK LQ JHQHUDO LV OHVV FDOLEUDWHG IRU
specificities of tHUULWRULHV´ILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
³$WWKHPRPHQWthe key obstacle is the missing legislation that would provide conditions 
IRUPDWFKLQJYDULRXVVRXUFHVRIIXQGLQJ´ILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\LQWHUYLHZ 
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6. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS 
The overarching aim of this study has been to assess how to improve the take-up and 
effectiveness of Cohesion policy financial instruments through the following key tasks: 
x Setting out the rationale for the use of financial instruments, taking account of 
the diverse economic contexts 
x Describing how Member States are making use of financial instruments in 
2014-20 
x Identifying practical, legal and administrative capacity issues which influence 
the uptake of FIs 
x Analysing the relationship between Cohesion policy FIs, EU level instruments 
and those managed by the EIB Group, especially EFSI. 
The study has involved an extensive review of the academic and policy literature, a 
µVWRFNWDNH¶ RI ),V SURYLGLQJ D VQDSVKRW RI 0DQDJLQJ $XWKRULW\ SODQV DQG SURJUHVV E\ 
spring 2016, an online survey of Managing Authorities, and around 130 interviews with 
Managing Authorities, Intermediate Bodies, financial intermediaries, and European 
Commission and EIB group officials.  
The aim of this final section of the report is to provide conclusions on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the legislative framework established at EU level for the use of financial 
instruments, to identify specific recommendations for possible improvements and to set 
out some options for the future regarding the legal framework and the uptake of 
financial instruments co-financed by ERDF, Cohesion Fund, ESF and EMFF.  
6.1. Conclusions 
Cohesion policy plans for 2014-20 are being implemented in a climate that is 
overshadowed by the aftermath of the crisis. A key factor in the weakness of the 
recovery has been the impact of the financial and economic crisis on public and private 
investment. In spite of historically low interest rates, investment has stagnated for much 
of the last decade in response to persistent uncertainty and low demand, fuelling 
concerns over the long-term future of the European economy. At national level, patterns 
of public and private investment vary widely. In some countries, public investment has 
shrunk dramatically since the crisis, while in others, probably partly due to Cohesion 
policy receipts, public investment has increased. Similarly, while in some countries 
private investment exceeded pre-crisis levels by 2015, in most countries private 
investment in 2015 was lower than in 2007 in real terms. More generally, public 
investment has been constrained by the impact of government spending in response to 
the crisis and private investment has been held back by uncertainty about the longer 
term implications of the sovereign debt crisis and the general weakness of economic 
activity.  
In spite of this uneven investment context, there is some consensus that there is no 
generalised problem of access to finance ± in fact, listed European companies have 
very large cash holdings; however, access to finance remains a serious concern for 
some firms and activities. In particular, small and medium-sized and innovative firms 
remain affected by financing constraints, partly owing to their reliance on bank lending 
which was curtailed as banks rebuilt their balance sheets and took more cautious 
approaches to risk. Moreover, there are infrastructure needs across Europe which face 
significant financial challenges because bond markets have dried up and private long-
term financing has become more difficult to secure. It is this perception that 
underpinned the establishment of EFSI. 
Clearly domestic sources of finance can and do play a significant role in addressing these 
issues. In this context it is worth emphasising that many Member States make extensive 
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use of FIs in domestic policy and in some, Cohesion policy essentially enhances the 
budgetary capacity of existing initiatives by adding another credit line or block of finance 
within an institution. Generally, however, it is difficult to assess the scale of 
domestic public sector finance in pursuit of economic development goals: the 
institutions delivering public sector FIs vary widely in structure and function and the 
sources and terms of finance are not always transparent or distinct, let alone 
comparable. At the same time, the sector is undergoing change with the emergence of 
new national promotional banks (NPBs) in a number of countries against the 
backdrop of the difficult investment climate. The overall landscape is made more 
complex by the role of EU institutions, which are increasingly involved in the supply 
of FIs both in their own name and through intermediaries operating domestically 
(including NPBs). The number, range and remits of domestic intermediaries, coupled 
with a lack of transparency in the ultimate source of funding ± partly owing to 
µUHEUDQGLQJ¶ - makes it difficult accurately to assess the scale of funds available and 
obscures the genuine additionality of ostensibly new funding streams.  
Against this background, what then is the rationale for financial instruments in 
Cohesion policy? There are arguably several dimensions to this. The underlying 
question is what the justification for public intervention in any form? The response 
to this is generally cast in terms of the need to support activities that the market cannot 
or will not undertake alone, but which are considered to be in the public interest. This 
can arise where there simply is no market (for instance public goods and some merit 
goods) and the private sector is operating quite rationally, or where the market is 
imperfect or operating sub-optimally. A second issue concerns the form of 
intervention. Repayable funds are an alternative delivery mechanism to grants (and 
not just a means of addressing a finance gap). However, financial instruments are only 
feasible where the investment is income-generating, enabling the initial support to be 
repaid. This means that where public intervention is justified by the need for public 
goods, repayable support is unlikely to be well-suited. Three principal arguments for 
using financial instruments instead of grants are conventionally highlighted in the 
context of Cohesion policy. First, FIs are more sustainable because funds are repaid, 
creating a legacy to invest again. Second, FIs can improve project quality ± this may 
be partly through the due diligence involved in private sector project assessment, but 
also because having to repay support focuses the recipient on project viability. Third, FIs 
can be more cost-effective partly because funds may be recycled, but also because of 
their potential to attract private funds.  
These arguments have largely underpinned Commission ambitions to double the 
expenditure on FIs in 2014-20, though it should be stressed that while these benefits 
are increasingly accepted as conventional wisdom, it is also clear that financial 
instruments are not suitable for all types of intervention, nor relevant to all 
Cohesion policy programmes.  
Direct comparisons between funding periods are not straightforward, but initial 
indications are that Member States are broadly on target to meet the goal of 
GRXEOLQJ),VSHQGZLWKSODQQHG(6,)FRPPLWPHQWVRIDURXQG¼ELOOLRQ+RZHYHUWKH
proposed use of FIs falls short of the indicative targets by investment area: this is 
met only in the case of R&D&I where 8.9 percent of ESIF spend is planned to be in the 
form of FIs, as against the target of five percent; for SMEs the target was 50 percent, 
but just 34 percent of ESIF spend is planned on FIs. In the case of sustainable transport, 
some 0.3 percent of the ESIF total is planned to take the form of FIs, against a target of 
10 percent. 
Overall, it can be seen that Member State plans for FIs are consistent with the 
theoretical rationales for financial instruments. Over 87 percent of planned FI 
spend is on TO1 (R&D&I - 17 percent), TO3 (SMEs ± 52 percent) or TO4 (low carbon ± 
17 percent) ± areas where there are known market imperfections (such as informational 
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asymmetries, risk aversion or long term financing needs). The broad nature of the 
Thematic Objectives makes it difficult to assess whether, in principle, there is greater 
potential for the use of FIs than planned by Managing Authorities, but the stated 
UHDVRQV IRU WKH µQRQ XVH¶ of FIs are instructive, especially in relation to those TOs 
where they are widely used. Overall, the main reasons for not using FIs is that they are 
deemed unsuitable for planned projects, likely reflecting, at least in part, the fact that 
many projects involve public or merit goods that are not revenue-generating. However, 
in the case of TO3 (SMEs) and TO4 (low carbon) the single most important reason given 
ZDV ODFN RI GHPDQG IURP ILQDO UHFLSLHQWV ZLWK µLQVXIILFLHQW FULWLFDO PDVV¶ LH WKH 23
EHLQJWRRVPDOODQGµODFNRIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHFDSDFLW\¶DOVRSURPLQHQW7KHVHUHDVRQVDUH
interesting, but each raises further questions: (i) Why is there a lack of demand: does 
WKLV UHIOHFW D µJUDQW FXOWXUH¶ D ODFN RI FRQILGHQFH WR LQYHVW RU WKH QHHG WR GHYHORS
µLQYHVWRU-UHDG\¶SURMHFWVWKURXJKRWKHUIRUPVRILQWHUYHQWLRQ"LL,IWKH23LVWRRVPDOO
LV WKHUH D µWLHU¶ RI IXQding or pooling mechanism that could be relevant? (iii) If 
administrative capacity is lacking, how best can this be addressed? 
In considering the strengths and weaknesses of the legislative framework 
generally, views are rather mixed and not always easy to reconcile. A widespread 
criticism of the 2007-13 legal framework for FIs was that it was too sparse. The 
provisions relating to financial instruments in the 2007-13 Structural Funds regulations 
were very limited in detail. A series of COCOF notes provided additional detail, but were 
criticised for being slow to appear, unclear in their status and retroactive in application. 
The regulatory provisions for financial instruments have been strengthened significantly 
in 2014-20 and while many Managing Authorities and financial intermediaries welcome 
the increased precision, others have criticised the new rules for being too detailed and 
complex. Managing Authorities have not always found the sheer number of different 
texts easy to navigate and have been critical of the delays in their adoption. Moreover, 
as well as introducing additional detail, Managing Authorities also widely perceive that 
the rules relating to selection of intermediaries were changed, which has made 
continuity difficult even for FIs that were working well in 2007-13.166 
A more general issue among Managing Authorities, whether users or non-users of 
financial instruments is that FIs are perceived to be complex to administer. Moreover, 
MAs with experience of both grants and FIs consider FIs to be considerably 
harder to administer (though some MAs also note that part of the burden can be 
delegated to financial intermediaries). The complexity of the rules, and their lack of 
clarity in places, coupled with the need for certainty fuelling demand for explanatory 
guidance, has proven a disincentive for many and a source of frustration for Managing 
Authorities that do pursue the use of FIs. In general, Managing Authorities tend to be 
risk-averse in applying Cohesion policy rules since payment suspensions resulting from 
transgressions are viewed as politically embarrassing and can affect the capacity of the 
programme to draw down the allocated funds. This raises the issue of the relationship 
between guidance and audit, with many Managing Authorities concerned that 
documents intended only to clarify or illustrate good practice are being elevated to 
mandatory status by auditors.  
Turning to some of the specific elements of the new rules, the requirement for an ex 
ante assessment is widely welcomed. That said, some expressed concern at the 
prescriptiveness of the methodology and doubts about the ability of such an analysis to 
capture changing economic conditions and market needs on a long term basis. There are 
also questions over the validity of the market assessment in the absence of a 
                                          
166 The Commission contends that full compliance with the procurement rules was already required 
in 2007-13; nevertheless, Managing Authorities perceived this as a rule change and adapted their 
behaviour. 
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comprehensive overview of FIs given the emergence of new initiatives at EU level or 
under EFSI, of which Managing Authorities are often ignorant.  
So-called µRII-the-VKHOI¶ LQVWUXPHQWV were eagerly anticipated by many as providing 
solutions to State aid compliance and procurement issues. In practice, the uptake has 
been low, and this for several reasons. First, many Managing Authorities planning FIs in 
2014-20 had used them in 2007-13 and had gained sufficient experience not to need a 
µWHPSODWH¶ SDUWO\ UHODWHG IRU RWKHUV WKH 276 PRGHOV VLPSO\ FDPH WRR ODWH 6HFRQG
State aid compliance in the first batch of OTS instruments is on the basis of de minimis 
support to final recipients; this may be less generous than aid on GBER terms and 
carries with it a considerable administrative burden that not all Managing Authorities are 
willing to carry. Third, the terms are not always sufficiently attractive to financial 
intermediaries with respect to risk-sharing.  
The new Regulations increased the range of implementation options and whilst this is 
generally welcomed, it also raises some issues about the relationship between different 
instruments and institutions, particularly in the context of new EU horizontal instruments 
and EFSI. These issues relate to both principle and detail. At a detailed level, perceptions 
of the EIB Group are mixed: some consider that their role in procuring intermediaries 
has been very valuable, but others express some resentment at the privileged position of 
the EIB Group in relation to domestic financial intermediaries in terms of their 
administrative burden and the lack of transparency in their mandate. There is also a 
perceived potential conflict of interest in the role of the EIB Group in providing both 
training and marketing its own products and activities. More generally, the uptake of the 
SMEI is widely viewed to have been more a result of political pressure rather than policy 
need, with some raising concerns at the relationship between SMEI and other support for 
SMEs, the lack of guidance on the role of the MA in relation to SMEI, and the risk that EU 
level instruments can inhibit the development of administrative capacity within the 
Member States. 
This leads on to a more general concern about the number and range of instruments 
with different geographies and governance systems, but operating in similar or 
overlapping markets. Evidence from this study suggests that the relationship between 
ESIF FIs and other EU instruments of various kinds is not well understood 
especially by Managing Authorities. This partly arises from the fact that Managing 
Authorities, certainly at regional levels, are much less likely to engage with instruments 
such as EFSI, or even SMEI, where decisions about whether to use such instruments are 
often taken at national level and involve more politicised decision making. That said, 
Managing Authorities that have completed ex ante assessments (and therefore likely to 
have greater experience of FIs) are more likely to consider that there is competition 
between ESIF FIs and other EU instruments than are MAs that have not undertaken ex 
ante assessments. Financial intermediaries tend to be more familiar with the financial 
instrument landscape than MAs, and whilst some view the range of options as 
encouraging healthy competition, many are critical of the overlap, the differences in 
WHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQVHJ LQ UHODWLRQ WR6WDWHDLGDQGWKHUHVXOWLQJFRQIXVLRQ µRQ WKH
JURXQG¶ ,Q DQ\ HYHQW H[SHULHQFH RI FRPELQLQJ ILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWV IURP GLIIHUHQW
sources remains rather limited, though there is evidence of considerable complexity, and 
delays, especially over State aid issues, when this has been pursued.167 
                                          
167 Ménard, L. (2017) 3ODQ-XQFNHUHWUqJOHPHQWDWLRQGHVDLGHVG¶(WDWséminaire sur les aides 
G¶(WDWHQIDYHXUGHVLQIUDVWUXFWXUHV(FROH0LOLWDLUH3DULV 
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6.2. Recommendations 
Against the background of these broad conclusions, a number of recommendations can 
be put forward, while acknowledging current Commission proposals for a so-called 
µRPQLEXV¶ 5HJXODWLRQ ZKLFK VHHNV WR DGGUHVV VRPH RI WKHVH LVVXHV 7KHVH
recommendations fall under three broad headings: a reappraisal of the roles of ESIF 
cofinanced FIs, EU level instruments and other initiatives; greater regulatory stability; 
and the refocusing of guidance and support. 
6.2.1. A reappraisal of the roles of ESIF co-financed FIs, EU level instruments 
and other initiatives 
Concern at under investment in the European economy has led to a number of EU level 
initiatives for financial instruments addressing a range of objectives, including SMEs, 
infrastructure and R&D&I; at the same time, EU Cohesion policy objectives have widened 
to embrace Europe 2020 aims, while budgetary pressures and concerns with efficiency 
have emphasised the use of financial instruments as a Cohesion policy tool, with an 
extended range of implementation options. 
The net outcome is a complex pattern of financial instruments of very varied types and 
scale, which may complement one another, but also overlap and compete. The tendency 
WR µUHEUDQG¶ (8 LQLWLDWLYHV ZKHQ LPSOHPHQWHG QDWLRQDOO\ RU WR LQFRUSRUDWH H[LVWLQJ
LQLWLDWLYHV ZLWKLQ DQRWKHU µZUDSSHU¶ RU µZLQGRZ¶ DV XQGHU ()6, FRQWULEXWHV WR WKH
difficulty in establishing the exact scale and source of the funding available. At the same 
time, political pressure to take up certain instruments and ensure a given geographical 
spread can result in the proliferation of measures at the point of delivery with distinct 
regulatory and other requirements, but ultimately similar policy objectives and arguably 
limited additionality. 
Figure 6.1: Estimating the scale of EU FIs by source and objective 
R&D&I
ICT
SME
E&E
Infrastructure
Social
EU level instruments EFSI ESIF
H2020 (Φ2.8 billion) TO1 (Φ3.7 billion)
TO2
COSME (Φ1.4 b)
TO3 (Φ11.3 billion)
TO4 TO5 TO6 (Φ4.9 billion)
Connecting Europe Facility (inc Cohesion 
Fund) (Φ14.6 billion)
TO8, 09, 10
Φ19.9 billion Φ26 billion Φ21.7 billion
NCFF
PF4EE
EASI
Creative 
Europe
Erasmus+
TO7
 
Notes: The boxes representing budget commitments are broadly to scale. In the case of EFSI, the 
breakdown of commitments as at November 2016 has been used as a proxy to disaggregate the 
commitment by objective for illustrative purposes, though clearly the past may not be a guide to 
the future.  
Source: EPRC calculations based on Regulations underpinning the various initiatives and OP 
budget commitments for ESIF. 
Against this background, there is a need to consider the respective role of different 
instruments and improve the legibility of the ILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWURDGPDS µ6\QHUJLHV¶
have become the holy grail of policy implementation, but the practicalities involved in 
achieving them are onerous, with different instruments driven by different regulatory 
requirements so that only the most determined, and those with the requisite 
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administrative capacity, are likely to be willing and able to achieve the coordination 
required. 
Cohesion policy FIs offer strengths and weaknesses in this environment. Among their 
strengths are the capacity to adapt to local conditions, develop regional financial markets 
and improve the geographical equity of spend ± there is a tendency for horizontal 
instruments to be demand-driven, with uptake higher in the more prosperous regions 
and to be unresponsive to local needs. Cohesion policy FIs also have weaknesses ± some 
of the regulatory aspects demand significant administrative capacity and some 
monitoring and reporting requirements, as well as constraints on management costs and 
fees, risk being a disincentive to the involvement of financial intermediaries. At the same 
time, many Cohesion policy FIs are small and may lack the critical mass needed to be 
effective, and cost-effective.  
In this context, some have promoted the SMEI as D µK\EULG¶ RSWLRQ ZKLFK DYRLGV WKH
State aid and procurement issues faced by tailor-made instruments, and yet allows a 
degree of adaptation to specific conditions. However, it is premature to draw conclusions 
on the performance and satisfaction with SMEI as time is needed to understand to what 
extent SMEI meets regional requirements, and / or potentially undermines capacity 
building. 
In parallel, it is open to question whether it is realistic or desirable to seek to increase 
further the use of FIs in Cohesion policy, especially in areas that come within the realm 
of horizontal policies and when the scope for comparatively large numbers of 
standardised applications (as is possible in the areas of SME support and to some extent 
energy efficiency) is limited. However, this of course touches on the more fundamental 
issue of the role of Cohesion policy in delivering sectoral elements of the Europe 2020 
agenda, a question which is beyond the purview of the present study.  
6.2.2. Greater regulatory stability 
For many Managing Authorities and regional economies, the use of FIs in Cohesion policy 
represents an important cultural shift away from grant-based intervention. In this 
context the regulatory challenges have been significant ± sparse rules and limited 
guidance in 2007-13, followed by detailed rules and delayed guidance in 2014-20. Many 
Managing Authorities are increasingly convinced of the merits of FIs in appropriate 
circumstances, but frustrated by the complexity of the rules and their revision on a 
seven-year cycle. 
Against this background, there is a compelling argument for regulatory stability, enabling 
policy practice to develop to meet regional economic needs, rather than being dominated 
by concerns with compliance; in both the 2007-13 and 2014-20 policy cycles, 
discussions about the effectiveness of financial instruments have been overshadowed by 
LVVXHVRIFRPSOLDQFHDQGSURFHVVUDWKHUWKDQSROLF\GHVLJQDQGDIRFXVRQµZKDWZRUNV
LQZKDWFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶WRDGGUHVVVSHFLILFHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWREMHFWLYHV 
The proposed omnibus Regulation168 is designed to address a number of specific issues 
in the rules on financial instruments, notably, in the present context, in relation to 
                                          
168 European Commission  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002, Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) 1301/2013, (EU) No 
1303/2013, EU No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1305/2013, (EU) No 1306/2013, (EU) No 1307/2013, (EU) 
No 1308/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014,(EU) No 283/2014, 
(EU) No 652/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision No 541/2014/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council, COM(2016)605 final of 14 September 2016.  
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contracting directly with national promotional banks for the implementation of FIs and 
facilitating the application of only one set of rules in the case of combinations of 
measures (such as ESIF and EFSI). However, there is a strong case for resisting further 
tinkering and allowing policy to bed down, enabling policymakers to focus on how well 
policy is working and to facilitate policy learning over several programming periods, 
UDWKHUWKDQµUHOHDUQLQJ¶SROLF\IUDPHZRUNVZLWKHDFKQHZF\FOH$VSDUWRIWKLVWKRXJKW
could be given to the scope to roll forward as seamlessly as possible those instruments 
which are considered to be performing well, without, for example, imposing a need to re-
procure financial intermediaries just to coincide with the OP planning cycle. A further 
move that would enable the rapid set-up of FIs would be to undertake the ex ante 
assessment for FIs in parallel with the ex ante evaluation of OPs, which would also help 
avoid situations in which grants can be made available more quickly. 
6.2.3. Refocusing guidance and support 
Partly related to the second recommendation, there is a case for shifting the emphasis of 
guidance and support. The more detailed guidance provided in 2014-20 has generally 
been appreciated by Managing Authorities and financial intermediaries, but has also been 
criticised on several counts and steps could be taken to refocus support to target specific 
implementation needs, especially against the backdrop of regulatory stability.  
First, in the 2007-13 and 2014-20 funding periods FI guidance has not been timely, but 
has often been published considerably later than the regulatory frameworks to which it 
relates. This creates uncertainty and / or delays in implementation since Managing 
Authorities must decide whether to proceed in the absence of guidance or await specific 
instruction. Greater stability in the regulatory framework would facilitate the 
simultaneous publication of the rules and guidance.  
Second, and related, the status of guidance and the role of audit need to be clarified. 
The presence of guidance can be double-edged ± the absence of guidance implies scope 
for discretion, but once guidance is available there is a widespread perception that 
auditors treat the content as mandatory, even where it may simply be intended to be 
illustrative or reflect good practice.  
Third, financial instruments have become prominent in the EU economic development 
toolkit, but the term embraces mechanisms that are very diverse in objectives, scope, 
scale, design and governance. At the same time, administrative capacity and experience 
differ considerably. This implies the need for more tailored support, including: the 
development of off-the-shelf instruments that address a wider range of needs; targeted 
coaching and exchange of best practice, notably in specialised fields or under the ESF or 
EMFF where there is less experience to date; and more direct communication between 
Managing Authorities and the Commission to address specific issues.  
6.3. Options 
The broad thrust of the recommendations outlined above is to consolidate, coordinate 
and stabilise the regulatory framework for financial instruments and to support the 
development of administrative capacity in Managing Authorities. Of course, it is also 
possible to countenance more radical options for increasing the uptake and effectiveness 
of financial instruments. The discussion below outlines some such options for different 
dimensions of financial instruments ± regulatory, governance, budgetary ± some of 
which have the scope to be combined with others. These are summarised in Error! 
eference source not found..  
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Figure 6.2: Options for improving the uptake and effectiveness of FI? 
Option Key features Key advantages Key disadvantages 
1. Status Quo 
Maintain current regulatory 
framework essentially unchanged 
Stability and familiarity with existing 
arrangements 
Knowingly retains some 
acknowledged weaknesses 
2. Status Quo Plus 
Maintain current regulatory 
framework, but align State aid and 
procurement rules for all FIs (shared 
management and EU level) 
Creates a level playing field for ESIF 
FIs 
Competition rules could be 
undermined, with wider 
implications, notably the risk that 
non-cofinanced domestic 
instruments may be disadvantaged 
3. Upfront Decisions about Delivery Mode 
a) Off-the-shelf 
options only 
Only FIs following an approved 
µWHPSODWH¶RIZKLFKWKHUHPD\EHD
wider range) would be eligible for 
co-financing 
Ease of regulatory compliance, 
comparability and transparency 
Insufficiently responsive to local 
contexts; difficult to justify on 
grounds of subsidiarity 
b) Delegation of all 
ESIF funded FIs to 
EU level 
ESIF to be used in the form of FIs 
would be reallocated to EU level 
instruments 
Reduces administrative burden on 
Managing Authorities and 
rationalises patchwork of FI 
measures; facilitates consistency in 
compliance and implementation 
Difficult to justify on grounds of 
subsidiarity; creates superfluous 
financial circuits 
c) Ring-fencing ESIF 
spend for FIs 
Earmark a minimum absolute 
amount or share of ESIF allocations 
to take the form of FIs 
Forces a more imaginative 
consideration of how FIs could be 
used (in order to avoid loss of ESIF) 
Arbitrary approach which is difficult 
to reconcile with ex ante 
assessment requirement and could 
encourage inappropriate spend 
d) Use of grants only 
under ESIF 
Only deploy ESIF in the form of 
grants, leaving FIs for domestic 
policy or EU instruments 
Reduces administrative burden on 
Managing Authorities and 
rationalises patchwork of FI 
measures 
Renders ESIF and its cofinancing 
less sustainable; restricts the range 
of projects under OPs and/or 
involves a shift back towards a 
µJUDQWFXOWXUH¶ 
e) Presumption in 
favour of FIs  
A presumption that support for 
revenue-generating projects would 
be in the form of FIs, implying an ex 
ante assessment for grant 
interventions  
Makes FIs rather than grants the 
default policy delivery option 
5LVNVEHFRPLQJDµWLFNER[¶H[HUFLVH
and systematic ex ante assessment 
of grants would be a substantial 
exercise 
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6.3.1. Status Quo 
The discussion of policy recommendations above made a strong case for policy stability 
in the context of financial instruments, arguing that regulatory change and adaptation to 
the new more detailed rules and guidance needed time. As such, essentially maintaining 
the status quo for the next programming period is clearly an option to which 
consideration should be given. Some of the advantages of retaining the status quo have 
already been outlined: 
x This could enable a re-focusing of attention on the content and substance of policy 
DQGµZKDWZRUNVZHOOLQZKDWFRQGLWLRQV¶LQSODFHRIWKHGRPLQDQFHRISROLF\
debates by process and compliance considerations. 
x It would also facilitate policy learning between programming periods, enabling 
SROLF\SURSHUO\WRµEHGGRZQ¶UDWKHUWKDQEHLQJXSURRWHGE\IXUWKHUUHJXODWRU\
change. Even experienced MAs have found it difficult dealing with changes in the 
regulations between periods.169 
x It would mitigate much of the delay involved in implementing FIs (which ironically 
can serve to render grant-based support more attractive) since it would enable ex 
ante assessments of FIs to be conducted in parallel with ex ante evaluations of 
the Operational Programmes. The ex ante assessment process has been found to 
be time-consuming and add to implementation delays.170 
The disadvantage of simply rolling forward the status quo is that, as this report has 
shown, Managing Authorities and others have expressed a range of concerns at the 
current rules (including the level of detail, complexity, and problems around 
interpretation)171, and the new regulations provide an opportunity potentially to simplify 
the implementation of ESIF cofinanced FIs instead of perpetuating known shortcomings.  
6.3.2. Status quo plus 
Following logically from the status quo option is a status quo plus option. Under this 
approach, the basic tenets of the current system would be retained but changes made in 
RUGHU WR µOHYHO WKH SOD\LQJ ILHOG¶ EHWZHHQ ILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWV RSHUDWHG XQGHU VKDUHG
management and those operated at the EU level, while addressing the perceived 
complexities in the shared management approach. The key areas of concern that have 
emerged from this study have been in relation to procurement of financial intermediaries 
and the State aid rules.  
In relation to procurement of intermediaries, the EIB group is perceived to benefit from a 
privileged status through its preferment in the Common Provisions Regulation;172 at the 
same time, some consider WKHUH WR EH D FRQIOLFW RI LQWHUHVW EHWZHHQ(,%¶V VWDWXV as a 
European institution and its essentially commercial activities which are heavily marketed 
to Managing Authorities. This is viewed as unfair competition.173 Concerns at the 
uncertainty surrounding the selection of intermediaries may be partly assuaged by the 
so-FDOOHG µRPQLEXV¶ SURSRVDOV PHQWLRQHG HDUOLHU ZKLFK DPRQJ RWKHU WKLQJV DLm to 
clarify the circumstances in which Managing Authorities can directly award a contract to a 
national promotional bank. However, at the time of writing, these proposals had not yet 
been agreed.  
                                          
169 See page 106. 
170 See page 107.  
171 See pages 105-106. 
172 Article 38(4)(b). 
173 See page 127. 
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7KHVHFRQGDUHDZKHUHWKHµSOD\LQJILHOG¶LVSHUFHLYHGWRbe tilted concerns State aid. In 
VSLWH RI WKH µRff-the-VKHOI¶ 5HJXODWLRQ DQG WKH H[SDQGHG *HQHUDO %ORFN ([HPSWLRQ
Regulation, State aid compliance remains of major concern to Managing Authorities. This 
is partly because MAs tend to be risk averse - the consequences of State aid compliance 
errors can be serious for final beneficiaries and final recipients, both of which may 
become unwitting recipients of incompatible State aid unless measures are carefully 
designed. In addition, many Managing Authorities consider that audit authorities are too 
cautious in their approach, due to lack of knowledge on both financial instruments and 
State aid issues. At the same time, where the EIB Group acts under a mandate from the 
European Commission and manages EU funds, Union financing does not qualify as State 
aid; substantive and procedural requirements of the State aid rules do not apply to the 
extent that there are no resources from or under the control of Member States.  
The main advantage of addressing procurement and State aid issues in ESIF FIs is that 
simplification of the regulatory requirements could encourage FI uptake and mitigate 
actual or potential competition between policy instruments deployed under different 
modes of governance. At present, procurement and State aid issues are among the most 
challenging for many Managing Authorities, and complexity and lack of uniformity 
between definitions and regulations is discouraging uptake of FIs.174 The Omnibus 
Regulation proposal takes some steps on both these issues. As mentioned, it aims to 
clarify the selection criteria for national promotional banks as financial intermediaries; in 
addition, it also proposes to align State aid compliance where ESI funds contribute to EU-
level financial instruments and eliminate double verification in such instances. However, 
no provisions are made in respect of State aid compliance for ESIF FIs implemented 
under shared management.  
The disadvantages of this option concern its wider implications. Alignment of the State 
aid and procurement rules for ESI Fund FIs with those for EU level FIs would either 
involve discrimination between domestic instruments with and without ESIF cofinancing, 
or call into question firmly embedded aspects of State aid and procurement rules. This 
would not only be complex to implement but could also run counter to the established 
decisional practice of the Commission or European Court case law.  
6.3.3. Upfront decisions about delivery mode 
Aside from the overarching framework within which FI design is set, there is potentially a 
number of specific options about how FIs could be implemented and governed, and what 
their scale or role might be in the overall operational programme - see Figure 6.2. These 
are now explored in more detail.  
a) Off-the-shelf options only 
One option for addressing the perceived regulatory complexity of FIs would be to deploy 
ESIF cofinanced FIs only through off-the-shelf (OTS) instruments. This would mean that 
FIs had to conform to a given template in order to qualify for ESIF co-financing. Off-the-
shelf instruments were eagerly awaited by many Managing Authorities, but so far, it 
appears that no Managing Authorities have actually used this implementation option 
directly. That said, there is evidence that OTS models are useG µDV LQVSLUDWLRQ¶ IRU
bespoke solutions. Moreover, Managing Authorities were not generally negative about 
off-the-shelf models and many would consider using OTS templates in future. However, 
in order to increase their uptake, it is likely that the range of OTS models would require 
to be expanded, for example, to include options with more generous terms than de 
minimis solutions to State aid or reducing the risk borne by private investors to improve 
the attractiveness of certain models.    
                                          
174 See page 113.  
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Restricting the implementation of ESIF FIs to those based on OTS models could offer a 
number of advantages: 
x The foremost advantage would be ease of regulatory compliance. Because of 
the requirement to use the template, uncertainties would be eliminated and 
the audit process eased. Their potential to speed up implementation and 
facilitate management is widely accepted.175 
x Additional benefits could derive from the transparency of the mechanisms 
involved, which would be more readily understood, and the comparability 
between jurisdictions.  
x This could potentially facilitate lesson-drawing between jurisdictions, making it 
HDVLHU WR HYDOXDWH µZKDW ZRUNV¶ LQ ZKDW FRQWH[W DQG DGMXVW IXWXUH SROLFLHV
accordingly.  
This approach would also have a number of disadvantages: 
x It would be difficult to justify the imposition of off-the-shelf models on 
Managing Authorities that had already found adequate tailor-made solutions. 
Indeed, the main reason cited by MAs for not using OTS FIs was a preference 
for building on their existing FIs, primarily because the available OTS models 
available did not meet the identified needs of the OP.176 
x There is also a wider subsidiarity principle to consider ± OTS models aim to 
facilitate the implementation of financial instruments, but it is difficult to 
justify using them to constrain how FIs are implemented when non-OTS 
solutions are also viable and may be better suited to local conditions; MAs 
preferred to implement FIs tailor-made to meet regional or national needs.177 
x The administrative burden at the level of the Commission; developing the 
current suite of models was a time-consuming and protracted exercise, 
involving extensive stakeholder and expert consultation. Among the reasons 
for the low interest in OTS is their lack of flexibility, suggesting that a wider 
range of models needs to be developed to increase their uptake. This task 
would involve significant work for the Commission, with the added challenge of 
providing a range of OTS models in a timely fashion ready for rapid 
deployment in the new planning period.  
x While OTS models are suitable for circumstances in which there a significant 
numbers of relatively standardised projects ± such as in the areas of SME 
support and energy efficiency in residential buildings ± there are other areas 
where a bespoke approach is required and insistence on the use of OTS 
models might unwittingly exclude imaginative or innovative projects. A range 
of potential new OTS models were suggested by MAs.178 
b) Delegation of all ESIF funded FIs to EU level 
A further option to address some of the regulatory issues under ESIF cofinanced FIs 
would be to delegate all financial instrument implementation to the EU level. In 
effect, this would extend and make mandatory the current provisions in the CPR under 
Article 38(1)(a) and Article 39. As such, the role of the Managing Authorities in FIs would 
                                          
175 See page 100.  
176 See pages 100-101.  
177 See page 101.  
178 See the case study on OTS instruments in Section 1.6 of Annex I. Suggestions included a 
securitisation instrument, support for R&I, especially for research and science institutes, 
environmental protection, microfinance lending and venture capital investment for high risk start-
ups, as well as a model specifically tailored to the needs of the fisheries sector, a model for energy 
renovation of public sector buildings, and a model suitable for use with ESF Fis. 
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be much more limited in relation to FIs and essentially involve instructing ex ante 
DVVHVVPHQWVDQGHYHQWKLVFRXOGEHGHOHJDWHGµXS¶DQGGHFLGLQJZKDWSURSRUWLRQRI23
resources to commit to which instruments; they would cease to be involved in the 
practical implementation.  
The key advantages of this option are: 
x This would simplify the tasks of Managing Authorities in key areas of FI 
implementation, notably State aid and selection of financial intermediaries, but 
also audit. It would facilitate compliance with State aid and procurement rules 
because of the role of the Commission (under Horizon 2020 or COSME, for 
example) and of the EIB group (under the SMEI, or similar instruments).  
x This approach could also help to rationalise the patchwork of measures across the 
EU by providing more consistent and comparable implementation of FIs, as 
currently there is concern about overlap and competition between the different 
initiatives, as well as a perceived lack of communication and transparency about 
new initiatives.179  
This approach also has a number of disadvantages: 
x Experience with the use of ESIF cofinanced EU level instruments and SMEI is 
rather limited to date,180 and it would be difficult to justify restricting FI 
implementation to models that have been little used.  
x As with imposing OTS models, it would be difficult to justify on grounds of 
subsidiarity especially, but not only, where Managing Authorities had found 
adequate solutions to implementing FIs suited to local contexts and institutional 
settings.  
x This approach would essentially add a further financial circuit to EU spend, with 
limited value-added.  
c) Ring-fencing of support for financial instruments in ESI Fund allocations 
Beyond the regulatory and governance options, there might be scope to encourage the 
uptake of FIs by ring-fencing ESIF spend for financial instruments. This could take 
the form of earmarking an absolute minimum amount or share of ESIF allocations to be 
spent in the form of financial instruments. This could be done at Member State or OP 
level and/or could be at the level of thematic priorities/investment areas.  
The main advantage of earmarking or ring-fencing sums for FIs is that it would force a 
more thorough, and potentially more imaginative, consideration of where and how 
financial instruments could be used. National authorities and/or Managing Authorities 
would have a particular incentive to maximise the use of FIs, or at least ensure that the 
µTXRWD¶ZDVPHWVLQFHWKHIXQGV might otherwise be lost.  
The disadvantage is that such earmarking is likely to be arbitrary by nature. There is no 
real basis ex ante for determining that a given share or amount of ESIF should take the 
form of financial instruments. Indeed, this runs counter to, or potentially undermines the 
role of the ex ante assessment for financial instruments, the purpose of which is to 
determine what level of funding and form of support is appropriate. This in turn would be 
a backward step since the introduction of obligatory ex ante assessments is widely 
                                          
179 See pages 125-126.  
180 See Section 5.2.  
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viewed as the most positive innovation in FI implementation in 2014-20, being viewed as 
a useful tool for assessing market needs.181 
d) Grant only support under ESI Funds 
A related option would be simply to cease using FIs and only deploy grants under 
ESIF. This might also imply a shift in the composition of ESIF co-financed interventions 
to focus more on public goods, non-revenue generating projects and areas where there is 
demonstrably no market as such, in short, refocusing ESIF support on interventions 
where grant funding is necessary. On the other hand, if similar priorities were pursued 
(such as SME support and low carbon economy), it might involve a return to supporting 
these wholly through grant-based mechanisms. As such, financial instruments would be 
deployed through domestic and EU level mechanisms to appropriate investments, but not 
with ESI Funds.  
The main advantage of this approach, as with several of the other options, concerns the 
reduction of the administrative burden on Managing Authorities, especially in the key 
areas of State aid and selection of intermediaries. Such an approach could also help 
rationalise the FI landscape and make ESIF intervention more focused and distinctive. 
This applies particularly to the ETC programmes, where FIs have been found particularly 
GLIILFXOWWRLQWHJUDWHLQWRWKHµFRRSHUDWLRQ¶DSSURDFK182  
This approach would also have several disadvantages: 
x It could restrict the range of interventions supported by ESIF, reducing the scope 
for complementarity between different instruments and policy objectives ± for 
instance, the provision of ESIF co-ILQDQFHGJUDQWVXSSRUWWRSURPRWHµLQYHVWPHQW-
UHDG\¶EXVLQHVVHVFRXOGQRWEHFRXSOHGZLWK(6,)FRILQDQFHGEXVLQHVVORDQVRU
equity under this model, potentially requiring different approaches to policy 
coordination.  
x If the areas of intervention remained unchanged, ESIF and its cofinancing would 
become less sustainable since all funds would be non-repayable. This would 
arguably be a retrograde step in areas such as SME support where legacy funds 
have come to be seen as important advantages of repayable support.183  
x The use of FIs in 2007-13 was perceived by many Managing Authorities to involve 
DVKLIWDZD\IURPDµVXEVLG\FXOWXUH¶a large number of respondents noted that 
FIs had a positive impact on the competitiveness of financial recipients or were 
more likely to attract high quality applicants than grants, in this context returning 
to grant-only based support even for revenue-generating projects would be a step 
backwards.184 
x e) Presumption in favour of FIs 
A related but qualitatively different approach to encouraging the uptake of FIs would be 
to introduce a presumption in favour of financial instruments in support of 
revenue-generating projects. Under this approach, support for potentially revenue-
generating projects in the form of grants would need to be explicitly justified. In a sense, 
this would extend the use of ex ante assessments to grant interventions ± there is 
perhaps already a mismatch in having an obligatory ex ante assessment to justify using 
                                          
181 See page 107.  
182 See page 76.  
183 See page 85.  
184 See page 88.  
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repayable forms of intervention, but no requirement to justify the use of non-repayable 
funds.  
The main advantage of this approach is that it makes financial instruments the default 
policy delivery mechanism, unless otherwise justified. As under the ring-fencing option 
described above, this could force a more thorough and more imaginative consideration of 
where and how financial instruments could be used.  
The key disadvantage of requiring a systematic justification for the use of grants is that 
LW FRXOG VLPSO\ EHFRPH D µWLFN ER[¶ H[HUFLVH UDWKHU WKDQ HQWDLO D UHDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI
repayable support options. An ex ante assessment for grant interventions is potentially a 
major exercise unless the scope were narrowed down and justification were only required 
for certain thematic objectives or priorities. Even so, it could be argued that encouraging 
the use of FIs might be better achieved through persuasion and presentation of 
successful examples than by requiring systematic justification for their non-use.  
6.3.4. Final remarks on the options for increasing uptake of financial 
instruments 
Some of the options outlined above represent quite radical and rather arbitrary 
approaches to future ESIF FI policy and they have been presented as if they were 
mutually exclusive.. However, the recommendations that emerged from the study 
emphasised the need for policy stability, and this would rule out some of the options 
outlined above, notably: 
x Limiting ESIF spending to µJUDQWVRQO\¶ 
x Limiting ESIF FI spending to using only off-the-shelf-models 
x Limiting the use of ESIF FIs only to EU level instruments 
x Ring-fencing a minimum amount within OPs for spending on FIs. 
In practice, the most effective way forward is likely to lie in combining elements of these 
options, and taking a more nuanced approach that takes account of past experience. 
Such an approach is summarised for the two core options (Status Quo and Status Quo+) 
in Figure 6.3. 
Figure 6.3µ)LQHVVLQJ¶WKHRSWLRQV 
 OTS EU level instruments 
Presumption in favour 
of FIs 
Status 
Quo 
Increase the range of 
OTS options; extend 
flexibility ± eg making 
more use of GBER 
Enable use of EU level 
instruments as now, but 
review the role of EU level 
FIs and their interface with 
ESIF FIs, including 
assessment of funding 
needs under ex ante 
assessment. 
Where grants are 
proposed for revenue-
generating projects, 
explicit justification 
should be sought. 
Status 
Quo 
plus 
OTS options could be 
increased, but this 
may be less critical if 
State aid and 
procurement issues 
addressed 
In the absence of major 
State aid and procurement 
issues for shared 
management FIs, the role 
of EU level FIs might shift 
and be more oriented 
towards OPs considered too 
small for FIs  
Where grants are 
proposed for revenue-
generating projects, 
explicit justification 
should be sought. 
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In essence, and in line with the recommendations for policy stability outlined above, this 
takes an incremental approach to policy change and supporting the uptake of FIs ± 
building on policy experience, learning and the development of administrative capacity, 
but adjusting policy to maximise the benefits from elements that have or could work 
well. In the meantime, the simplifications included in the proposed µ2PQLEXV¶5HJXODWLRQ
have yet to be adopted, and the impact of these changes in terms of helping encourage 
greater uptake of FIs will only be seen over time. The use of co-financed FIs has involved 
the build-up of administrative capacity and of the policy networks needed to facilitate 
their use. Regulatory stability is essential to consolidate this experience and to enable the 
focus to shift away from procedural challenges to concentrate on the substantive 
change that FIs can induce. For this, more and better information is needed to enable a 
fine-grained analysis of which co-financed financial products work and why: concrete 
evidence of how and where FIs can be effective, and models of µsuccess¶ would provide 
compelling reasons to increase their uptake.  
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